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ABSTRACT 
Corresponding to the pivotal role of trust for all kinds of social interactions and inter-
personal relationships, trust has been the target of abundant research across scientific disci-
plines. However, an integration of the huge literature is currently missing – thus hampering a 
common understanding of trust and a synthesis between the fields. Furthermore, from a psy-
chological perspective, there is an insufficient understanding of the (basic) personality traits 
accounting for individual variation in trust. Therefore, the overall objective of this thesis is to 
bridge the gap between different lines of trust research and to uncover the dispositional de-
terminants of trust. To that end, a behavioral view on trust is adopted, defining trust in terms 
of a risky choice to depend on another. Based on a broad review of the literature, a theoretical 
framework is distilled, identifying the situational features and personality characteristics un-
derlying trust. Specifically, trust is considered to be a function of (1) attitudes toward risky 
prospects (risk and loss aversion), (2) trustworthiness expectations, and (3) betrayal sensitivi-
ty. These determinants are, in turn, rooted in different traits (i.e., anxiety/fear, trustworthiness, 
and forgiveness) which can be localized in the space defined by basic personality models. 
Here, the HEXACO model provides particularly clear-cut hypotheses on the basic traits driv-
ing trust, including a unique factor for each of the proposed (specific) trait determinants. 
Building on this reasoning, the empirical part of this thesis presents first evidence on the 
link between the HEXACO dimensions and trust. As a starting point, the focus was on the 
Honesty-Humility factor, representing the unique feature of the HEXACO model compared to 
more established models of personality (e.g., the Five-Factor Model). In line with the pro-
posed theoretical framework, two sets of studies provided support for a social projection path 
from trait trustworthiness to trustworthiness expectations. Specifically, high levels of Hones-
ty-Humility predicted more optimistic trustworthiness expectations and – as necessitated by 
social projection – were also positively linked to trustworthy behavior. As such, the findings 
not only identify a trait source of trust, but also clarify the dispositional determinants of trust-
worthiness. Overall, the theoretical framework and empirical evidence presented in this thesis 
suggests the fruitfulness to take a closer look at trust – from a trait perspective. 
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1. ARTICLES 
This thesis is based on a set of three articles that have been published in peer-reviewed 
journals. The articles will be discussed – and are appended to this work – in the order in 
which they are listed below. This order mirrors the chronological order of development, 
demonstrating the deductive approach adopted in this thesis (i.e., from theoretical framework 
to empirical evidence). It does, however, not perfectly correspond to the time of publication 
(which is why the second article is already cited in the first). In general, note that in summa-
rizing the articles throughout this thesis, I will refrain from reiterating any details of the par-
ticular articles which can be found in the articles as appended to this work. 
 
(1) Thielmann, I., & Hilbig, B. E. (2015b). Trust: An integrative review from a person-
situation perspective. Review of General Psychology, 19(3), 249-277. doi: 
10.1037/gpr0000046 
 
(2) Thielmann, I., & Hilbig, B. E. (2014). Trust in me, trust in you: A social projection ac-
count of the link between personality, cooperativeness, and trustworthiness expecta-
tions. Journal of Research in Personality, 50(3), 61-65. doi: 10.1016/j.jrp.2014.03.006  
 
(3) Thielmann, I., & Hilbig, B. E. (2015a). The traits one can trust: Dissecting reciprocity 
and kindness as determinants of trustworthy behavior. Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy Bulletin, 41(11), 1523-1536. doi: 10.1177/0146167215600530 
 
 
Note that four more articles related to the topic at hand (i.e., pro-social behavior in eco-
nomic games) have been published during the development of this thesis (see below). How-
ever, given that these articles leave trust and trustworthiness aside, they do not constitute an 
integral part of this thesis. Nonetheless, they will be referred to in the main text whenever 
appropriate.  
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Hilbig, B. E., Thielmann, I., Hepp, J., Klein, S., & Zettler, I. (2015). From personality to 
altruistic behavior (and back): Evidence from a double-blind dictator game. Journal 
of Research in Personality, 55, 46-50. doi: 10.1016/j.jrp.2014.12.004 
 
Hilbig, B. E., Thielmann, I., Wührl, J., & Zettler, I. (2015). From Honesty-Humility to fair 
behavior – Benevolence or a (blind) fairness norm? Personality and Individual Dif-
ferences, 80, 91-95. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2015.02.017 
 
Thielmann, I., Böhm, R., & Hilbig, B. E. (2015). Different games for different motives: 
Comment on Haesevoets, Folmer, and Van Hiel (2015). European Journal of Per-
sonality, 29(4), 506-508. doi: 10.1002/per.2007 
 
Thielmann, I., Hilbig, B. E., & Niedtfeld, I. (2014). Willing to give but not to forgive: Bor-
derline personality features and cooperative behavior. Journal of Personality Disor-
ders, 28(6), 778-795. doi: 10.1521/pedi_2014_28_135 
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“Trust is the glue of life. It's the most essential ingredient  
in effective communication. It's the foundational  
principle that holds all relationships.” 
 
Stephen Covey, Roger Merrill, & Rebecca Merrill 
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2. INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
Trust as “the glue of life” (Covey, Merrill, & Merrill, 1994, p. 203) constitutes an essen-
tial pillar of all kinds of social interactions and relationships, even among strangers. It is thus 
unsurprising that trust has been the target of abundant scientific research for several decades, 
in psychology and beyond. In what follows, I will first introduce the two most prominent con-
ceptualizations of trust as used in the diverse literature and outline how I will refer to the term 
“trust” throughout this thesis. Building on this, I will then elaborate on the theoretical founda-
tion of this thesis (Article 1), including a detailed definition of trust as well as a summary of 
its determinants and their trait basis (if applicable). The subsequent empirical part of this the-
sis will be concerned with empirically testing one of the theoretically implied paths from per-
sonality to trust (Article 2) – which also necessitates considering the counterpart of trust, 
namely trustworthiness (Article 3). Finally, I will outline some empirical and theoretical im-
plications and draw general conclusions. 
Before going into detail, however, some clarification seems in order at the outset. Spe-
cifically, note that this thesis will exclusively be concerned with interpersonal trust (i.e., trust 
in individuals, not in groups or organizations) and trust in others’ intentions (i.e., not trust in 
others’ expertise or skill, respectively). For example, a trusting act as discussed herein (i.e., 
interpersonal trust in intentions) would be to borrow money to a person from whom you ex-
pect not to be exploited. A similar instance would be to ask a stranger in the train to have an 
eye on your luggage while you visit the restrooms (expecting that the stranger will refrain 
from steeling your luggage). By contrast, interpersonal trust in another’s expertise – as when 
trusting in a medicine that she will be successful with your knee surgery – or trust in an or-
ganization – as when trusting the government that they care for peace and order in your coun-
try – represent different types of trust that will not be addressed in this thesis.  
 
2.1 CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF TRUST 
As noted above, there is a long tradition of trust research in various scientific disci-
plines. Corresponding to this diversity of research, the term “trust” has been used and concep-
tualized in different ways. Basically, two broad conceptualizations of trust can be distin-
guished: (1) trust as an attitude and (2) trust as a behavior. Note that, historically, both con-
ceptualizations have been developed almost in parallel. That is, none of the conceptualizations 
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directly builds on the other, and both understandings coexist until today. In what follows, I 
will briefly summarize the essence of these two conceptualizations and outline how I will 
conceptualize trust in the remainder of this thesis.  
 
(1) Trust as an attitude  
Understanding trust in terms of an attitude implies that trust is basically cognitive in na-
ture. Broadly speaking, an attitude denotes “a psychological tendency that is expressed by 
evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor" (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, 
p. 1). In a situation of trust, this “entity” – or object of evaluation, respectively – might either 
refer to the trusted party (i.e., the trustee) or to the trusting act itself. Correspondingly, two 
types of trust attitudes can be distinguished: trust as a mere expectation, on the one hand, and 
trust as an intention, on the other hand.  
In psychology, the view that trust basically represents an expectation regarding anoth-
er’s trustworthiness has first been discussed by Julian Rotter (1967, 1971). In his seminal 
work, Rotter described interpersonal trust in terms of “an expectancy […] that the word, 
promise, verbal or written statement of another individual or group can be relied upon” 
(Rotter, 1967, p. 651). As a measurement instrument, Rotter (1967) developed the Interper-
sonal Trust Scale, thereby setting the cornerstone for the assessment of trust via self-report 
questionnaires (for similar measures see, e.g., Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; Larzelere & 
Huston, 1980; Yamagishi, 1986). Until today, Rotter’s understanding of trust as an expecta-
tion has been very well received and is still shared by several scholars (e.g., Ben-Ner & 
Halldorsson, 2010; Gambetta, 1988; Robinson, 1996; Sitkin & Roth, 1993). 
Besides defining trust in terms of an expectation, another attitudinal view of trust im-
plies that trust basically mirrors an intention, thus rendering the trusting act itself the entity of 
evaluation. According to this view, trust denotes the “willingness to be vulnerable to another 
party” (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995, p. 726) based on some expectation regarding an-
other’s trustworthiness (see also, e.g., McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998; Rousseau, 
Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). The trust attitude as defined along these lines hence involves 
a vulnerability aspect beyond mere expectations. However, note that trust is still distinguished 
from consequential (risk-taking) behavior. That is, according to the idea that trust reflects an 
intention of making oneself vulnerable – and an attitudinal understanding of trust more gener-
ally – “one does not need to risk anything in order to trust” (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 724). 
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(2) Trust as a behavior  
Unlike the view that trust is different from a consequential risk-taking action, under-
standing trust in terms of a behavior implies that trust basically mirrors a risky choice. Morton 
Deutsch (1958, 1962) was the first researcher to adopt this view in psychology. In his pioneer-
ing work, Deutsch conceptualized trust as a “choice of an ambiguous path” (Deutsch, 1973, p. 
149), based upon some expectation that a desirable event will occur. In essence, Deutsch 
hence considered those aspects emphasized in attitudinal views of trust (i.e., expectations and 
vulnerability, as summarized above) as prerequisites of trust – which, in itself, is conceptual-
ized in terms of a decision to depend on another. As such, Deutsch operationalized trust in 
game-theoretic (social dilemma) paradigms in which an individual’s outcome – once she has 
trusted – is entirely contingent upon another’s action (Deutsch, 1960, 1973; see also Swinth, 
1967; Wrightsman, 1966, for similar approaches). 
Until today, several scholars have adopted an equivalent behavioral understanding of 
trust, describing trust as a choice to rely or depend on another – and thus as a special case of 
risk-taking1 (e.g., Boon & Holmes, 1991; Coleman, 1990; Fehr, 2009; Kee & Knox, 1970; 
Riker, 1974; Yamagishi, Kanazawa, Mashima, & Terai, 2005). The development of the Trust 
Game in economics (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995) has finally heavily stimulated corre-
sponding research on trust behavior in the past 20 years (for a meta-analytic review see 
Johnson & Mislin, 2011). In particular, the Trust Game seeks to provide a unique measure of 
trust given that trust is considered the primary motive driving behavior (cf. Berg et al., 1995).2 
Taken together, conceptualizing trust in terms of a behavior hence implies that trust is conse-
quential in that it corresponds to a risky decision to entrust a personal resource to another. 
                                                 
1
 Although Deutsch explicitly separated trust behavior from risk-taking or gambling, respectively, he 
implicitly incorporated risk-taking as an aspect of trust. Specifically, Deutsch considered that the trusting 
choice is inevitably linked to the possibility of a loss  – which essentially implies a risk as conceptualized in 
this thesis and elsewhere (e.g., Das & Teng, 2004; Orbell, 1993; see also Footnote 3).  
2
 In the Trust Game, the so-called trustor is endowed with a certain amount of money from which 
she can entrust any proportion to her interaction partner, the trustee. The entrusted amount is typically tri-
pled by the experimenter before passed on to the trustee who can then decide how much to return to the 
trustor. Commonly, the amount entrusted by the trustor is considered a measure of trust behavior whereas 
the amount returned by the trustee is considered a measure of trustworthy behavior. The Trust Game is 
hence sought to provide a purer measure of trust compared to the social dilemma games originally used by 
Deutsch (which heavily confound trust with cooperation; e.g., Yamagishi et al., 2005). However, note that 
other motives have also been discussed as drivers underlying trust decisions in the Trust Game (e.g., social 
welfare maximization, fairness; cf. Thielmann, Böhm, & Hilbig, 2015). Thus, it is questionable whether the 
Trust Game indeed overcomes the limitations associated with previous game-theoretic measures of trust. 
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To sum up, two broad conceptualizations of trust can be distinguished: trust as an atti-
tude versus trust as a behavior. Whereas the former clearly separates trust from risk-taking, 
the latter implies that trust inherently involves a risk and corresponding action. In fact, it has 
been noted elsewhere (and will be detailed in the next section) that risk constitutes a key char-
acteristic of trust given that “the twin of trust is betrayal” (Dunn, 1988, p. 81) – thus rendering 
a loss resulting from trust inevitably possible. Conceptualizing trust in terms of an attitude 
that separates trust from risk-taking misses out on this vital aspect. Furthermore, understand-
ing trust in terms of an attitude leaves trust without any consequences – a view that is com-
pletely at odds with corresponding economic approaches emphasizing the importance of in-
centives and outcomes (cf. Lopes, 1994). Hence, a purely attitudinal understanding of trust 
might endanger the fruitful collaboration between psychologists and economists which is still 
in its infancy (Handgraaf & Fred van Raaij, 2005) after years of “suspicion and distaste” 
(Lopes, 1994, p. 198). In this regard, it seems also worth mentioning that, originally, “psy-
chology is the science of behavior” (Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder, 2007, p. 396) – a fact that 
has increasingly fallen into oblivion since the cognitive revolution in the late 20th century and 
will likewise be undermined by a purely attitudinal conceptualization of trust.  
Based on this reasoning, I will adopt a behavioral understanding of trust in this thesis. 
However, as sketched above, this does certainly not imply that attitudes are generally exclud-
ed from the concept of trust. Rather, a behavioral view allows an integration of attitudes as 
prerequisites of trust behavior. Against this background, in the next section I will provide a 
detailed definition of trust – which I have, admittedly, left aside so far – and clarify the under-
lying determinants of trust as distilled based on a broad review of the trust literature. 
 
2.2 DEFINING FEATURES AND DETERMINANTS OF TRUST 
Thielmann, I., & Hilbig, B. E. (2015b). Trust: An integrative review from a person-situation 
perspective. Review of General Psychology, 19(3), 249-277. doi: 10.1037/gpr0000046 
 
As mentioned previously, trust is at the heart of various social interactions, even among 
strangers. Hence, trust has been the target of abundant research across different fields. The 
main goal in Thielmann and Hilbig (2015b; Article 1) was to review and integrate this diverse 
literature into a coherent structure to arrive at a common understanding of trust and its deter-
minants and to consequently bridge the gap between different scientific disciplines. For this 
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purpose, we first considered it vital to incorporate findings from both personality and social 
psychology and to profit from their fruitful synthesis (e.g., Fleeson & Noftle, 2008; Funder, 
2008). In this regard, we specifically intended to overcome the current neglect of (basic) per-
sonality traits as underlying determinants of trust behavior. So far, approaches to trust mainly 
considered trust propensity, that is, a person’s “general willingness to trust others” (Mayer et 
al., 1995, p. 715), as a specific trait to account for the large individual variation in trust 
(Johnson & Mislin, 2011). In light of the multifaceted nature of trust behavior (as will be de-
tailed below), this approach is apparently highly oversimplified. Moreover, we particularly 
aimed at integrating the vast literature from economics and related fields – corresponding to 
the behavioral view on trust adopted herein and the “collaborative potential of psychology and 
economics” (Handgraaf & Fred van Raaij, 2005, p. 388). So, on the whole, we provided an 
integrative person-situation framework on trust behavior based on a broad review of the litera-
ture from personality psychology, social psychology, and economics, particularly focusing on 
trust among unknown agents. 
In what follows, I will summarize the essence of our review and framework. Although I 
will refrain from reiterating details and references that can be found in the article as appended 
to this thesis, the summary of this particular article will be quite detailed given that it provides 
the core theoretical background of this thesis. 
 
Defining trust 
As a first step, we considered it important to provide an integrative definition of trust 
behavior that incorporates different perspectives on trust and, more importantly, captures the 
key features of trust as proposed in previous work (e.g., Rousseau et al., 1998) and as 
sketched above: (a) uncertainty and risk3, (b) expectations, and (c) vulnerability. At first, there 
is high agreement that trust behavior is necessarily associated with uncertainty and risk. Un-
certainty implies that, in a situation of trust, the trustor can never have conclusive knowledge 
about the trustee’s trustworthiness and, in turn, the likelihood of trust appreciation versus trust 
betrayal (e.g., Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). In consequence, trusting inevitably involves 
                                                 
3
 Following the decision-making literature, uncertainty implies that the decision maker is unfamiliar 
with the odds of gain versus loss. Risk, by contrast, suggest that the decision maker can experience both a 
gain or a loss, but that the corresponding odds are known (e.g., Ellsberg, 1961; Orbell, 1993). Typically, 
risk and uncertainty covary given that low uncertainty is associated with low risk and high uncertainty is 
associated with high risk. 
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risk (e.g., Coleman, 1990; Das & Teng, 2004) due to the possibility of a loss resulting from 
potential betrayal. As follows from this inherent uncertainty, on the one hand, and risk, on the 
other hand, the trustor has to base her decision to trust on expectations regarding the other’s 
trustworthiness (e.g., Boon & Holmes, 1991; Deutsch, 1958) and to accept personal vulnera-
bility (e.g., Das & Teng, 2004; Mayer et al., 1995), that is, a loss due to misplaced trust.  
In sum, we hence define trust behavior as “a risky choice of making oneself dependent 
on the actions of another in a situation of uncertainty, based upon some expectation of wheth-
er the other will act in a benevolent fashion despite an opportunity to betray” (p. 251). As 
such, our definition offers a straightforward operationalization of trust in terms of a risky de-
pendence choice. However, although we clearly conceptualize trust in terms of a behavior, we 
nonetheless incorporate those aspects that have been emphasized in attitudinal conceptualiza-
tions of trust as summarized above (i.e., expectations and vulnerability). 
 
Determinants of trust 
As follows from considering the decision to trust structurally similar to a decision under 
risk, trust behavior should involve four basic components (according to the decision-making 
literature on risky choice): the probability of a gain (i.e., trust appreciation), the utility of that 
gain, the probability of a loss (i.e., trust betrayal), and the utility of that loss (Payne, 1973; 
Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968). Based on this notion – and the key characteristics of trust as 
outlined above (i.e., risk and uncertainty, expectations, and vulnerability) – we distilled three 
core determinants underlying the decision to trust from the literature: (I) attitudes toward risky 
prospects (i.e., risk aversion and loss aversion), (II) trustworthiness expectations, and (III) 
betrayal sensitivity (see Figure 1, for a graphical illustration). Notably, each determinant ei-
ther refers to the probabilities or to the utilities of the potential outcomes of the trusting 
choice. In what follows, I will briefly elaborate on these three determinants of trust and fur-
ther delineate their trait bases (in terms of specific as well as basic personality traits). For the 
sake of brevity, I will refrain from reiterating evidence supporting the corresponding conjec-
tures which can be found in the article as appended to this thesis. 
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Figure 1. Graphical illustration of the determinants of trust behavior as summarized in Thiel-
mann and Hilbig (2015b). Solid arrows denote causal relationships; dashed arrows denote 
information input. Personality traits are framed with round boxes. Adapted from “Trust: An 
integrative review from a person-situation perspective” by Thielmann and Hilbig (2015b). 
Copyright 2015 by the American Psychological Association. 
 
According to prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984) – and corresponding 
to the risk and uncertainty aspects of trust – two attitudes toward risky prospects (I) should 
arguably drive the decision to trust: risk aversion and loss aversion. More detailed, risk aver-
sion denotes an individual’s tendency to prefer a sure (positive) outcome over a potentially 
higher, yet risky outcome (cf. Glöckner & Hilbig, 2012). Regarding the decision to trust, sev-
eral scholars hence agree that individuals high in risk aversion should require a high subjec-
tive probability of encountering a trustworthy interaction partner (i.e., high probability of a 
gain) in order to prefer trust (the risky option) over distrust (the safe option). By contrast, for 
individuals low in risk aversion, a comparably small probability of encountering a trustworthy 
trustee might suffice to opt for the (risky) trusting choice. Loss aversion, in turn, denotes an 
individual’s tendency to evaluate a loss as being more aversive than a gain of comparable 
magnitude attractive (cf. Bibby & Ferguson, 2011). Concerning the decision to trust, loss 
aversion might hence influence the trustor’s evaluation of the positive utility (i.e., the gain) 
resulting from trust appreciation in relation to the negative utility (i.e., the loss) resulting from 
trust betrayal. That is, the higher the loss aversion, the more weight (or severity, respectively) 
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should be assigned to the potential loss resulting from betrayal, thus rendering trust less like-
ly. Altogether, whereas risk aversion should influence the processing of the (subjective) prob-
abilities of the potential gain versus loss associated with trust, loss aversion should influence 
the processing of the corresponding utilities. In terms of personality traits, evidence implies 
that both attitudes toward risky prospects are linked to trait anxiety and fear, respectively. 
Besides these two attitudes toward risky prospects, we summarize trustworthiness ex-
pectations (II) as a second determinant of trust decisions. As sketched above, the inherent 
uncertainty in a trust situation forces the trustor to infer the trustee’s trustworthiness in the 
absence of conclusive knowledge. Ample evidence suggests that trustors make use of differ-
ent sources of information to form these trustworthiness expectations, namely trust cues, prior 
trust experiences, and social projection. Trust cues are somewhat observable pieces of evi-
dence available in the environment (cf. lens model; Brunswik, 1952) that can either refer to 
characteristics of the trustee (i.e., outward appearance, reputation, social category) or to fea-
tures of the trust situation (i.e., temptation to betray, presence of potential sanctions for un-
trustworthy behavior). Prior trust experiences, in turn, emphasize the assumed learning aspect 
underlying trust behavior. Specifically, trustors seem to consult their past experiences in simi-
lar situations to estimate the probability of trust appreciation versus trust betrayal in a new 
situation (e.g., Blair & Stout, 2001; Rotter, 1967). Finally, it has been noted that individuals 
might use their own trustworthiness to infer others’ trustworthiness. In particular, such a so-
cial projection account implies that individuals project their own tendencies onto others, thus 
expecting others to be as trustworthy as they themselves are (e.g., Krueger & Acevedo, 2005; 
Krueger, DiDonato, & Freestone, 2012). As such, an individual’s trait trustworthiness – that 
is, her trait fairness or honesty, respectively, depending on the specific trust situation and trust 
object (e.g., a material good vs. a secret) – should account for inter-individual variation in 
trust behavior. On the whole, irrespective of which pieces of information a trustor actually 
uses, the resulting trustworthiness expectations should arguably provide the (subjective) prob-
ability input on which risk aversion operates (cf. Figure 1). 
Third and finally, we proposed betrayal sensitivity (III) as a determinant underlying 
trust, based on the notion that individuals differentiate between losses resulting from another’s 
betrayal and losses resulting from nature (e.g., bad luck; cf. Rabin, 1993). In particular, vari-
ous evidence suggests that people have a general tendency to perceive losses resulting from 
betrayal to be more severe than losses resulting from nature, a phenomenon called betrayal 
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aversion (e.g., Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004). Correspondingly, we define betrayal sensitivity 
in terms of individual differences in betrayal aversion as “an individual’s tendency to attribute 
a greater severity to a loss resulting from human selfishness than to a formally equivalent loss 
resulting from nature” (p. 261). In other words, the higher the betrayal sensitivity, the more 
severely an individual should evaluate the negative utility resulting from potential betrayal. 
Betrayal sensitivity will hence provide the outcome input on which loss aversion operates (cf. 
Figure 1). In terms of a more basic trait, betrayal sensitivity should arguably be rooted in trait 
forgiveness.  
 
Trust in models of basic personality structure 
As mentioned above, a central goal of our review and framework was to bridge the gap 
between different lines of research, with a particular focus on integrating approaches and evi-
dence from personality psychology into the trust literature. Therefore, as a next step, we 
linked the distilled determinants of trust (i.e., attitudes toward risky prospects, trustworthiness 
expectations, and betrayal sensitivity) and their proposed trait bases (i.e. anxiety and fear, 
trustworthiness, and forgiveness) to models of basic personality structure – which provide a 
broad and parsimonious account to the study of individual differences (e.g., Funder, 2001; 
Ozer & Reise, 1994). In particular, we identified the basic trait dimensions that should, ac-
cording to the proposed framework, account for individual variation in trust behavior. To this 
end, we concentrated on two personality models that have mainly been considered in recent 
research on social behavior: the Five-Factor Model (FFM; Costa & McCrae, 1992; McCrae & 
Costa, 1985) and the HEXACO model of personality structure (Ashton & Lee, 2007; Lee & 
Ashton, 2004). 
Corresponding to its name, the FFM includes five factors, namely Neuroticism, Extra-
version, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. As follows from their theoretical 
conceptualizations and corresponding evidence, two of these, Neuroticism and Agreeableness, 
should be relevant for trust to occur. Specifically, it has repeatedly been shown that individual 
differences in anxiety and fear are accounted for by Neuroticism. Besides, trait trustworthi-
ness – with its components fairness and honesty – seems to be best reflected in the Agreea-
bleness factor of the FFM, which basically involves differences in the motivation to cooperate 
versus defect (Denissen & Penke, 2008). Finally, forgiveness has consistently been linked to a 
mixture of said dimensions, namely low levels of Neuroticism and high levels of FFM-
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Agreeableness. In total, the FFM would thus account for individual variation in trust behavior 
through Neuroticism and Agreeableness – a conjecture that has already obtained some (albeit 
weak) empirical support. 
As an extension and slight variation of the FFM, the HEXACO model – with its name 
derived as an acronym of the factors it constitutes, namely Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, 
eXtraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience – has recently 
been established based on lexical studies across diverse languages. In particular, these studies 
suggest that personality is best described in terms of six rather than five broad trait dimen-
sions (Ashton et al., 2004; Lee & Ashton, 2008).4 As such, the HEXACO model proposes 
three factors accounting for the quality of social interactions and pro-social behavior: Hones-
ty-Humility, Emotionality (i.e., the counterpart of FFM-Neuroticism), and Agreeableness 
(Ashton, Lee, & de Vries, 2014). More detailed, Honesty-Humility and Agreeableness capture 
complementary aspects of reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971), that is, fairness versus for-
giveness. Emotionality, in turn, represents tendencies relevant for kin altruism (e.g., empathet-
ic concern, emotional attachment, and harm-avoidance). Notably, each of these three pro-
social traits can, at least in theory, be linked to one of the trait aspects that are assumed to un-
derlie trust (according to our framework). First, anxiety and fear are both captured by the 
Emotionality factor and its corresponding facets. Second, trustworthiness is arguably covered 
by Honesty-Humility incorporating sincerity as well as fairness at the facet-level (see Section 
3.1 for details and supporting evidence). And third, forgiveness is mirrored in the Agreeable-
ness factor of the HEXACO model (see Section 3.3 for further information). Overall, com-
pared to the FFM, the HEXACO model hence provides more clear-cut hypotheses on the trait 
determinants of trust behavior, thus allowing for particularly strict empirical testing. Howev-
er, as evidenced by a recent meta-analysis (Zhao & Smillie, 2015), actual evidence on the link 
between trust behavior (in the Trust Game) and the HEXACO dimensions is fully missing. 
 
                                                 
4
 Specifically, three HEXACO dimensions, namely Extraversion, Conscientiousness, and Open-
ness to Experience, are nearly identical in content to their FFM-counterparts. However, for the remain-
ing dimensions, the HEXACO model incorporates considerable changes. Most strikingly, Honesty-
Humility is proposed as a new, sixth trait factor, capturing content beyond the FFM. Furthermore, the 
HEXACO model comprises alternative rotations of Neuroticism (termed Emotionality) and Agreea-
bleness. In consequence, the model offers particularly straightforward theoretical interpretations of the 
different trait factors (for further details see Ashton et al., 2014). 
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To sum up, our review and framework provides an integrative summary and coherent 
structure of the extant trust literature from different fields. In essence, it implies that (a) trust 
can be regarded as a risky dependence choice, (b) multiple person and situation characteristics 
may influence the decision to trust, and (c) individual differences in trust are likely rooted in a 
combination of different personality traits. Hence, it seems heavily oversimplified to assume 
that one specific trait dimension (such as trust propensity) might sufficiently account for indi-
vidual variation in trust behavior. That said, a critical reflection is nonetheless in order: First 
and foremost, our conclusions were almost exclusively based on trust among strangers. It is 
thus an important quest for future research to clarify whether and how the proposed frame-
work applies or can be extended to other types of trust. Moreover, for several aspects suggest-
ed in the framework – especially those related to the proposed (basic) traits underlying trust – 
evidence is remarkably weak, thus emphasizing the necessity for critical empirical tests in 
future studies. In this regard, it seems also worthwhile to take specific person-situation-
interactions into account which we have, admittedly, left aside from our discussion due to the 
deficiency of corresponding evidence. 
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3. BEYOND THEORY 
As summarized above, several gaps in the trust literature still exist, thus inevitably ren-
dering our theoretical framework partly speculative in nature. First and foremost, there is only 
rudimentary knowledge of the trait basis underlying trust behavior. That is, whereas the situa-
tional aspects driving trust are well-investigated, this is, in fact, not the case for the potential 
personality aspects underlying trust. In particular, evidence on the link between trust behavior 
and basic personality traits is remarkably weak – with a complete lack of evidence on the di-
mensions of the more recently proposed HEXACO model (cf. Zhao & Smillie, 2015). 
Notably, however, the HEXACO model has already proven to allow for an exceptional-
ly fine-grained analysis of pro-social tendencies, especially when evidence on the somewhat 
broader FFM is inconclusive (cf. Hilbig, Glöckner, & Zettler, 2014). Correspondingly, the 
HEXACO model also provides particularly clear-cut hypotheses on the trait basis of trust. 
That is, as detailed above, each theoretically-implied trait aspect of trust behavior (i.e., anxie-
ty/fear, trustworthiness, and forgiveness) is arguably reflected in one specific HEXACO di-
mension (i.e., Emotionality, Honesty-Humility, and Agreeableness). Hence, it seems particu-
larly promising to investigate individual differences in trust behavior based on the HEXACO 
traits. 
According to this reasoning, the following empirical part of this thesis is concerned with 
individual differences in trust (and trustworthy) behavior from the perspective of the HEXA-
CO model. Specifically, given that the predictive advantage of the HEXACO model is primar-
ily reducible to the inclusion of Honesty-Humility as a sixth trait dimension – capturing sev-
eral aspects that are not well accommodated by the FFM (e.g., Ashton & Lee, 2008; Lee, 
Ogunfowora, & Ashton, 2005) – I considered Honesty-Humility as a promising starting point 
for empirical testing. Hence, I will particularly focus on Honesty-Humility in what follows 
and, corresponding to our person-situation framework, on the proposed link between trait 
trustworthiness (arguably covered by Honesty-Humility) and trustworthiness expectations. As 
such, the overarching objective of the empirical part of this thesis was to break the first 
ground on bridging the gap between trust and personality research and to enhance the under-
standing of the basic traits underlying trust.  
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3.1 HONESTY-HUMILITY AND TRUSTWORTHINESS EXPECTATIONS:  
A PATH OF SOCIAL PROJECTION? 
Thielmann, I., & Hilbig, B. E. (2014). Trust in me, trust in you: A social projection account of 
the link between personality, cooperativeness, and trustworthiness expectations. Journal 
of Research in Personality, 50(3), 61–65. doi: 10.1016/j.jrp.2014.03.006 
 
In Thielmann and Hilbig (2014; Article 2), our goal was to provide first evidence on the 
notion that trait trustworthiness (in terms of individual levels in Honesty-Humility) might 
account for individual variation in trustworthiness expectations through social projection. The 
theoretical starting point for this conjecture was two-fold: On the one hand, it has been noted 
on numerous occasions that social projection constitutes a reasonable antecedent of trust be-
havior (e.g., Krueger et al., 2012; Krueger, Massey, & DiDonato, 2008). That is, individuals 
might expect others to be as trustworthy as they themselves are – an assumption nicely corre-
sponding to the typically observed positive relation between individuals’ willingness to trust 
and to behave trustworthily (e.g., Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007; Wrightsman, 1966). On the 
other hand, trait trustworthiness is arguably captured by the HEXACO Honesty-Humility fac-
tor. Supporting this notion – and corresponding to the theoretical conceptualization of Hones-
ty-Humility subsuming sincerity, fairness, greed-avoidance, and modesty – a substantial body 
of evidence has proven Honesty-Humility to be a valid predictor of fairness-related behaviors 
(e.g., Baumert, Schlösser, & Schmitt, 2013; Hilbig, Thielmann, Hepp, Klein, & Zettler, 2015; 
Hilbig, Zettler, & Heydasch, 2012) as well as of honesty (Hilbig, Moshagen, & Zettler, 2015; 
Hilbig & Zettler, 2015) – the two pillars of trustworthiness, as outlined above. 
Integrating these two pieces of evidence, our aim was to test the hypothesis that indi-
viduals infer others’ trustworthiness from their own trait trustworthiness (i.e., their Honesty-
Humility levels) by means of social projection. More precisely, we assumed that individuals 
high in Honesty-Humility will have more optimistic expectations regarding others’ trustwor-
thiness than their counterparts low in Honesty-Humility because they themselves are more 
trustworthy or cooperative, respectively. In a study (N = 244), we assessed individuals’ Hon-
esty-Humility levels (Ashton & Lee, 2009) and their expectations regarding another’s trust-
worthiness in the Distrust Game (McEvily, Radzevick, & Weber, 2012) – an alternative to the 
Trust Game that offers a more straightforward operationalization of trustworthiness expecta-
tions (because in the Distrust Game the trustee’s behavior is not contingent on the trustor’s 
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behavior). To test the social projection account more conclusively, we additionally included 
measures of cooperativeness (i.e., a hypothetical Dictator Game; Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, 
& Sefton, 1994) and entitlement (i.e., a hypothetical Ultimatum Game; Güth, Schmittberger, 
& Schwarze, 1982). By this means, we intended to explicitly verify that individuals high in 
Honesty-Humility expect others to be more trustworthy because they themselves are, rather 
than because they feel entitled to a good treatment by others. 
In line with this hypothesis, we found a positive relation between Honesty-Humility and 
trustworthiness expectations which was mediated through cooperativeness in the Dictator 
Game, but not through entitlement in the Ultimatum Game. Hence, the data supported the idea 
that social projection of one’s own trait trustworthiness matters for the formation of trustwor-
thiness expectations. However, it should be acknowledged that the effect of Honesty-Humility 
on trustworthiness expectations was only small to medium-sized. On the one hand, this might 
be due to the exclusive reliance on hypothetical games without real interaction partners or 
incentives involved. On the other hand, individual differences in the tendency to rely on social 
projection (Krueger & Acevedo, 2007) might have acted as a moderator of said relationship, 
thus reducing the overall effect size. Furthermore, another shortcoming of our study is that we 
entirely focused on individuals’ trustworthiness expectations, without considering a measure 
of actual trust behavior. Although (a priori) expectations regarding another’s trustworthiness 
have been shown to reliably drive trust behavior (e.g., Coricelli, Gonzalez Morales, & 
Mahlstedt, 2006; Kugler, Connolly, & Kausel, 2009; Yamagishi et al., 2013), combining the 
presented design with a measure of trust behavior might be a worthwhile extension for future 
research – alongside the use of real interactions involving actual incentives. 
 
3.2 FROM TRUST TO TRUSTWORTHINESS 
As another limitation of the above reasoning, the postulated social projection account 
basically rests on the notion that Honesty-Humility actually explains individual variation in 
trustworthiness. Although this assumption seems well-justified in light of the empirically 
demonstrated links between Honesty-Humility and pro-social/honest behavior, direct evi-
dence on said relation is still missing. Thus, for the social projection account to hold, it seems 
necessary to critically test whether Honesty-Humility indeed explains individual variation in 
trustworthy behavior, that is, variation in the appreciation of another’s trust. 
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By and large, evidence on the (basic) traits underlying trustworthiness is scarce anyway. 
First, extant findings on the FFM are inconclusive as, for example, indicated by a weak meta-
analytic correlation between FFM-Agreeableness and trustworthiness in the Trust Game 
(Zhao & Smillie, 2015). Thus, investigating trustworthy behavior from the perspective of the 
HEXACO model, specifically the Honesty-Humility factor, might be a promising approach to 
clarify the inconsistent empirical picture (cf. Hilbig et al., 2014). Moreover, prior research is 
still vague on the specific mechanism underlying trustworthiness that might, in turn, drive the 
relation between basic personality traits and trustworthy behavior. In particular, it is unclear 
whether trustworthiness is an expression of positive reciprocity, negative reciprocity, or un-
conditional kindness (e.g., Ashraf, Bohnet, & Piankov, 2006; Ben-Ner & Halldorsson, 2010; 
Cox, 2004). Stated differently, evidence is inconclusive on whether trustworthiness mirrors a 
conditional behavior that is contingent on the level of the trustor’s prior trust (thus reflecting 
reciprocity) or whether it mirrors an unconditional behavior in that it involves a relatively 
stable reaction that does not perfectly correspond to the trustor’s previous behavior (thus re-
flecting kindness). 
Notably, illuminating the nature and dispositional determinants of trustworthiness might 
not only enhance the understanding of trustworthy behavior as such, but also of the rationale 
underlying trust. That is, given that trust is only profitable and reasonable if the corresponding 
reaction is trustworthy to some extent (cf. Evans & Krueger, 2011; Hardin, 1996), there 
should be no trust at all in the absence of trustworthiness. In other words, trustworthiness be-
gets trust (e.g., Hardin, 2002; Tullberg, 2008). Thus, knowledge about the (trait) determinants 
driving trustworthiness will provide basic insights into the factors that foster trust in the long 
run. Based on this reasoning, in Article 3 we (Thielmann and Hilbig, 2015a) dissected the trait 
determinants underlying trustworthy behavior by means of the HEXACO model of personali-
ty. Importantly, this approach did not only allow us to illuminate the specific mechanism driv-
ing trustworthiness, but also to critically test whether Honesty-Humility indeed explains indi-
vidual differences in trustworthy behavior – the basic conjecture underlying the proposed so-
cial projection path to trustworthiness expectations. 
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3.3 DISSECTING THE TRAIT DETERMINANTS OF TRUSTWORTHINESS  
Thielmann, I., & Hilbig, B. E. (2015a). The traits one can trust: Dissecting reciprocity and 
kindness as determinants of trustworthy behavior. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 41(11), 1523-1536. doi: 10.1177/0146167215600530 
 
As mentioned previously, there is currently only a rudimentary understanding of the na-
ture and trait determinants of trustworthy behavior. On the one hand, evidence on the basic 
traits underlying trustworthiness is restricted to the FFM, with inconclusive findings overall. 
On the other hand, it is still unclear whether trustworthy behavior is an expression of positive 
reciprocity, negative reciprocity, or unconditional kindness. In Thielmann and Hilbig (2015a; 
Article 3), the overall objective was hence to dissect the potential dispositional factors under-
lying trustworthiness based on the HEXACO model of personality. 
As an advantage, the HEXACO model distinguishes between different cooperative 
tendencies given that it does, most prominently, specifically capture active cooperativeness 
(i.e., fairness or non-exploitation) in the factor of Honesty-Humility and reactive cooperative-
ness (i.e., forgiveness or non-retaliation) in the factor of Agreeableness – as empirically sup-
ported by a pattern of double-dissociation (Hilbig, Zettler, Leist, & Heydasch, 2013; 
Thielmann, Hilbig, & Niedtfeld, 2014). Corresponding to this distinction – and of particular 
interest for the issue at hand – Honesty-Humility has been explicitly linked to unconditional 
kindness (e.g., Hilbig, Thielmann, Wührl, & Zettler, 2015) and positive reciprocity (e.g., 
Ackermann, Fleiß, & Murphy, in press) whereas HEXACO-Agreeableness has been specifi-
cally associated with negative reciprocity (e.g., Ackermann et al., in press). Consequently, for 
each of the proposed mechanisms to trustworthiness, the HEXACO model provides detailed 
and specific predictions on the to-be-expected link between trustworthiness and Honesty-
Humility or HEXACO-Agreeableness, respectively, and the potential moderating role of the 
level of prior trust shown by the trustor. This allows for strict empirical tests of the competing 
mechanisms. In detail, if trustworthiness is an expression of unconditional kindness, there 
should be a positive link between trustworthiness and Honesty-Humility, irrespective of the 
level of prior trust. By contrast, the relation between trustworthiness and Honesty-Humility 
should be moderated by the level of trust if trustworthiness mirrors positive reciprocity. Final-
ly, if negative reciprocity is the driving mechanism, trustworthiness should be negatively 
linked to HEXACO-Agreeableness, again as a function of the level of prior trust.  
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In a set of three web-based studies, participants acted as the trustees in the Trust Game 
(Berg et al., 1995) who either specified their trustworthiness in reaction to all potential trust 
levels a trustor might show (Studies 1 and 2; N = 108 and N = 118, respectively) or to one 
specific trust level only (Study 3; N = 177). Besides, we assessed the HEXACO dimensions 
(Ashton & Lee, 2009) and, in two studies, additionally the FFM dimensions (Borkenau & 
Ostendorf, 2008). Overall, all three studies revealed a positive relation between Honesty-
Humility and trustworthy behavior. Importantly, this relationship was unaffected by the trus-
tor’s level of prior trust. HEXACO-Agreeableness, by contrast, indicated no association with 
trustworthiness whatsoever. Altogether, the pattern of results was hence compatible with the 
predictions as derived from the unconditional kindness mechanism, but contradicted the posi-
tive and negative reciprocity mechanisms. This conclusion was further underpinned by the 
results of Study 3, showing that, for example, the positive relation between Honesty-Humility 
and trustworthy behavior was mediated by an unconditional kindness justification, but not by 
a positive or negative reciprocity justification of trustees’ return decisions. As such, the results 
also reconciled the inconsistent evidence on the link between FFM-Agreeableness and trust-
worthy behavior. In particular, those aspects predicting unconditional kindness are only mar-
ginally represented in FFM-Agreeableness, thus producing a small overall effect. 
In summary, the reported studies enhance the understanding of trustworthiness in terms 
of its underlying personality traits. Importantly, they support the assumption that Honesty-
Humility accounts for individual variation in trustworthy behavior, thereby validating and 
complementing the above reasoning underlying the social projection path from trait trustwor-
thiness (in terms of Honesty-Humility) to trustworthiness expectations. Nonetheless, some 
critical remarks are worth mentioning. First, the web-based procedure might have insufficient-
ly triggered reciprocity due to the minimal interpersonal contact between interaction partners 
(i.e., trustors and trustees). A replication of the above results in a lab-based setting with a 
higher degree of interpersonal contact is thus desirable. Also, the findings are entirely based 
on a specific trust situation (i.e., the Trust Game) and a specific type of trust relationship (i.e., 
trust among strangers), thus questioning the generalizability of conclusions. For example, it 
might be the case that in close relationships, trustworthiness is more a matter of (posi-
tive/negative) reciprocity than of unconditional kindness because individuals might expect 
close others to be trustful toward them. Future studies might critically test this conjecture and 
look for potential moderators of the relation between personality traits and trustworthiness. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 
The theoretical framework and empirical evidence reported on in this thesis revealed in-
sights into individual differences in interpersonal trust and trustworthiness from a (basic) trait 
perspective. In Thielmann and Hilbig (2015b; Article 1), we provided a broad review and 
integrative summary of the diverse trust literature, based on which we distilled a person-
situation framework on trust behavior. As such, we introduced a theoretical foundation for the 
study of individual differences in trust. Building on this, in Thielmann and Hilbig (2014;  
Article 2) we presented corresponding empirical support for one of the proposed sources of 
individual variation in trust: an individual’s own trustworthiness. Specifically, we showed that 
individuals apparently use their trait trustworthiness (operationalized via individuals’ Hones-
ty-Humility levels) to infer others’ trustworthiness – reflecting a path of social projection un-
derlying trustworthiness expectations. However, given that this reasoning rested on the (un-
tested) notion that Honesty-Humility accounts for trustworthy behavior, in Thielmann and 
Hilbig (2015a; Article 3) we finally shifted our focus from trust to the personality aspects pre-
dicting trustworthiness. In line with the postulated social projection account, we provided first 
empirical evidence on the predictive power of Honesty-Humility for trustworthy behavior. At 
the same time, we clarified the dispositional determinants underlying trustworthiness and 
demonstrated that trustworthy behavior is basically a question of unconditional kindness. 
Overall, the work presented in this thesis sets a starting point for an enhanced under-
standing of individual differences in trust (and trustworthiness) – an issue that has gained in-
sufficient attention in prior research. Nevertheless, there are still several gaps and open quests 
that should be addressed in future work. Most strikingly, evidence on the two additional paths 
from personality to trust behavior as proposed in our person-situation framework (i.e., from 
trait anxiety/fear via attitudes toward risky prospects to trust behavior and from trait for-
giveness via betrayal sensitivity to trust behavior; cf. Figure 1) is inconclusive or even miss-
ing so far. Moreover, transferring the theoretical assumptions and empirical evidence present-
ed in this thesis to trust and trustworthiness in other types of relationships (e.g., friends or 
romantic partners) seems a desirable extension to be targeted in future research. In general, it 
is my hope that the work presented herein, especially the provided theoretical framework on 
trust, will stimulate systematic research on the (basic) trait sources underlying individual dif-
ferences in trust (and trustworthy) behavior among several types of trust relationships.  
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Beyond revealing future research avenues, the work presented in this thesis also has im-
portant theoretical implications for the study of trust. In particular, it first seems advisable to 
conceptualize trust in terms of a behavior – corresponding to the “original goal [of psycholo-
gy] of being the science of behavior” (Baumeister et al., 2007, p. 400). Notably, such a behav-
ioral view on trust allowed us to take a particularly fine-grained look at the different determi-
nants of trust. At the same time, a behavioral view might also foster the fruitful symbiosis 
between different areas of trust research, most notably psychology and economics (Handgraaf 
& Fred van Raaij, 2005). Besides, within psychology, research on trust might profit from a 
synthesis between social and personality psychology (e.g., Fleeson & Noftle, 2008; Funder, 
2008). In this regard, I hope to have elucidated the specific usefulness to take into account the 
actors’ personality characteristics beyond situational features (as primarily focused on in prior 
research) to get a complete understanding of the occurrence of trust among strangers. Recent 
research on cooperation has already demonstrated the fruitfulness of considering (basic) per-
sonality traits to account for individual differences in cooperative behavior (e.g., Zhao & 
Smillie, 2015) – an approach that has recently even found its way into economics (Handgraaf 
& Fred van Raaij, 2005). In the area of trust research, it may likewise be the time to increas-
ingly integrate a trait perspective to illuminate the emergence of trust behavior. By this 
means, we might achieve a more holistic understanding of the puzzle of trust as the “founda-
tional principle that holds all relationships” (Covey et al., 1994, p. 203). 
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APPENDIX:  COPIES OF ARTICLES  
Trust: An Integrative Review From a Person–Situation Perspective
Isabel Thielmann
University of Koblenz-Landau and University of Mannheim
Benjamin E. Hilbig
University of Koblenz-Landau
Trust is a key aspect of various social interactions. Correspondingly, trust has been heavily studied across
different scientific disciplines. However, an integration of the diverse research and literature is still
missing. Addressing this issue, we review several hundred articles on interpersonal trust among strangers
and integrate them into a coherent framework, explaining trust behavior among unfamiliar agents based
on an interaction between situational features and distinct personality characteristics. Understanding trust
as a decision under risk, we distill 3 core components of trust behavior from the extant literature: attitudes
toward risky prospects (i.e., risk aversion and loss aversion), trustworthiness expectations, and betrayal
sensitivity. Each of these refers to a distinct set of causal determinants, including personality character-
istics (anxiety/fear, trustworthiness, and forgiveness) which can be localized in the space defined by
models of basic personality structure (e.g., the Five-Factor Model and the HEXACO model of person-
ality). In sum, the review contributes to the understanding of trust behavior by linking and integrating the
findings from various fields of trust research. Additionally, it provides fruitful directions and implications
for future research.
Keywords: betrayal sensitivity, interpersonal trust behavior among strangers, personality traits, risk/loss
aversion, trustworthiness expectations
We’re never so vulnerable than when we trust someone—but para-
doxically, if we cannot trust, neither can we find love or joy.
—Walter Anderson
The importance of trust for all areas of human interaction can
probably not be overemphasized (cf. Yamagishi, 2011). As Rotter
(1971) summarized, “the entire fabric of our day-to-day living, of
our social order, rests on trust” (p. 443). In other words, “perhaps
there is no single variable which so thoroughly influences inter-
personal and group behaviour as does trust” (Golembiewski &
McConkie, 1975, p. 131). Whether in close relationships or in
interactions with strangers, we trust on numerous occasions
throughout our lives. For example, we trust our partner not to cheat
on us, we confide in friends with personal or intimate problems,
we employ others to take care of our children, we ask strangers on
the train to watch our luggage while we visit the restrooms, we buy
second-hand cars hoping to not end up with a lemon, and we
purchase goods online without actually knowing the seller or
testing the product beforehand. Based on this omnipresence of
trust, it is unsurprising that trust is arguably one of the most
heavily studied constructs across all social and economic sciences
(e.g., psychology, economics, political science, sociology, law)
and beyond.
Traditionally, one type of trust seems particularly relevant,
namely trust among strangers—also referred to as initial trust
(McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998). Today, the growing
e-commerce sector increasingly forces people to trust strangers
when purchasing products online. Besides, a variety of social
interactions in every-day life require trust in unknown others, thus
precluding the long-term establishment of trusting relationships
(cf. Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004; Dunning, Fetchenhauer, &
Schlösser, 2012; Dunning & Fetchenhauer, 2010; Gill, Boies,
Finegan, & McNally, 2005). From an economic (game-theoretic)
perspective—assuming that humans are rational utility maximizers
primarily motivated by self-interest and, by implication, mainly
untrustworthy—it seems mostly irrational to trust strangers (cf.
Evans & Krueger, 2009; J. M. Weber, Malhotra, & Murnighan,
2005). However, as the examples above demonstrate, people do
trust unknown others. Indeed, trust among strangers represents a
behavioral tendency that, once developed, remains stable across
the life span (Sutter & Kocher, 2007). Based on this apparent
discrepancy between rationality and observable behavior, the cur-
rent work aims at uncovering the determinants underlying this
seemingly irrational, yet common and indeed often necessary type
of social behavior. In particular, we review and, more importantly,
aim to integrate the interdisciplinary literature on trust among
strangers, thus providing a coherent summary of this phenomenon.
Within the varied research, different approaches have been put
forward to explain trust behavior in general, and trust among
strangers in particular. To name a few prominent examples, the
literature comprises game-theoretic approaches to trust (e.g.,
Cabon-Dhersin & Ramani, 2007; Macy & Skvoretz, 1998), ap-
proaches focusing on specific aspects of trust (e.g., risk; Das &
Teng, 2004) or specific occurrences of trust (e.g., trust in groups;
Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996), and approaches focusing on
This article was published Online First July 20, 2015.
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particular areas of trust (e.g., organizational trust; Mayer, Davis, &
Schoorman, 1995; McKnight et al., 1998). Though all of these
approaches come with different foci, most of them share one core
feature: Trust is considered to be the result of an interaction
between features of the specific trust situation and individual
characteristics of the trusting person (i.e., the trustor). That is, on
the one hand, individuals are commonly assumed to condition their
trust on situation-specific variables (e.g., another’s trustworthi-
ness), suggesting an intraindividual variability of trust behavior
across situations. On the other hand, people are assumed to have a
stable inclination toward (dis)trusting, suggesting a person-specific
aspect underlying trust and an intraindividual consistency of trust
behavior across situations (Fleeson & Leicht, 2006).
Especially regarding this latter point—the individual differences
in trust and the personality characteristics responsible for this
variation—existing approaches are notably underspecified. That
is, existing trait-based accounts mainly refer to trust propensity as
the underlying personality dimension of trust, defined as an indi-
vidual’s “general willingness to trust others” (Mayer et al., 1995,
p. 715) or “one’s personal tendency to believe in others’ trustwor-
thiness” (Das & Teng, 2004, p. 109). However, as these definitions
clearly demonstrate, assigning trust propensity scores to individu-
als who differ in trust behavior is a mere redescription of observed
behavior, rather than an explanation in terms of underlying per-
sonality traits (cf. Hilbig, Zettler, & Heydasch, 2012). In terms of
theoretical progress, such redescriptions are not particularly useful
(Gigerenzer, 1998), thus signaling the need for a more basic
trait-based understanding of individual differences in trust. In
addition, the implication that trust behavior can be reduced to a
single specific personality trait may well be an oversimplification
given the apparent complexity of trust behavior (as will be detailed
below).
To overcome such limitations, we present an integrative review
of the literature on trust among strangers and incorporate the
research from different disciplines into a coherent person-situation
framework in the sense of a descriptive taxonomy. In this frame-
work, we specify both the situational and the personality aspects
underlying trust behavior. Specifically, we summarize theoretical
and empirical contributions from behavioral economics, social
psychology, and personality psychology—thus bridging the gap
between different lines of research. As such, we conclude that (a)
trust behavior is a function of multiple situation and person char-
acteristics and (b) individual differences in trust behavior result
from a combination of relatively distinct personality traits. At the
same time, we present an up-to-date review of the trust literature,
particularly considering the various findings put forward in the
past decade of trust research. In this regard, we also aim at pointing
to the gaps in the trust literature that we hope can be bridged by
future research. In general, we focus on interpersonal trust (rather
than trust in and among groups or organizations) and trust in
intentions (rather than capabilities; cf. Snijders & Keren, 2001).
Also, we approach trust from a behavioral perspective, following
the growing body of research operationalizing trust through be-
havior in economic games.1 Note that this behavioral perspective
also corresponds to recent research on conformity (as first pro-
moted by Asch, 1956), which proposes that disagreeing with better
informed others—and thus disclosing one’s ignorance—is another
expression of trust (particularly in others’ good-will; Hodges,
Meagher, Norton, McBain, & Sroubek, 2014; Hodges, 2014).
The article will be structured as follows: First, we review existing
conceptualizations of trust so as to derive an integrative definition of
trust behavior—in close adherence to the proposed standards for
generating construct definitions (Gilliam & Voss, 2013). This defini-
tion is designed to overcome potential limitations of prior definitions
and, more importantly, mirrors the essence of the framework we put
forward to integrate the extant literature. Based on the definition, we
then examine the situational and individual determinants of trust
behavior, including their potential interactions, and combine them into
a coherent person-situation framework. At this point, we will start off
by summarizing the gist of the proposed framework before elaborat-
ing on each single component of the framework in detail. As part of
this detailed view, we also link the specified personality determinants
underlying trust behavior to well-established models of basic person-
ality structure. Finally, we discuss the implications of the presented
framework for theory and research and elaborate how it can easily be
extended to apply to other types of trust (beyond trust among strang-
ers).
Defining Trust
As sketched above, the concept of trust has been approached
from various perspectives and different scientific disciplines. Cor-
respondingly, a substantial number of definitions and conceptual-
izations of trust have been proposed (for overviews see, e.g.,
Blomqvist, 1997; Das & Teng, 2004; Hosmer, 1995; McKnight &
Chervany, 2001). Despite this diversity, however, scholars from
different fields do agree on the basic components of trust (Rous-
seau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998) which are essentially cap-
tured in one of the most heavily cited definitions, describing trust
as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of
another party based on the expectation that the other will perform
a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the
ability to monitor or control that other party“ (Mayer et al., 1995,
p. 712). According to this definition—and in line with the common
understanding of trust—trusting (a) implies uncertainty and risk,2
1 Specifically, research on trust behavior has mainly considered the trust
game (Camerer & Weigelt, 1988; Dasgupta, 1988; Kreps, 1990), also
known as the investment game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; for a
meta-analytic review see Johnson & Mislin, 2011). In this game, a trustor
decides how to divide an endowment between herself and the so-called
trustee. The amount of monetary units the trustor is willing to transfer is
usually tripled and added to the trustee’s earnings. As a response, the
trustee can then transfer any amount back to the trustor. In general, the
amount sent by the trustor is considered an indicator of trust whereas the
amount returned by the trustee is considered an indicator of trustworthi-
ness. Corresponding to this interpretation, investments in the trust game
have been shown to be mostly interpreted in terms of risk, faith in others
(i.e., beliefs in others’ trustworthiness), trust, and gambling (Dunning et al.,
2012; see also Dunning et al., 2014).
2 Note that, in decision making research, uncertainty refers to the fact
that a decision maker is unfamiliar with the odds of gain versus loss,
whereas risk refers to the fact that both a gain or a loss can occur (neither
is certain) and the decision maker is familiar with the corresponding odds
(e.g., Ellsberg, 1961; Orbell, 1993). Thus, in a trust situation, uncertainty
exists because the trustor is unfamiliar with the probabilities of gain (i.e.,
trust appreciation) versus loss (i.e., trust betrayal). Concurrently, risk exists
because of the trustee’s opportunity to betray and the corresponding
possibility for the trustor to experience a loss. In general, uncertainty and
risk typically covary given that high certainty will be associated with low
risk and low certainty will be associated with high risk, respectively (cf.
Yates & Stone, 1992).
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given the absence of control on the part of the trustor, (b) is based
on an expectation that the interaction partner (the trustee) will act
in the trustor’s interest (i.e., in a benevolent fashion), and (c)
requires accepting personal vulnerability in terms of potential
betrayal. In the following, we will elaborate on these three basic
components of trust (see Table 1 for primary references).
To begin with, various approaches imply that trust is inevitably
accompanied by uncertainty and risk (e.g., Boon & Holmes, 1991;
Das & Teng, 2004; see also Table 1). Given the absence of
information about the trustee’s intention, a trustor will never be
able to conclusively predict the trustee’s behavior (Corcos, Pan-
nequin, & Bourgeois-Gironde, 2012; Kramer, 2010; Yamagishi &
Yamagishi, 1994). Hence, “it is in situations in which social
uncertainty is large that trust is needed” (Yamagishi, 2011, p. 11).
As a consequence of this uncertainty, trusting is necessarily ac-
companied by the possibility of a loss, representing the source of
risk associated with trusting (cf. Rousseau et al., 1998).
Similarly following from this uncertainty, a trustor has to rely on
her expectation about the trustee’s trustworthiness in her decision
to trust (e.g., Deutsch, 1958; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994; see
also Table 1). That is, before deciding whether it is reasonable to
trust or not, a trustor has to estimate the probabilities with which
a trustee might honor versus betray her trust. From a rational
perspective, a trustor should only trust if it is sufficiently likely that
the trustee reacts in a benevolent and favorable fashion; otherwise,
trusting would be self-destructive (Evans & Krueger, 2009). Sup-
porting this reasoning, findings show that (a priori) expectations
about the trustworthiness of potential interaction partners deter-
mine individuals’ actual decision to trust in trust games (Bigoni,
Bortolotti, Casari, & Gambetta, 2013; Coricelli, Gonzalez Mo-
rales, & Mahlstedt, 2006; Deutsch, 1960; Fetchenhauer & Dun-
ning, 2009; Holm & Danielson, 2005; Kugler, Connolly, &
Kausel, 2009; Vollan, 2011; Vyrastekova & Garikipati, 2005;
Yamagishi et al., 2013), thus pointing to the importance expecta-
tions might play for trust to occur.
However, even if a trustor has a somewhat optimistic expecta-
tion about the trustee’s trustworthiness, she can never be certain
that the trustee will actually honor her trust. Always and by
definition, betrayal remains “the twin of trust” (J. Dunn, 1988, p.
81)—and thus possible. In essence, betrayal implies a loss for the
trustor such that she is worse off after having trusted. Therefore,
trusting is necessarily associated with vulnerability toward the
trustee’s actions (e.g., Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998;
see also Table 1). Vulnerability refers to the severity of adverse
outcomes or potential losses (cf. Das & Teng, 2004). It exists
whenever the trustee has an incentive to betray the trustor for
personal gain (cf. Malhotra, 2004). As this is typically the case in
the trust situation, trusting requires taking the risk of a potential
loss or, stated differently, accepting vulnerability toward the (po-
tentially betraying) actions of another (e.g., Evans & Krueger,
2011; Ross & LaCroix, 1996; see also Table 1).
Reflecting this vulnerability aspect of trust behavior, trusting
has frequently been referred to as a choice of relying or depending
on another (e.g., Giffin, 1967; Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; see
also Table 1). In a situation of uncertainty, choosing to depend on
another necessarily requires accepting personal vulnerability (cf.
Boon & Holmes, 1991). For example, entrusting one’s child to a
babysitter (e.g., to gain an evening out with friends) means to
depend on the babysitter’s trustworthiness and to accept the pos-
sibility that something bad could happen to the child if the baby-
sitter does not take her job seriously. Similarly, asking a stranger
on the train to keep an eye on one’s luggage means to depend on
the stranger’s trustworthiness and to accept the possibility that the
stranger might steal the luggage. Finally, openly disagreeing with
a better informed other and exposing one’s ignorance means to
depend on another’s willingness to appreciate the awkwardness of
one’s position and to accept the possibility of becoming ostracized
(cf. Hodges, 2014). In line with these considerations, a recent
meta-analysis identified social dependence as one of the most
agreed upon conditions of trust (Balliet & Van Lange, 2012).
In summary, we define interpersonal trust as
a risky choice of making oneself dependent on the actions of another
in a situation of uncertainty, based upon some expectation of whether
the other will act in a benevolent fashion despite an opportunity to
betray.
In line with previous conceptualizations of trust, this definition
includes all core components identified in earlier research (i.e.,
uncertainty, risk, expectation, and vulnerability toward betrayal),
but extends these definitions by incorporating the diverse perspec-
tives found in different scientific disciplines: First, we explicitly
distinguish between uncertainty as a feature of the trust situation
(i.e., the absence of conclusive information about the trustee’s
trustworthiness) and risk as a feature of the trusting action (i.e.,
accepting the possibility of a loss arising from the other’s oppor-
tunity to betray). Second, we incorporate the idea of separating
trust cognitions from trust behavior (e.g., Baron, 1998; Das &
Teng, 2004; Fehr, 2009; Hardin, 2002; Kee & Knox, 1970; McK-
night et al., 1998; Rotenberg, 2010; Sapienza, Toldra Simats, &
Zingales, 2013) by clearly differentiating between expectation
(i.e., cognition) and risky dependence choice (i.e., behavior)—
which corresponds to recent developments in trust research to the
effect that trust behavior and expectations are separately assessed
via economic games (e.g., Dunning, Anderson, Schlösser, Ehl-
ebracht, & Fetchenhauer, 2014; Yamagishi et al., 2013). Finally,
this definition entails a straightforward operationalization of trust
behavior for future research, namely that the willingness to depend
on another is a direct indicator of the willingness to trust (cf. Table
1). Hence, unlike prior definitions based on which trust was
difficult to operationalize (see, e.g., the conceptualizations by
Mayer et al., 1995, defining trust as “the willingness [. . .] to be
vulnerable”, p. 712, or by Rousseau et al., 1998, defining trust as
“a psychological state”, p. 395), the present definition renders trust
directly observable and thus easily quantifiable.3
Integrating the Determinants of Trust Behavior
Based on the above definition of trust behavior, we distill three
central determinants from the extant literature that should drive the
3 In general, this conceptualization of trust behavior is in line with a
unidimensional view of trust, defining trust based on a continuum ranging
from distrust (low values) to trust (high values). In contrast, according to
a two-dimensional view, trust and distrust are distinct (albeit related)
constructs which can coexist as a result of separate underlying continua
ranging from low to high trust and low to high distrust, respectively (e.g.,
Hill & O’Hara, 2006; Lewicki et al., 1998; McKnight & Chervany, 2001;
Sitkin & Roth, 1993).
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Table 1
Defining Attributes of Trust with Primary References, Corresponding Determinants (as Included in the Person–Situation Framework),
and Implications for Theory and Research
Defining attributes
of trust Primary references
Related
determinant(s) Implications
Trust is inherently
accompanied by
uncertainty and risk.
(Boon & Holmes, 1991; Camerer,
2003; Coleman, 1990; Das &
Teng, 2004; Evans & Krueger,
2011; Gambetta, 1988; Johnson-
George & Swap, 1982; Kramer,
2010; Luhmann, 1988; McKnight
& Chervany, 2001; Rempel,
Holmes, & Zanna, 1985; Rousseau
et al., 1998; Schlenker, Helm, &
Tedeschi, 1973; B. H. Sheppard &
Sherman, 1998; Snijders & Keren,
1999; J. M. Weber et al., 2005;
Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994)
Risk aversion
Loss aversion
Trust behavior can be conceptualized as a decision
under risk, involving integration of probabilities
and outcomes. Thus, the decision to trust
incorporates two attitudes toward risky
prospects—risk aversion and loss aversion—
which should be treated as distinct (albeit
complementary) aspects.
Inconsistent evidence on the link between trust
and risk aversion does not necessarily imply a
minor role of risk aversion for trust because it
might be attributable to challenges associated
with the assessment of risk aversion. It is
important to consider the heterogeneity and
domain-specificity of risk aversion and thus to
carefully select appropriate measures in future
studies.
Inconsistent evidence on the link between trust
and risk aversion might also be attributable to
specific interactions between the different trust
determinants. These should be addressed in
future research.
Risk-seeking and low loss aversion might explain
individuals’ willingness to trust despite
expecting a relatively low probability of trust
appreciation.
The lack of any evidence on the influence of loss
aversion on trust behavior should be addressed
empirically.
Theoretical integration with the vast literature on
(cognitive processes of) risky choice is
necessary.
Trust is based on
expectations about
another’s
trustworthiness.
(Bacharach & Gambetta, 2001; Boon
& Holmes, 1991; Deutsch, 1958;
Gambetta, 1988; Hardin, 2002;
Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies,
1998; McKnight et al., 1998;
Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; Robinson,
1996; Sapienza et al., 2013; Six et
al., 2010; Yamagishi &
Yamagishi, 1994)
Trustworthiness
expectations,
based on three
sources of
information:
Trust is not an expectation per se, but expectations
are a determinant of trust behavior.
Depending on the amount and validity of available
information and how it is integrated to form a
judgment, trustworthiness expectations are more
or less accurate.(a) trust cues
(b) prior trust
experiences
(c) social projection
It should be addressed how individuals search for
and integrate information about another’s
trustworthiness to come up with a judgment.
Theoretical integration with the vast literature
on judgment processes is needed.
The potential influence of prior trust experiences
on trust behavior implies that it might be
prudent to take into account whether individuals
have participated in previous studies using
similar paradigms.
Trust requires accepting
vulnerability due to
the potential betrayal
by another.
(Baier, 1986; Bohnet & Zeckhauser,
2004; J. Dunn, 1988; Dunning &
Fetchenhauer, 2010, 2011; Evans
& Krueger, 2011; Fehr, 2009;
Hong & Bohnet, 2007; Malhotra,
2004; Mayer et al., 1995; Ross &
LaCroix, 1996; Rousseau et al.,
1998; Zand, 1972)
Betrayal sensitivity Individuals might differ in their weighting of
(objectively comparable) losses resulting from
another’s betrayal versus bad luck. This
tendency might in turn affect one’s general
willingness to trust.
Low betrayal sensitivity might explain individuals’
willingness to trust despite expecting a
relatively low probability of trust appreciation.
Research on betrayal sensitivity as a potential
source of interindividual variation in trust
behavior is needed.
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decision of an individual X to (dis)trust an individual Y in a
situation Z: (I) attitudes toward risky prospects (i.e., risk aversion
and loss aversion), (II) trustworthiness expectations, and (III)
betrayal sensitivity (for a graphical illustration see Figure 1).
Before we will discuss these three broad determinants in more
detail (and establish links to basic personality traits where appro-
priate), we provide a brief summary of the gist of the framework
in the following. Note that the initial focus of this summary (as
well as the more elaborated review thereafter) will be on the
component displayed in the center of Figure 1 (i.e., risk aversion/
loss aversion) because all other determinants are integrated into a
behavioral response at this point. However, although risk aversion
and loss aversion hence form the “centerpiece” of this overarching
framework, we do not mean to imply that they play a superior role
compared to the other determinants. As will be outlined below, it
might even be the case under certain circumstances that one
particular determinant outweighs the others, thus primarily driving
the decision to trust.
Attitudes toward risky prospects (I) capture the risk and uncer-
tainty aspect of trust behavior (as defined above). That is, given
that the decision to trust is inherently associated with uncertainty
about another’s trustworthiness and the possibility of a loss (re-
sulting from betrayal), an individual’s general attitudes toward
uncertainty (i.e., risk aversion) and potential losses (i.e., loss
aversion) should affect the willingness to trust another. From a
personality perspective, this implies that traits driving risk and loss
aversion, namely anxiety-related traits, might likewise account for
individual variation in trust behavior.
Furthermore, as follows from the uncertainty aspect of trust,
trustors can never be completely sure about the trustee’s trustwor-
thiness, but have to estimate the probability of trust appreciation.
These trustworthiness expectations (II; commonly called beliefs in
Table 1 (continued)
Defining attributes
of trust Primary references
Related
determinant(s) Implications
Trust behavior refers to
a choice of
depending (or
relying) on another.
(Baier, 1986; Boon & Holmes, 1991;
Colquitt et al., 2007; Currall &
Judge, 1995; Giffin, 1967;
Hosmer, 1995; James, 2002;
Johnson-George & Swap, 1982;
McKnight & Chervany, 2001;
McKnight et al., 1998; Moorman,
Zaltman, & Deshpande, 1992;
Rotenberg, 2010; Schlenker et al.,
1973; B. H. Sheppard & Sherman,
1998; Yamagishi et al., 2005)
Trust should be conceptualized as a choice or
decision, respectively, rather than as a state or
trait (or the like). Similarly, trust behavior has
to be distinguished from trust cognitions (i.e.,
expectations).
The choice to depend on another represents a
straightforward operationalization of trust
behavior in future research.
Integration with the decision-making literature is
needed.
Figure 1. Graphical illustration of the three core components of trust behavior as distilled from the literature
and their underlying determinants. Solid arrows reflect causal relationships; dashed arrows reflect information
input. Personality traits are framed with round boxes.
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economics) might be inferred based on different sources of infor-
mation (depending on their availability): trust cues, prior trust
experiences, and social projection. Trust cues are pieces of evi-
dence available in the environment. They can either refer to the
situation at hand (e.g., the temptation to betray) or to the trustee’s
person (e.g., her appearance). By contrast, prior trust experiences
and social projection refer to internal sources of information spe-
cific to the trustor. More specifically, prior trust experiences mirror
an individual’s learning history in similar situations; social pro-
jection implies that a trustor’s own trustworthiness (in terms of her
trait fairness and honesty) might be a source of trustworthiness
expectations—thus implying another potential source of individual
variation in trust behavior besides risk and loss aversion.
Finally, as follows from the risk aspect of trust, trustors have to
accept the possibility of a loss due to another person’s betrayal.
The way an individual perceives the severity of a loss resulting
from betrayal (compared to a loss resulting from nature) denotes
her betrayal sensitivity (III) which should, in turn, influence her
general willingness to trust. In terms of a more basic trait, betrayal
sensitivity arguably relates to trait forgiveness, thus representing
an additional source accounting for individual differences in trust
behavior.
Integrating the three components sketched so far, we propose
that trustworthiness expectations provide the (subjective) proba-
bility input on which an individual’s risk aversion operates
whereas betrayal sensitivity provides the (subjective) outcome
input on which an individual’s loss aversion operates (cf. Figure
1). In what follows, we will describe these three determinants of
trust in detail and elaborate on the underlying rational of the
current framework.
I. Attitudes Toward Risky Prospects: Risk Aversion
and Loss Aversion
Trust behavior as risky choice. As defined above, trust be-
havior refers to a risky choice of depending on another versus
maintaining control over a personal resource. Correspondingly,
trust behavior has frequently been described in terms of risk-taking
versus risk-avoidance (e.g., Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004; Boon &
Holmes, 1991; Das & Teng, 2004; Evans & Krueger, 2011; Ross
& LaCroix, 1996; Rousseau et al., 1998; Ullmann-Margalit, 2004).
As such, the decision to trust seems to be conceptually similar to
a more general decision under risk which is characterized by four
basic ingredients (in the decision making literature): the probabil-
ity of a gain (positive outcome), the value or utility of the gain, the
probability of a loss (negative outcome), and the value or utility of
the loss (Payne, 1973; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968). In a situation
of trust, the probabilities of gain versus loss reflect the probabili-
ties of trust appreciation versus trust betrayal—that is, the trustee’s
trustworthiness. In case of a trustworthy interaction partner, the
probability of a gain is higher (and the probability of a loss lower)
than in case of an untrustworthy interaction partner. However, as
stated above, the probabilities of gain versus loss are inherently
unknown and thus have to be estimated or somehow inferred.
In terms of potential outcomes (of trust vs. distrust), the amount
to gain reflects the positive utility resulting from trust appreciation
whereas the amount to lose reflects the negative utility resulting
from trust betrayal (cf. Evans & Krueger, 2011)—with the latter
essentially reflecting the vulnerability aspect of trust behavior.
Note, however, that recent evidence on the expressive nature of
trust behavior (i.e., consideration of immediate rewards from the
trusting act itself; Dunning et al., 2014, 2012; Dunning & Fetch-
enhauer, 2010, 2011) suggests that the amount to gain might also
refer to the positive feelings associated with trusting and the
communication of respect for another’s moral character. Referring
to the babysitter example from above, the gain hence corresponds
to the positive feelings related to trusting the babysitter and spend-
ing an evening out with one’s friends; the loss, in turn, corresponds
to the potential “bad things” that might happen in the case the
babysitter does not take good care of the child. In general, trustors
are thus “confronted with an ambiguous path, a path that can lead
to an event perceived to be beneficial [. . .] or to an event perceived
to be harmful” (Deutsch, 1962, p. 303).
Supporting this idea that the decision to trust is conceptually
similar to a decision under risk, evidence shows that individuals
condition their trust behavior on both the probabilities of and the
outcomes related to trust appreciation versus trust betrayal. That is,
on the one hand, individuals indicated a higher willingness to trust
a stranger when the chance of encountering a trustworthy interac-
tion partner was 80% as compared to when the chance was only
46% (Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2012)—that is, when it was “not
too risky” to trust (Courtois & Tazdaït, 2012, p. 377). On the other
hand, individuals were more likely to trust when trusting was
associated with a high (as compared to a low) potential gain, but
less likely to trust when trusting was associated with a high (as
compared to a low) potential loss (Dufwenberg & Gneezy, 2000;
Evans & Krueger, 2011, 2014; Goto, 1996; Lenton & Mosley,
2011; Malhotra, 2004; Snijders & Keren, 1999, 2001)—a behav-
ioral tendency that is already apparent in children and adolescents
(van den Bos, Westenberg, van Dijk, & Crone, 2010). From a
dispositional point of view—and in line with the most widely
accepted framework model of risky choice, prospect theory (Kah-
neman & Tversky, 1979, 1984)—the risk-taking aspect of trust
behavior might hence depend on two determinants: (a) an individ-
ual’s risk aversion (i.e., the willingness to take a risk as a function
of the probabilities of gain vs. loss) and (b) an individual’s loss
aversion (i.e., the willingness to take a risk as a function of the
relation between positive and negative outcomes). In the follow-
ing, we will describe both components in detail.
Risk aversion. Risk aversion defines “an individual’s dispo-
sitional tendency to evaluate a prospect with (positive) probabilis-
tic outcomes as having a value lower than (i.e., risk aversion),
equal to (i.e., risk neutrality), or higher than (i.e., risk seeking) its
expected value” (Glöckner & Hilbig, 2012, p. 547). In other words,
risk aversion captures an individual’s preference for choosing a
sure (positive) outcome over a potentially higher, but risky out-
come. For example, given the choice between a safe gain of $10
and winning $20 with a probability of 50% (otherwise nothing), a
risk-averse individual should prefer the safe gain whereas a risk-
seeking individual should prefer the risky gamble. Transferred to
the decision to trust, a risk-averse individual should hence require
a larger subjective probability that the other is trustworthy (and
therefore likely to honor trust) before actually trusting. In turn, a
risk-seeking individual should be willing to trust even if she expects
a smaller probability that the other is trustworthy (and therefore
unlikely to honor trust). Following from this reasoning, dispositional
risk aversion should be a determinant of trust behavior.
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Supporting the influence of dispositional risk aversion on trust
behavior, several studies identified risk aversion as a significant
predictor of investments in the trust game (Altmann, Dohmen, &
Wibral, 2008; Bigoni et al., 2013; Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2012;
Karlan, 2005; Lönnqvist, Verkasalo, Walkowitz, & Wichardt,
2010; Sapienza et al., 2013; Schechter, 2007). Specifically, indi-
viduals willing to entrust large amounts of their endowment (i.e.,
trusting individuals) were also more willing to take a risk in a
lottery or in a financial decision than individuals willing to entrust
only small amounts or nothing of their endowment (i.e., distrusting
individuals).4 Correspondingly, the term “risk” has been found to
be most frequently associated with trust behavior in the trust game
(Dunning et al., 2012). However, in contrast to these findings, the
effect of risk aversion on trust behavior could not be consistently
shown in previous research (Ashraf, Bohnet, & Piankov, 2006;
Ben-Ner & Halldorsson, 2010; Corcos et al., 2012; Dunning et al.,
2014; Eckel & Wilson, 2004; Etang, Fielding, & Knowles, 2011;
Houser, Schunk, & Winter, 2010; Macko, Malawski, & Tyszka,
2014).
Strikingly though, researchers still disagree on how disposi-
tional risk aversion can be appropriately assessed (and conceptu-
alized). That is, several different measures of risk aversion have
been proposed, including diverse self-report questionnaires (e.g.,
Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, et al., 2011; Meertens & Lion,
2008; E. U. Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002; Zuckerman, Eysenck, &
Eysenck, 1978) as well as various behavioral measures such as the
multiple price list method (Holt & Laury, 2002), the Balloon
Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002), the card gamble
task (Eckel & Wilson, 2004), and the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task
(BRET; Crosetto & Filippin, 2013). Given that (at least some of)
these measures are only weakly related to each other (e.g., Ben-
Ner & Halldorsson, 2010; Eckel & Wilson, 2004; Lönnqvist et al.,
2010), it is questionable whether they actually measure the same
construct (i.e., risk aversion).
In any case, besides measurement-related issues, research points
to a high domain-specificity of risk aversion (i.e., financial, health/
safety, recreational, ethical, and social; Blais & Weber, 2006; E. U.
Weber et al., 2002), thus shedding doubts on whether risk aversion
is a stable tendency across different contexts. In turn, it is ques-
tionable whether nonsocial risk aversion (e.g., lottery-based, finan-
cial) should predict trust-related risk-taking at all. Overall, trust
researchers should bear these issues related to the assessment of
risk aversion (i.e., heterogeneity of measures and domain-
specificity) in mind and carefully select measures that are infor-
mative and appropriate regarding the specific research question
under scrutiny. In the end, even the inconsistent findings on the
relation between risk aversion and trust behavior do not necessar-
ily contradict the idea that trust behavior is (to some extent) an
expression of a dispositional risk-taking tendency (cf. Table 1).
Nonetheless, in light of current knowledge, it seems unlikely that
trust decisions are invariably influenced by dispositional risk aver-
sion. We will later elaborate on how the interplay of the different
trust determinants might account for a weak influence of risk
aversion on trust under certain circumstances.
Loss aversion. In addition to risk aversion, loss aversion
denotes another important aspect of risky choice, referring to the
utilities of the potential outcomes rather than to their probabilities.
That is, whereas risk aversion describes the willingness to take a
risk as a function of the probabilities of gain versus loss, loss
aversion describes the willingness to take a risk as a function of the
relation between a gain and a loss (i.e., the outcomes). According
to prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984), loss aver-
sion captures the intuition that a loss of X is more aversive than a
gain of X is attractive. In terms of an individual difference variable,
loss aversion can thus be defined as “the propensity for losses to
loom larger than gains [of comparable magnitude]” (Bibby &
Ferguson, 2011, p. 263; see also Gächter, Johnson, & Herrmann,
2010). Correspondingly, an individual with high loss aversion is
assumed to evaluate a loss of X to be more aversive than a gain of
X attractive—thus placing much more weight on a potential loss
compared to a potential gain of equal magnitude (cf. Shelley,
1994). In contrast, an individual with low loss aversion is assumed
to evaluate a loss of X as rather equally aversive as a gain of X
attractive—thus placing comparable weights on both potential loss
and potential gain.
Regarding the decision to trust, loss aversion might influence
how an individual evaluates the potential gain resulting from
honored trust (and the trusting act itself) in relation to the potential
loss resulting from betrayed trust. On the one hand, trusting is
typically accompanied by a potential gain in the case the trustee
behaves trustworthily, thus implying that the trustor benefits from
trusting in case the trustee honors the trust. In addition, the positive
feelings associated with trusting might constitute a gain for the
individual, regardless of the trustee’s behavior. On the other hand,
trusting as defined above is also necessarily accompanied by a
potential loss resulting from the trustee’s opportunity to betray,
thus implying that the trustor suffers from trusting in case the
trustee betrays. Referring to the babysitter example from above,
one might spend an enjoyable evening out with friends if the
babysitter takes good care of the child (i.e., behaves trustworthily),
thus gaining from the trust placed in the babysitter beyond the
mere positive feelings associated with the trusting act. At the same
time, one also faces the risk of experiencing a loss (i.e., something
bad happening to the child) in case the babysitter does not take her
job seriously (i.e., behaves untrustworthily). Depending on the
relation between the utilities of potential gain versus potential loss
of trusting—in our example, the positive utility of trusting the
babysitter and spending an evening out with friends versus the
negative utility of whatever might occur to the child—individuals
should hence be more or less willing to trust. In line with this idea,
previous research already considered loss aversion as an underly-
ing determinant of trust behavior (Aimone & Houser, 2012; Boh-
net, Herrmann, & Zeckhauser, 2010; Bohnet & Meier, 2005).
However, empirical evidence on the link between dispositional
loss aversion and trust is still missing, thus remaining a quest for
future research. Hence, it seems advisable for future research to
consider both attitudes toward risky prospects (i.e., risk aversion
and loss aversion) as distinct (risk-related) aspects underlying trust
decisions (cf. Table 1).
4 Note that some authors interpreted this effect of risk aversion on trust
behavior in terms of a limitation of the trust game to appropriately disen-
tangle trust from risk (Karlan, 2005; Sapienza et al., 2013; Schechter,
2007). However, in line with previously voiced arguments, we maintain
that this effect demonstrates the (theoretically reasonable) risk-taking as-
pect of trust behavior (cf. Altmann et al., 2008; Dohmen, Falk, Huffman,
& Sunde, 2011; Fehr, 2009; Lönnqvist et al., 2010).
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Personality traits linked to risk and loss aversion. Linking
risk aversion and loss aversion to general personality traits, both
have most prominently been associated with trait anxiety and fear5
(cf. Figure 1). With regard to risk aversion, evidence shows asso-
ciations with both dispositional anxiety (Butler & Mathews, 1987;
Lorian & Grisham, 2010; Maner & Schmidt, 2006; Maner et al.,
2007; Wray & Stone, 2005) and dispositional fear (Lerner &
Keltner, 2001; Maner & Gerend, 2007) as well as with anxiety-
and fear-related basic traits (Glöckner & Hilbig, 2012; Lauriola &
Levin, 2001; Lee, Ogunfowora, & Ashton, 2005; Weller & Thulin,
2012; Weller & Tikir, 2011) and pathological anxiety (Giorgetta et
al., 2012; Lorian & Grisham, 2010, 2011; Lorian, Mahoney, &
Grisham, 2012). Unlike in the case of risk aversion, evidence on
the connection between trait anxiety/fear and loss aversion is
rather scarce. Nonetheless, like risk aversion, loss aversion has
also been linked to anxiety-related traits (Bibby & Ferguson, 2011)
as well as to fear (Camerer, 2005; McCarter, Rockmann, & North-
craft, 2010). Overall, these links imply that dispositional anxiety
might account for individual variation in trust behavior (through its
link to risk and loss aversion). However, given the lack of evidence
on the relation between dispositional anxiety and trust behavior,
further research is needed to clarify whether findings on the
relation between dispositional anxiety and risk/loss aversion can
actually be generalized to the trust context.
Preliminary summary of (I) attitudes toward risky
prospects. Based on the reasoning that the decision to trust
reflects a decision under risk, the present framework includes two
attitudes toward risky prospects as underlying determinants of an
individual’s willingness to trust, distilled from the extant literature:
risk aversion and loss aversion (cf. Figure 1). Whereas risk aver-
sion denotes the willingness to take a risk as a function of the
probabilities of gain versus loss, loss aversion denotes the willing-
ness to take a risk as a function of the relation between the utilities
of the potential gain versus the potential loss. Thus, each attitude
refers to a specific aspect of the risky choice of trusting (i.e.,
probabilities and outcomes). Depending on the importance indi-
viduals assign to either aspect in the specific trust situation, each
might drive the decision to trust more or less strongly. In terms of
an underlying personality characteristic, both are linked to trait
anxiety/fear.
Admittedly, so far we presumed that individuals are familiar
with the probabilities of trust appreciation versus trust betrayal—
since we merely referred to risk aversion as an individual’s ten-
dency to take a risk as a function of (known) probabilities of gain
versus loss. However, as reasoned above, this is typically not the
case because of the inherent uncertainty about the trustee’s trust-
worthiness. Individuals thus have to estimate these probabilities
based on the information available in the situation. Moreover—
given that the potential loss of trusting results from another per-
son’s betrayal (rather than from bad luck)—trusting might not only
involve a material loss, but also a psychological loss because of the
manner in which the loss comes about (i.e., an action of another
individual vs. chance). In consequence, the evaluation of the
potential outcomes (especially losses) might not be as straightfor-
ward as in a nonsocial decision under risk such as gambling. Based
on these notions, we propose trustworthiness expectations and
betrayal sensitivity as two additional determinants of trust behav-
ior (component II and III, respectively, in Figure 1). Whereas
trustworthiness expectations essentially reflect individuals’ prob-
ability estimates of gain versus loss, betrayal sensitivity should
underlie individuals’ evaluation of the potential outcomes (partic-
ularly losses). Both determinants will be described in the follow-
ing.
II. Trustworthiness Expectations
Following from the inevitable uncertainty about the probabili-
ties of trust appreciation (gain) versus trust betrayal (loss), a trustor
has to infer another’s trustworthiness before deciding whether it is
reasonable to trust or not (e.g., Anh, Pereira, & Santos, 2011;
Bacharach & Gambetta, 2001; Chang, Doll, van’t Wout, Frank, &
Sanfey, 2010; Eckel & Wilson, 2004; Hill & O’Hara, 2006;
Kramer, 2010; Macy & Skvoretz, 1998; Snijders & Keren, 1999,
2001; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). Depending on the specific
trust situation, these inferences might, for example, refer to
whether the trustee provides trustworthy information, behaves
cooperatively in a negotiation or an exchange of resources, or
refrains from (emotionally) harming the trustor.6 In any case, in
interactions with strangers, a trustor must draw these inferences in
the absence of reliable information about the interaction partner’s
trustworthiness. To nevertheless form an expectation about the
other’s likely behavior, the trustor can consider different (more or
less implicit) sources of information, namely (a) trust cues, (b)
prior trust experiences, and (c) social projection.
Trust cues. Trust cues are in some way observable or given
pieces of evidence a trustor might use to draw inferences about a
trustee’s trustworthiness in a specific situation. In terms of
Brunswik’s (1952) lens model, trust cues are observable cues
available in the trustor’s environment, yielding probabilistic infor-
mation about an interaction partner’s likely trustworthiness. Ac-
cording to a person-situation-interaction perspective (e.g., Funder,
2008), one can differentiate between two types of trust cues:
personal and situational. Whereas personal trust cues refer to
individual characteristics of the trustee (i.e., outward appearance,
reputation, or social category), situational trust cues refer to fea-
tures of the specific trust situation (i.e., temptation to betray or
availability of potential sanctions).
First off, personal trust cues denote characteristics of the trustee
predicting her trustworthiness or cooperativeness, respectively. In
interactions with strangers, personal trust cues mainly refer to the
trustee’s outward appearance, including facial features (Stewart et
al., 2012; Todorov, Baron, & Oosterhof, 2008; Todorov, Pakrashi,
& Oosterhof, 2009), facial expressions (Campellone & Kring,
2013; Eckel & Wilson, 2003; Krumhuber et al., 2007; Little, Jones,
DeBruine, & Dunbar, 2013; Scharlemann, Eckel, Kacelnik, &
Wilson, 2001; Shinada et al., 2010; Sofer, Dotsch, Wigboldus, &
Todorov, 2015; Yu, Saleem, & Gonzalez, 2014), facial expressiv-
5 Specifically, anxiety refers to the reaction of approaching to danger
whereas fear refers to the reaction of escaping from danger (McNaughton,
2011).
6 The diverse nature of trustworthiness expectations (determined by the
specific trust situation) implies that these inferences might refer to both
epistemic trust concerns (expectations that an informant provides reliable/
correct information; e.g., P. L. Harris, 2007; Koenig & Harris, 2005;
Landrum et al., 2015; Shafto et al., 2012) and emotional trust concerns
(expectations that another refrains from causing emotional harm to the
trustor; e.g., Betts, Rotenberg, & Trueman, 2009; Corriveau & Harris,
2010; Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; Rotenberg, 2010) as typically dis-
tinguished in developmental psychology.
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ity (Boone & Buck, 2003), and body language (DeSteno et al.,
2012; Naumann, Vazire, Rentfrow, & Gosling, 2009). For exam-
ple, individuals from different cultures seem to agree that faces
with high inner eyebrows, pronounced cheekbones, wide chins,
and shallow nose sellion appear more trustworthy than faces with
low inner eyebrows, shallow cheekbones, thin chins, and deep
nose sellion (Birkás, Dzhelyova, Lábadi, Bereczkei, & Perrett,
2014; Todorov et al., 2008). Moreover, individuals evaluated
facial expressions (e.g., smiling) and body language cues (e.g.,
energetic and tense stance) as indicating (high) Agreeableness
(Naumann et al., 2009)—a potential predictor of high cooperative-
ness (Denissen & Penke, 2008). Overall, individuals seem to
automatically use appearance-based personal trust cues to predict
the trustworthiness of unknown interaction partners (Bonnefon,
Hopfensitz, & De Neys, 2013; De Neys, Hopfensitz, & Bonnefon,
2015) and, in turn, to condition their trusting behavior on these
judgments (Chang et al., 2010; DeSteno et al., 2012; Oda, Naga-
nawa, Yamauchi, Yamagata, & Matsumoto-Oda, 2009; Posten,
Ockenfels, & Mussweiler, 2014; van ’t Wout & Sanfey, 2008).
Note, however, that reliance on trust cues has no immediate
implication for whether or not the trustworthiness judgment ulti-
mately formed is, in fact, correct or accurate (cf. Table 1). Indeed,
whereas some studies suggest that people are somewhat accurate
in predicting the trustworthiness of others on the basis of facial
cues (D. S. Berry, 1990; Bond, Berry, & Omar, 1994; Little et al.,
2013; Stirrat & Perrett, 2010), other studies indicate the opposite
(e.g., Bonnefon et al., 2013; Efferson & Vogt, 2013; Manson,
Gervais, & Kline, 2013; Rule, Krendl, Ivcevic, & Ambady, 2013).
In turn, the accuracy of predictions does not seem to be moderated
by individuals’ Theory of Mind, that is, the ability to infer others’
mental states (Sylwester, Lyons, Buchanan, Nettle, & Roberts,
2012). Nevertheless, “trustworthiness judgments from faces reflect
inferences of behavioral intentions that signal approach/avoidance
behaviors” (Todorov, 2008, p. 220).
Besides outward appearance cues, “reputation provides a good
opportunity for trust to prosper” (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994,
p. 138; see also Klapwijk & Van Lange, 2009; Manapat, Nowak,
& Rand, 2013). Whenever reputational information is available, a
trustor might hence consider the trustee’s reputation to form a
trustworthiness judgment. Correspondingly, evidence suggests that
individuals actually condition their trust behavior on reputational
information. Specifically, individuals are more willing to trust
people with a positive reputation than those with a negative rep-
utation (Albert, Güth, Kirchler, & Maciejovsky, 2007; Barclay,
2004; Boero, Bravo, Castellani, & Squazzoni, 2009; Bohnet &
Huck, 2004; Bracht & Feltovich, 2009; Charness, Du, & Yang,
2011; Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 2005; Fehrler & Przepiorka,
2013; Gambetta & Przepiorka, 2014; Keser, 2003; King-Casas et
al., 2005; Manapat & Rand, 2012; Masuda & Nakamura, 2012;
Rezlescu, Duchaine, Olivola, & Chater, 2012). Hence, individuals
seem to use reputational information as a vital cue in their decision
to trust.
Regarding trust among strangers, the role of reputational informa-
tion seems to be particularly relevant in the context of online purchase
(e.g., Kollock, 1999; Resnick & Zeckhauser, 2002). For example,
online purchase systems (such as eBay or Amazon) specifically
implement reputation systems by collecting buyers’ and sellers’ rat-
ings of each other after each transaction and, in turn, making them
available to all users. Indicating the effectiveness of such reputation
systems, trustors seem to place higher trust in favorably rated sellers
than in unfavorably rated sellers, indicated by a larger probability of
sale and higher average selling prices for sellers with a positive
reputation (Przepiorka, 2013). However, information about a seller’s
reputation does not seem to suppress the importance of outward
appearance on trust behavior when both trust cues are presented in
combination (Bente, Baptist, & Leuschner, 2012).
Finally, social category represents another personal trust cue
relevant for the occurrence of trust among strangers. For example,
trustors place higher trust in strangers who are in-group members
(due to expecting altruistic and fair treatment)—a phenomenon
termed group-based trust (Foddy, Platow, & Yamagishi, 2009;
Platow, Foddy, Yamagishi, Lim, & Chow, 2012). In particular,
meta-analytic evidence indicates that individuals have more opti-
mistic expectations regarding in-group members’ trustworthiness
(Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014)—thus rendering high trust rea-
sonable. Similarly, knowledge about another’s social category can
trigger social stereotypes which, in turn, may be associated with
specific trustworthiness expectations (Brewer, 2008). In general,
the tendency to predict another’s trustworthiness based on social
category information is already apparent in children (Landrum,
Eaves, & Shafto, 2015). Altogether, a trustee’s social category is
hence another potential source of information people might use to
infer the trustworthiness of an unknown interaction partner.
In addition to personal trust cues, trustors might also consider
situational trust cues in their probability estimates of trust appre-
ciation versus trust betrayal. Unlike personal trust cues, situational
trust cues refer to characteristics of the situation that might affect
an interaction partner’s trustworthiness independent of (or in some
interaction with) her general trustworthiness. In interdependence
situations—as the one of trust—several characteristics of the sit-
uation can be distinguished (e.g., dependence and power imbal-
ances, conflicts of interest, and behavioral control; Kelley et al.,
2003). Most prominently, research on trust considered a trustee’s
temptation to betray, that is, the difference in the trustee’s payoff
between honoring and betrayal of trust (cf. Evans & Krueger,
2011), as a vital situational trust cue. Specifically, the temptation
to betray refers to the trustee’s conflict of interest (Kelley et al.,
2003). Thus, it should be relevant to a trustor’s expectation about
the trustee’s trustworthiness because it reasonably affects the trust-
ee’s motivation to betray rather than to honor trust (Balliet & Van
Lange, 2012; Evans, Athenstaedt, & Krueger, 2013; Evans &
Krueger, 2011, 2014; James, 2002; Murray & Holmes, 2009;
Snijders & Keren, 1999, 2001; Yamagishi, Kanazawa, Mashima,
& Terai, 2005). In situations in which trust betrayal leads to a
considerably higher outcome for the trustee than trust appreciation
(i.e., high temptation to betray), a trustor might expect a relatively
high probability of trust betrayal and should, in turn, be less
willing to trust the other. By contrast, in situations in which trust
betrayal only leads to a slightly higher outcome for the trustee than
trust appreciation (i.e., low temptation to betray), a trustor might
expect a relatively low probability of trust betrayal and should, in turn,
be more willing to trust the other. In line with this reasoning, empirical
findings demonstrate a decline in trust behavior when the trustee’s
temptation to betray increases (Evans & Krueger, 2011, 2014; Sni-
jders & Keren, 1999, 2001). However, trustors appear to underesti-
mate the impact of the temptation to betray on the trustee’s trustwor-
thiness. Specifically, focusing primarily on their own potential
outcomes, trustors consider a trustee’s temptation only when the
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potential losses and gains associated with the trusting choice are
favorable for themselves (Evans & Krueger, 2011, 2014).
Similar to the temptation to betray, the presence versus absence
of potential sanctions for betrayal constitutes another situational
trust cue. Clearly, potential sanctions in case of betrayal decrease
the attractiveness of betrayal for the trustee, thus allowing the
trustor to expect a higher probability of trust appreciation (Bacha-
rach & Gambetta, 2001; Yamagishi, 1986, 1988; see also Balliet,
Mulder, & Van Lange, 2011, for a meta-analytic review on the
cooperation-promoting effect of potential punishment). Consistent
with this idea, the presence of potential sanctions for trustees’
betrayal (e.g., payoff reduction or negative reputation) increased
trustors’ optimism about the trustees’ trustworthiness and, in con-
sequence, their willingness to trust (Bigoni et al., 2013; Bohnet &
Baytelman, 2007; Charness, Cobo-Reyes, & Jimenez, 2008; Mat-
thews, Kordonski, & Shimoff, 1983; Stiff, 2008; Vollan, 2011).
Hence, it is reasonable to consider potential sanctions (or their
absence) as another situational trust cue, beyond the temptation to
betray.7
Prior trust experiences. Following from the notion that trust
refers to a basic social behavior, it is reasonable to expect that
people can fall back on a substantial number of experiences related
to trust behavior. Such prior trust experiences should, in conse-
quence, influence people’s trust behavior in comparable situations
(Bicchieri, Duffy, & Tolle, 2004; Blair & Stout, 2001; Bohnet &
Huck, 2004; Deutsch, 1962; Glanville & Paxton, 2007; Rotter,
1967, 1980; Snijders & Keren, 1999; Tullberg, 2008; Van Lange,
Vinkhuyzen, & Posthuma, 2014; Yu et al., 2014), most arguably
through affecting their expectations about others’ trustworthiness.
Especially in situations in which trust cues are absent or ambigu-
ous, prior trust experiences (collected in similar situations) might
guide one’s trust behavior in terms of an a priori trustworthiness
expectation. For example, an individual who had positive experi-
ences with buying a car second-hand from an unknown seller (i.e.,
encountering a cooperative interaction and ending up with a car of
high quality) might be willing to do so again in the future—even
from another seller, thus expecting this other (unknown) seller to
be similarly trustworthy.
Supporting this reasoning, buyers whose trust had been betrayed
in an online transaction generalized their reduced trust to all sellers
whereas buyers whose trust had been rewarded maintained their
general trust in the sellers (Bolton, Katok, & Ockenfels, 2004).
Hence, trusting is arguably a “learned behavior” (Blair & Stout,
2001, p. 1742; see also Van Lange, 2015) to some extent as it will
be based on previous experiences with others’ trustworthiness
(Courtois & Tazdaït, 2012; Fang, Kimbrough, Valluri, Zheng, &
Pace, 2002; Landrum et al., 2015; Rothmund, Gollwitzer, Bender,
& Klimmt, 2015; van den Bos, van Dijk, & Crone, 2012). Note
that the accuracy of trustworthiness judgments based on prior trust
experiences will essentially depend on whether or not the gener-
alization (from prior experiences to the current situation) is justi-
fied. Typically, this will be more often the case if the current
trustee is somehow similar to the one(s) encountered previously. In
general, future research might profit from taking into account the
potential influence of prior trust experiences on trust behavior (cf.
Bellemare & Kroger, 2007) and, in turn, consider whether indi-
viduals have participated in previous studies using similar para-
digms (e.g., the trust game) in which they have received feedback
on another’s trustworthiness (cf. Table 1).
Social projection. Besides trust cues and prior trust experi-
ences, a third (trait-based) source of information people might
consider in their probability estimates of others’ trustworthiness is
social projection. Social projection is a “judgmental heuristic that
leads people to expect that others will behave as they themselves
do” (Krueger & Acevedo, 2005, p. 18). As recently discussed by
Krueger and colleagues (Krueger & Acevedo, 2005; Krueger,
DiDonato, & Freestone, 2012; Krueger, Massey, & DiDonato,
2008; Krueger, 2007), social projection represents a reasonable
antecedent of trust.8 According to this view, people predict anoth-
er’s trustworthiness (or cooperativeness, respectively) by project-
ing their own cooperative preferences onto the other. Based on this
prediction of another’s trustworthiness, people might then decide
whether it is reasonable to trust. Correspondingly, a cooperative
individual should expect others to be cooperative (i.e., trustworthy)
as well, thus considering trust reasonable due to a high expected
probability of trust appreciation. In contrast, an uncooperative
individual should expect others to be uncooperative as well, thus
considering trust unreasonable due to a high expected probability
of betrayal.
In line with the idea that one’s own cooperativeness influences trust
behavior (i.e., through social projection), different variants of other-
regarding preferences such as altruism, unconditional kindness, fair-
ness, and inequality aversion have repeatedly been considered rele-
vant predictors of trust (Ashraf et al., 2006; Cox, 2004; Derks, Lee, &
Krabbendam, 2014; Dunning et al., 2012; Fehr, 2009; Hong & Boh-
net, 2007; Johansson-Stenman, Mahmud, & Martinsson, 2013;
Krueger et al., 2008; Lehmann-Waffenschmidt & Leipold, 2011;
Mansbridge, 1999; Sapienza et al., 2013). Indeed, evidence shows that
individuals with a prosocial social value orientation (SVO) or a high
willingness to cooperate in the dictator or the prisoner’s dilemma
game were more likely to trust than individuals with a proself SVO or
a low willingness to cooperate in either game (Ashraf et al., 2006;
Ben-Ner & Halldorsson, 2010; Bohnet & Baytelman, 2007; Chaud-
huri & Gangadharan, 2007; Cox, 2004; Etang et al., 2011; Kanaga-
retnam, Mestelman, Nainar, & Shehata, 2009; Macko et al., 2014;
Sapienza et al., 2013; Yamagishi et al., 2013, 2012). In the same vein,
findings from the trust game demonstrate that high trustworthiness is
typically accompanied by a high willingness to trust. That is, individ-
uals who honored (rather than betrayed) trust as a trustee also en-
7 Note, however, that potential sanctions should only increase trust
concerning others’ external motivation to honor trust, but might even
decrease trust concerning others’ intrinsic motivation to do so (Chen,
Pillutla, & Yao, 2009; Mulder, van Dijk, De Cremer, & Wilke, 2006).
Besides, the effectiveness of potential sanctions to increase trust might
differ across societies as a function of generalized trust in others, that is,
trust propensity (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013).
8 Note that social projection has also been (implicitly) considered in
previous trust theories. For example, Sapienza et al. (2013) propose that
belief-based trust (in the sense of trustworthiness expectations) is strongly
affected by a trustor’s own behavior. Similarly, Hill and O’Hara (2006)
assume that people facing a trust decision imagine others to behave as they
themselves would behave. Finally, Brewer (2008) refers to social projec-
tion as a mediator of intragroup trust. Likewise, social projection has been
discussed early on as a determinant of expectations about a partner’s
willingness to cooperate in the prisoner’s dilemma game (Dawes, McTav-
ish, & Shaklee, 1977; Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Orbell & Dawes, 1991).
Yet, in this context, trustworthiness expectations have only been assessed
a posteriori to actual trusting choices, thus considering social projection as
a postchoice process rather than as a (prechoice) determinant of expecta-
tions and corresponding behavior.
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trusted relatively large amounts of money as a trustor (Altmann et al.,
2008; Chaudhuri & Gangadharan, 2007; De Neys et al., 2015; Evans
& Revelle, 2008; Schechter, 2007; Vyrastekova & Garikipati, 2005;
Yamagishi et al., 2013).
However, given that the investment in the trust game affects
another person’s (i.e., the trustee’s) outcome, it does not represent
a pure measure of trust, but also incorporates aspects of coopera-
tion (Ben-Ner & Putterman, 2009; Burks, Carpenter, & Verhoo-
gen, 2003; Cox, 2004; Evans et al., 2013; Holm & Nystedt, 2008;
Kamas & Preston, 2012; McEvily, Radzevick, & Weber, 2012;
Vollan, 2011; Vyrastekova & Garikipati, 2005; Yamagishi et al.,
2013). Hence, evidence linking other-regarding preferences to
trust behavior in the trust game cannot conclusively corroborate a
mechanism of social projection, but might reflect the cooperation-
related aspect of trust game investments. Ruling out this alternative
explanation, recent evidence based on the faith game—a game
sought to provide a pure measure of trust in another’s coopera-
tiveness (Kiyonari, Yamagishi, Cook, & Cheshire, 2006; Kiyonari
& Yamagishi, 1999)9—also pointed to a significant relation be-
tween individuals’ own cooperativeness (in different economic
games) and trust behavior (Yamagishi et al., 2013). Similarly, trait
cooperativeness has been specifically identified as a predictor of
trustworthiness expectations (Thielmann & Hilbig, 2014). That is,
compared to uncooperative individuals, cooperative individuals were
more optimistic about an unknown other’s fairness and, in turn,
trustworthiness. In summary, various findings support the notion that
social projection of one’s own trustworthiness onto others might be a
common source of information people consider in forming trustwor-
thiness expectations. Note, however, that people will differ in their
tendency to project their own characteristics onto others (Krueger &
Acevedo, 2007). Correspondingly, people might also differ in their
tendency to use social projection as a means of predicting others’
trustworthiness.
Following from the idea that individuals’ own trustworthiness
affects their trustworthiness expectations (through social projec-
tion) and, in turn, their trust behavior, personality traits determin-
ing an individual’s trustworthiness should predict trust behavior. In
general, trustworthiness comprises two components, namely co-
operation and honesty (cf. Van Lange, Van Vugt, Meertens, &
Ruiter, 1998; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994; Yamagishi, 1988).
Most basically, cooperation is reducible to trait fairness (e.g.,
Arneson, 1982; Eek & Biel, 2003; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Güney
& Newell, 2013; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Rabin,
1993; Wilke, 1991), which represents an individual’s willingness
to share or give rather than to exploit others, even if there is no
particular incentive to do so.10 Honesty, in contrast, describes the
degree to which one can rely on the word or promise of an
individual (cf. López-Pérez, 2012). Correspondingly, people typ-
ically ascribe benign intentions to honest others (Ashton, Lee, &
Son, 2000; Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972; Van Lange & Kuhlman,
1994; Van Lange & Semin-Goossens, 1998; C. S. Wang, Galinsky,
& Murnighan, 2009). Overall, both trait fairness and trait honesty
are hence reasonable determinants of trustworthiness and—based
on the idea of social projection—of individual differences in trust
behavior (cf. Figure 1).
Note, however, that these two components should underlie trust
behavior in somewhat different situations: Whereas fairness refers to
trust behavior in situations in which the trustor depends on the
trustee’s cooperativeness (e.g., the willingness to return entrusted
money in the trust game), honesty refers to trust behavior in situations
in which the trustor depends on the trustee’s word or promise (e.g., the
willingness to truthfully report some relevant information). In any
case, both components refer to an individual’s trustworthiness and
should therefore refer to a single underlying trait as determinant.
Nevertheless, it seems advisable to consider which aspect of trust-
worthiness is more relevant for the trust situation at hand (fairness vs.
honesty) and to choose corresponding methods in future studies
concerned with the influence of social projection on trust decisions.
Preliminary summary of (II) trustworthiness expectations.
As detailed above, we summarize three different sources of informa-
tion individuals might use to predict an unknown other’s trustworthi-
ness (cf. Figure 1): (a) situational and personal trust cues available in
a specific trust situation, (b) prior trust experiences collected in
situations similar to the one at hand, thus reflecting an a priori
trustworthiness expectation about unknown others in a specific situ-
ation, and (c) social projection of one’s own trustworthiness, captur-
ing the personality aspect underlying trustworthiness expectations in
terms of trait fairness and trait honesty. Integrating these pieces of
evidence, a trustor may arrive at some estimate of the probability of
trust appreciation versus trust betrayal, thereby reducing uncertainty
about the other’s likely behavior. However, by definition, a trustor can
never be completely certain about another’s trustworthiness as long as
the situation is one of trust rather than confidence (i.e., assurance
without an involvement of uncertainty or risk, respectively; Luhmann,
1988), regardless of the number and the validity of the available
trustworthiness-related pieces of evidence.
Concerning the accuracy of trustworthiness judgments, it ap-
pears that even children are somehow able to distinguish trustwor-
thy from untrustworthy trustees based on different trust cues (see
Mills, 2013, for a recent review). However, it should also be noted
that (even in adults) the trustor’s judgment does not necessarily
9 In the faith game, individuals decide whether to receive an unknown
amount of money a randomly matched dictator allocated to a recipient or
to receive a fixed amount of money from the experimenter that is known
to be less than half of the amount the dictator could divide. If an individual
trusts in the fairness of the dictator, she should prefer the (potentially
higher) amount allocated by the dictator over the fixed amount from the
experimenter. But, if an individual distrusts in the fairness of the dictator,
she should go for the fixed amount from the experimenter. Note that, in
general, the trusting choice in the faith game has no effect on the joint or
the partner’s outcome.
10 Besides fairness, previous research has considered altruism (i.e., per-
sonal sacrifice on behalf of others) and greed (i.e., high importance of own
gains) as general traits underlying cooperation. However, because both
altruism and greed have usually been defined in terms of dictator game
giving—which basically reflects a measure of fairness—they are well
captured in the concept of trait fairness (cf. Eek & Biel, 2003; Wilke,
1991). Similarly, scholars have proposed several specific traits as under-
lying factors of individual differences in cooperative behavior. Most prom-
inently, cooperation has been linked to social value orientation, reflecting
the weights people assign to their own and to others’ outcomes in situations
of interdependence (Messick & McClintock, 1968; for a meta-analytic
overview see Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009). Furthermore, inequality
aversion (i.e., disliking differences between own and others’ or own and
average payoffs, respectively; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt,
1999) and strong reciprocity (i.e., high willingness to cooperate with
cooperative others and to punish those who violate the norms of cooper-
ation, at a personal cost; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003) have been
discussed as specific traits underlying cooperation. However, all these
concepts ultimately share a common core captured by what we mean by
“fairness”.
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reflect the available evidence in terms of an optimal probability
estimate. For example, individuals might consider only a subset of
the available information due to time pressure, low motivation, or
little need to reduce uncertainty about the other’s trustworthi-
ness.11 They might use simplifying heuristics for probability esti-
mation (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982) and/or different
strategies for cue integration (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; New-
ell & Bröder, 2008), the accuracy of which will depend on the cue
environment (Hogarth & Karelaia, 2007). Also, the probability
estimate may be distorted by an individual’s sensitivity to victim-
ization (Gollwitzer, Rothmund, Alt, & Jekel, 2012; Gollwitzer,
Rothmund, Pfeiffer, & Ensenbach, 2009; Gollwitzer, Rothmund,
& Süssenbach, 2013), emotional state (J. R. Dunn & Schweitzer,
2005), and a negativity bias (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer,
& Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001), mirroring people’s
general tendency to overestimate the probability of negative events
compared to positive or neutral ones (A. J. L. Harris, Corner, &
Hahn, 2009). As the latter suggests, people may generally overes-
timate the probability of trust betrayal—which is in line with
evidence indicating that people tend to generally underestimate
others’ trustworthiness (Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009, 2010;
D. T. Miller, 1999). Unfortunately, though, there have been no
attempts so far to integrate the literature on trustworthiness expec-
tations and (cognitive processes of) judgments under uncertainty
as typically addressed in the cognitive psychological literature.
Thus, the question of how different sources of information are
integrated and to what extent intuitive versus deliberate cognitive
processes are at work (cf. Betsch & Glöckner, 2010; Glöckner &
Witteman, 2010) is largely unanswered. Undoubtedly, the ex-
pected probability of another’s (un)trustworthiness should strongly
influence an individual’s willingness to trust. To specify how
exactly individuals form this probability estimate—and thus bridge
the noteworthy gap between trust research and judgment re-
search—remains a vital quest for future research (cf. Table 1).
However, recent developments in (probabilistic) modeling of epis-
temic trust in children based on Bayesian inference (Shafto, Eaves,
Navarro, & Perfors, 2012) seems to provide a valuable starting
point and a fruitful (statistical) approach to close this gap.
III. Betrayal Sensitivity as a Determinant of
Outcome Evaluation
In addition to the determinants introduced so far (i.e., (I) atti-
tudes toward risky prospects and (II) trustworthiness expectations),
we finally propose (III) betrayal sensitivity as a third component
underlying trust behavior, particularly influencing individuals’
evaluations of potential losses resulting from trust behavior. As
discussed above, trusting is accompanied by risk (in the sense of a
potential loss) due to the trustee’s opportunity to betray and the
trustor’s inevitable uncertainty about the trustee’s inclination to do
so. This suggests that if trusting results in a loss, the loss can
specifically be traced back to another person’s betrayal (rather than
to bad luck, for instance). A loss resulting from misplaced trust
might hence go beyond a mere material loss, but also involve a
psychological loss due to the way the loss came about (cf. Rabin,
1993). As Bohnet et al. (2010) reasoned based on prospect theory,
“betrayal imposes an additional utility cost beyond monetary loss.
That cost increases the more the likelihood of betrayal deviates
from one’s reference points of accustomed experience” (p. 812). In
line with this reasoning, recent research suggests that people are, in
general, less willing to take a risk when the risk results from
human selfish and untrustworthy behavior (i.e., trust situation) as
opposed to the risk resulting from bad luck (i.e., gamble situa-
tion)—a phenomenon called betrayal aversion (Aimone & Houser,
2011, 2012, 2013; Baumgartner, Heinrichs, Vonlanthen, Fisch-
bacher, & Fehr, 2008; Bohnet, Greig, Herrmann, & Zeckhauser,
2008; Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004; Corcos et al., 2012; Fehr,
2009; Hong & Bohnet, 2007; Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, Fisch-
bacher, & Fehr, 2005).
Supporting the idea of betrayal aversion, several studies have
demonstrated that individuals distinguish between risks resulting
from betrayal and risks resulting from bad luck. More specifically,
one line of research showed that participants are less willing to
take a risk in trust situations compared with nonsocial risk situa-
tions (Baumgartner et al., 2008; Bohnet et al., 2008; Bohnet &
Zeckhauser, 2004; Kosfeld et al., 2005). In these studies, partici-
pants had to estimate the minimum acceptable probability of
gaining the higher of two outcomes in a (trust or risk) game for
which they would prefer the game over a sure (but relatively low)
outcome. In the trust game, the final outcome was determined by
another person; in the risk game, it was determined by nature. As
expected, individuals indicated higher minimum acceptable prob-
abilities in the trust game than in the risk game, thus indicating a
lower willingness to take a risk in situations in which a poor
outcome is produced by another’s betrayal rather than the same
outcome being due to bad luck. Of note, recent evidence on the
biological basis of trust suggests that the positive effect of oxyto-
cin on trust is due to a reduction in betrayal aversion (Baumgartner
et al., 2008; Kosfeld et al., 2005) which, in turn, most likely results
from a decrease in amygdala activation (e.g., Kirsch et al., 2005;
see also Rilling & Sanfey, 2011, for an overview).
In addition to differences between trust and risk games, further
evidence suggests that individuals are particularly motivated to
prevent suffering from knowing that another person betrayed their
trust (Aimone & Houser, 2012, 2013). That is, when participants
were able to choose whether they want to know the decision of
their assigned trustee or instead receive a payment according to a
random draw from a separate pool of decisions identical to the
pool of the trustee’s decisions, they preferred to avoid knowing
whether their trustee honored or betrayed their trust and rather
chose to be paid according to the behavior of a randomly drawn
trustee. Strikingly, if participants could not avoid knowing their
partner’s trustworthiness, they were less willing to trust in the first
place. Irrational though this appears, people may thus be more
willing to trust if they need not learn whether the trustee betrayed
them. In real-life, however, one may argue that individuals cannot
avoid receiving feedback about a trustee’s trustworthiness (or
betrayal, respectively), unless they mistrust in the first place (cf.
11 Individuals usually differ in their motivation to reduce uncertainty as
a function of their individual level of ambiguity aversion (i.e., the prefer-
ence for known risks over unknown risks; Ellsberg, 1961). In a trust
situation, individuals with high ambiguity aversion might hence gather as
much information as possible to come up with a fairly reliable (and rather
certain) prediction about an interaction partner’s trustworthiness. Individ-
uals with low ambiguity aversion, in contrast, might be satisfied with only
gathering little information given that they should consider the state of
uncertainty less aversive.
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Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2010). Nevertheless, the findings re-
viewed so far support the notion that individuals differentiate
between different sources of risk (i.e., human selfishness vs. na-
ture)—showing sensitivity toward betrayal (cf. Lehmann-
Waffenschmidt & Leipold, 2011).12
Betrayal sensitivity. Based on these findings on betrayal
aversion, betrayal sensitivity—an individual’s tendency to attri-
bute a greater severity to a loss resulting from human selfishness
than to a formally equivalent loss resulting from nature—should be
a vital determinant underlying trust behavior.13 In particular, in-
dividuals might differ regarding their weighting of (objectively
comparable) losses resulting from taking a social versus taking an
asocial risk (cf. Table 1). That is, whereas some individuals might
perceive the potential loss of trusting rather similar to the potential
loss of gambling (i.e., low betrayal sensitivity), others might
perceive the potential loss of trusting clearly more severe than a
formally equivalent loss of gambling (i.e., high betrayal sensitiv-
ity). This implies another source of interindividual variation in
trust decisions. In effect, betrayal sensitivity should be negatively
related to trust because of its influence on the evaluation of
outcomes, particularly losses.
Given that individuals high in betrayal sensitivity are assumed
to ascribe a greater severity to losses resulting from nonappreci-
ated trust than to comparable losses resulting from bad luck,
betrayal sensitivity should arguably be driven by low interpersonal
forgiveness (cf. Fehr, 2009). Forgiveness refers to the willingness
to refrain from retaliatory actions when others are behaving un-
fairly. If one is quick to forgive, there is little need for betrayal
aversion. Supporting this notion, betrayal has been found to induce
reactions that are antithetical to forgiveness (i.e., grudge, ven-
geance, and retribution; Finkel, Rusbult, Kumashiro, & Hannon,
2002; Stouten, De Cremer, & van Dijk, 2006). Similarly, trust
behavior following a transgression was predicted by trait forgive-
ness (Desmet, De Cremer, & van Dijk, 2011) as well as disposi-
tional (dis)trust (Maltby et al., 2008; Walker & Gorsuch, 2002).
We thus propose individual differences in betrayal sensitivity to be
explainable by trait forgiveness. However, because betrayal sen-
sitivity has not yet been operationalized as an individual difference
construct, the relation between betrayal sensitivity and general
personality traits (such as forgiveness) remains an open quest for
future research.
In summary, we propose betrayal sensitivity as a third determi-
nant underlying trust behavior (besides risk aversion/loss aversion
and trustworthiness expectations; cf. Figure 1), especially affecting
the evaluation of potential losses resulting from trust behavior.
Individuals high in betrayal sensitivity are expected to be less
willing to take a risk in a trust situation than in a comparable risky
gamble situation (due to ascribing a higher negative utility to a loss
resulting from betrayal than to a formally equivalent loss resulting
from bad luck). Given that individuals high in betrayal sensitivity
thus seem to particularly dislike nonappreciated trust, trait forgive-
ness should arguably drive individual differences in betrayal sen-
sitivity—and thus trust.
Reward sensitivity. Note, however, that in addition to focus-
ing on the potential losses associated with betrayed trust (as
implied by the notion of betrayal sensitivity), some individuals
may also place considerable attention on the potential reward
inherent in a positive (i.e., trusting) social interaction. This corre-
sponds with neurobiological evidence pointing to an involvement
of reward-related brain areas in trust behavior (Delgado et al.,
2005; Fehr & Camerer, 2007; King-Casas et al., 2005) as well as
with recent research proposing an expressive in addition to an
instrumental component of trust, assuming that individuals also
consider the immediate “gains” (i.e., positive feelings) associated
with the trusting act itself in their decision to trust (Dunning et al.,
2014, 2012; Dunning & Fetchenhauer, 2010, 2011).
Specifically, individuals high in Extraversion should perceive
social interactions as particularly rewarding per se (e.g., Ashton,
Lee, & Paunonen, 2002; Denissen & Penke, 2008; Fishman, Ng, &
Bellugi, 2011; Lucas, Diener, Grob, Suh, & Shao, 2000; Lucas &
Diener, 2001; Pavot, Diener, & Fujita, 1990) and therefore be
highly motivated to approach such interactions (Depue & Collins,
1999; Gray, 1970). In turn, extraverts might be more willing to
trust others than introverts as a result of anticipating a large gain
from trusting. Correspondingly, findings point to a positive rela-
tion between Extraversion and the willingness to trust (Evans &
Revelle, 2008; Hiraishi, Yamagata, Shikishima, & Ando, 2008;
Swope, Cadigan, Schmitt, & Shupp, 2008; Thielmann & Hilbig,
2014). Note, however, that the above reasoning presupposes a truly
social situation involving interpersonal interaction. Particularly in
the context of trust among strangers this may rarely be the case
because many situations involve a limited amount of social inter-
action (e.g., online purchase). In turn, the effect of reward sensi-
tivity is restricted to situations involving a high social component.
Besides, given that most people should be motivated to avoid
betrayal (as implied by a general tendency toward betrayal aver-
sion; e.g., Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004), betrayal sensitivity should
be the stronger predictor of trust behavior as compared to reward
sensitivity. For these reasons, we primarily focus on betrayal
sensitivity as a determinant of outcome evaluation in situations of
trust among strangers.
The Big Picture: The Interplay of Trust Determinants
So far, we have outlined how the trusting choice of making
oneself dependent on another can be understood as a function of
three determinants: (I) attitudes toward risky prospects (i.e., risk
aversion and loss aversion), (II) trustworthiness expectations
(based on trust cues, prior trust experiences, and/or social projec-
tion), and (III) betrayal sensitivity. Assuming that the decision to
trust is conceptually comparable to a decision under risk, risk
aversion and loss aversion should essentially mediate the effects of
trustworthiness expectations and betrayal sensitivity, respectively.
Specifically, trustworthiness expectations influence the probability
12 Unlike the (multiple) findings indicating betrayal aversion, there is
also some evidence pointing to the opposite, namely a higher willingness
to take a risk in the trust game compared to a risk game (Fetchenhauer &
Dunning, 2009, 2012). However, in these studies, a participant’s decision
to trust in the trust game, but not her decision to take a risk in the risk game,
determined the outcome of another person—which might in turn explain
the deviating results.
13 Note that, although similar in name, betrayal sensitivity has to be
differentiated from rejection sensitivity, which denotes an individual’s
disposition to anxiously expect, readily perceive, and intensely respond to
rejection (Downey & Feldman, 1996). By contrast, betrayal sensitivity
does not involve specific expectations toward betrayal or a particular
readiness to perceive betrayal, but rather specifically captures individuals’
evaluation of losses due to betrayal (compared to losses attributable to
nature).
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input which is processed based on an individual’s risk aversion. In
turn, betrayal sensitivity influences the outcome input which is
processed based on an individual’s loss aversion (cf. Figure 1). In
other words, (I) risk aversion and loss aversion essentially operate
on (II) the subjective probability of betrayal (the result of the
formation of trustworthiness expectations) and (III) the subjective
outcome utility (the result of outcome evaluation as potentially
distorted through betrayal sensitivity), respectively.
Although this combined view suggests that all three determi-
nants make a unique contribution to the decision to trust, trust-
worthiness expectations seem especially important given that trust
behavior is based upon some expectation of whether the trustee
will act in a benevolent fashion. That is, it is arguably a necessary
condition of trust that the trustor expects (i.e., subjectively esti-
mates) at least a larger-than-zero probability of trust appreciation
(cf. Giffin, 1967). In case a trustor expects a 0% probability that
the trustee acts trustworthily (e.g., due to the presence of suspi-
cious trust cues), the trustor should never trust, regardless of how
small the potential loss (and how large the potential gain) of
trusting might be. In effect, risk aversion, loss aversion, and
betrayal sensitivity will thus be irrelevant.
In turn, whenever the estimated probability of trust appreciation
exceeds zero, individuals’ levels of risk aversion, loss aversion,
and betrayal sensitivity might come into play. More specifically,
these components may be particularly influential whenever a trus-
tor has neither a very positive, nor a very negative expectation
about the interaction partner’s trustworthiness; that is, in situations
in which the subjective chance of trust appreciation equals the
subjective chance of trust betrayal (i.e., both approximate 50%).
Indeed, evidence suggests that risk aversion is especially relevant
for trust behavior when individuals have a rather vague trustwor-
thiness expectation. For example, risk aversion has been found to
be most predictive of trust behavior in individuals with neither a
strong prosocial nor a strong proself SVO (Kanagaretnam et al.,
2009) and thus in individuals who will not arrive at a strong
expectation through social projection. Moreover, increasing the
subjective confidence in trustworthiness expectations by providing
specific information about an interaction partner (i.e., sex, prefer-
ences, appearance, ethnicity) eliminated the otherwise observed
relation between risk aversion and trust behavior (Eckel & Wilson,
2004). Similarly, information about an interaction partner’s likely
back transfer reduced the (albeit small) impact of risk aversion on
trust behavior (Houser et al., 2010). In sum, these findings suggest
that the impact of risk aversion on trust behavior depends on the
degree of uncertainty and risk expressed in the trustworthiness
expectations. Arguably, the same should apply to loss aversion and
betrayal sensitivity, though no empirical evidence for or against
this conjecture is currently available.
Furthermore, it seems likely that actual decisions to trust are not
universally and equally contingent on all trust determinants. If, for
example, the trustor anticipates a highly positive outcome from
trusting, this anticipated gain might outweigh the potential losses,
especially in individuals low in loss aversion. As a consequence,
the individual might place great emphasis on the resulting positive
utility and essentially neglect the probabilities of trust appreciation
versus trust betrayal in her decision to trust. In turn, dispositional
risk aversion (which processes these probabilities) might only play
a minor role for the particular decision to trust. The same might
hold if the utility associated with trusting is highly negative, thus
leading to distrust in the first place (again almost irrespective of
dispositional risk aversion). Such interactions between determi-
nants might hence also account for the inconsistent evidence
relating dispositional risk aversion to trust behavior (in addition to
measurement-related issues, as summarized above). In any case,
the speculative nature of these arguments shows that further re-
search will be necessary to clarify the potential interplay of dif-
ferent trust determinants (cf. Table 1). Even so, it seems at least
reasonable that actual trust decisions will sometimes deviate from
how trust decisions should be made based on consequentialist
logic.
Models of Personality
As reasoned above, one of the key aims of the current review is
to link the main components of trust to individual differences and
personality traits. In particular, we focus on the links between
models of basic personality structure and the three central compo-
nents of trust summarized above so as to provide a theory-driven,
comprehensive, and parsimonious account. Recall that we previ-
ously outlined three broad (combinations of) personality traits
relevant for trust behavior: (I) anxiety and fear, explaining indi-
vidual differences in risk and loss aversion, (II) fairness and
honesty (i.e., trustworthiness), explaining individual differences in
trustworthiness expectations through social projection, and (III)
forgiveness, explaining individual differences in betrayal sensitiv-
ity. In the following, we will discuss whether and how these
personality traits are covered in models of basic personality struc-
ture. To this end, we refer to two models that have been primarily
considered in recent personality research on social behavior: the
Five-Factor Model (Costa & McCrae, 1992; McCrae & Costa,
1985) and the HEXACO model of personality structure (Ashton &
Lee, 2007; Lee & Ashton, 2004). Note that more specific traits that
have been considered relevant predictors of social behavior—most
prominently SVO (Van Lange, 1999)—can be subsumed under
the broader traits conceptualized in the basic trait models.
The Five-Factor Model
As the name suggests, the Five-Factor Model of personality
(FFM) entails five factors as the basic dimensions of individual
differences: Neuroticism, Extraversion, Conscientiousness, Agree-
ableness, and Openness to Experience (Costa & McCrae, 1992;
McCrae & Costa, 1985). With regard to the presented three-
component framework—and the traits assumed to drive trust be-
havior (viz., anxiety/fear, trustworthiness, and forgiveness)—Neu-
roticism and Agreeableness are the two factors that should be
primarily responsible for individual differences in trust behavior.
In the following, we will briefly review evidence supporting this
assumption.
As outlined above, trait anxiety and fear, respectively, should
explain individual differences in risk aversion and loss aversion
(cf. Figure 1) and thereby account for how expectations (i.e.,
subjective probabilities) and potential outcomes are processed and
integrated. In the FFM, trait anxiety and fear are both included in
the anxiety facet of Neuroticism (e.g., as assessed by the NEO
Personality Inventory Revised, NEO-PI-R; Costa & McCrae,
1992) which, in turn, is referred to as “the sensitivity of a domain-
general system to respond to environmental threats” (Denissen &
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Penke, 2008, p. 1289). Correspondingly, several studies reported
high correlations between Neuroticism and trait anxiety and/or fear
(e.g., Doty, Japee, Ingvar, & Ungerleider, 2013; Gomez & Francis,
2003; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). Moreover, high levels of
Neuroticism have been identified as a risk factor for the develop-
ment of anxiety disorders (Clark, Watson, & Mineka, 1994).
Neuroticism should hence explain individual differences in trust
behavior through its influence on trait anxiety and fear.
With regard to the second component of trust reviewed above,
trustworthiness expectations, our summary of the literature sug-
gests that social projection of an individual’s own trustworthiness
(i.e., fairness and honesty) will influence her expectations. In terms
of the FFM, one’s trustworthiness should in turn be covered by
Agreeableness. From among the FFM dimensions, the latter has
most consistently been related to fairness, with high Agreeableness
predicting sharing in the dictator game (Baumert, Schlösser, &
Schmitt, 2013; Becker, Deckers, Dohmen, Falk, & Kosse, 2012;
Ben-Ner, Kong, & Putterman, 2004), nonexploitation in resource
dilemmas (Koole, Jager, van den Berg, Vlek, & Hofstee, 2001) and
public goods games (Volk, Thöni, & Ruigrok, 2011), cooperation
in the prisoner’s dilemma game (Pothos, Perry, Corr, Matthew, &
Busemeyer, 2011), and trustworthiness in the trust game (Becker
et al., 2012; Ben-Ner & Halldorsson, 2010)—although these ef-
fects are not entirely robust and null-findings have also been
reported (Brocklebank, Lewis, & Bates, 2011; Evans & Revelle,
2008; Hirsh & Peterson, 2009; Kurzban & Houser, 2001; Lön-
nqvist, Verkasalo, & Walkowitz, 2011; Müller & Schwieren,
2012; for a recent review on the relation between behavior in
economic games and basic personality traits see Zhao & Smillie,
2015). According to the presented framework, individuals high in
Agreeableness might hence have rather optimistic expectations
about another’s trustworthiness (due to projecting their own ten-
dency to be cooperative onto others), thus being more willing to
trust than individuals low in Agreeableness. Indeed, Agreeableness
specifically includes a trust facet, describing “the tendency to
attribute benevolent intent to others” (Costa, McCrae, & Dye,
1991, p. 888)—thus essentially capturing the essence of trustwor-
thiness expectations. Similarly, trait honesty—the second dimen-
sion of trustworthiness—is covered by the straightforwardness
facet of Agreeableness as measured by the NEO-PI-R (Ashton et
al., 2000; Costa et al., 1991), thus further supporting the notion that
Agreeableness should account for individual differences in trust-
worthiness.
Third and finally, evidence suggests that forgiveness—the trait
assumed to drive betrayal sensitivity—should be best explained by
low Neuroticism and high Agreeableness. Specifically, low Neu-
roticism and high Agreeableness have consistently been associated
with trait forgiveness and forgiveness-related behavior (Ashton,
Paunonen, Helmes, & Jackson, 1998; J. W. Berry, Worthington,
O’Connor, Parrott, & Wade, 2005; Brose, Rye, Lutz-Zois, & Ross,
2005; Jensen-Campbell & Graziano, 2001; Walker & Gorsuch,
2002; T.-W. Wang, 2008). In turn, high Neuroticism and low
Agreeableness have been associated with vengefulness (Maltby et
al., 2008; McCullough, Bellah, Kilpatrick, & Johnson, 2001; Mc-
Cullough & Hoyt, 2002)—an expression of low forgiveness (e.g.,
McCullough et al., 2001). Thus, Neuroticism and Agreeableness
should explain individual differences in trust behavior, in this case
through their influence on trait forgiveness which arguably drives
individuals’ betrayal sensitivity.
Concluding from the evidence sketched so far, the FFM would
account for individual differences in trust behavior primarily
through two dimensions, namely Neuroticism and Agreeableness.
With regard to Agreeableness, prior evidence directly supports this
idea, showing that high Agreeableness has a positive effect on
investments in the trust game (Becker et al., 2012; Ben-Ner &
Halldorsson, 2010; Evans & Revelle, 2008; Mikolajczak et al.,
2010; Zhao & Smillie, 2015) which could—in line with the pre-
sented framework—be particularly traced back to the trust and
straightforwardness facets of Agreeableness (Müller & Schwieren,
2012). With regard to Neuroticism, however, evidence is rather
scarce with only one study supporting the proposed negative
relation between Neuroticism (specifically the anxiety facet) and
trust (Müller & Schwieren, 2012) and another study hinting at a
trend for said relation (Ben-Ner & Halldorsson, 2010). However,
only a few studies have predicted trust behavior from the perspec-
tive of the FFM, and thus further research is needed to critically
test the proposed associations between trust behavior and Neurot-
icism as well as Agreeableness.
The HEXACO Model
As an extension and slight variation of the FFM, the HEXACO
model of personality structure (Honesty-Humility, Emotionality,
eXtraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness to
Experience) has recently been proposed based on lexical studies
across various languages, supporting a six-factor structure of basic
personality traits (Ashton & Lee, 2007; Lee & Ashton, 2004).
From a theoretical point of view, the HEXACO model specifically
proposes three dimensions as underlying factors of prosocial be-
havior (Ashton, Lee, & De Vries, 2014; Ashton & Lee, 2007) and
thus of trust: Emotionality, Honesty-Humility, and Agreeableness.
We will outline how each of these three HEXACO dimensions
particularly covers one of the proposed personality aspects under-
lying trust behavior (i.e., anxiety/fear, trustworthiness, and for-
giveness) in what follows.
To begin with, anxiety and fear are both included in the Emo-
tionality factor of the HEXACO model, a variant of FFM-
Neuroticism. In particular, Emotionality contains one specific
facet for each of these traits, with the anxiety facet capturing the
tendency to worry and the fearfulness facet capturing the tendency
to experience fear (Lee & Ashton, 2004). By definition, high levels
of Emotionality are linked to “decreased opportunities for gains
that are [. . .] associated with risks” (Ashton & Lee, 2007, p. 156).
Emotionality can hence be assumed to account for individual
differences in trust behavior based on its effect on trait anxiety and
fear.
With regard to trustworthiness, the second trait component of
trust proposed in the present framework, the HEXACO model
clearly points to the newly introduced Honesty-Humility factor as
the primary predictor of fairness and honesty. More specifically,
Honesty-Humility represents “the tendency to be fair and genuine
in dealing with others, in the sense of cooperating with others even
when one might exploit them without suffering retaliation”
(Ashton & Lee, 2007, p. 156). Correspondingly, high levels of
Honesty-Humility have consistently been related to fairness and
nonexploitation in economic games (Baumert et al., 2013; Hilbig,
Glöckner, & Zettler, 2014; Hilbig et al., 2012; Hilbig, Thielmann,
Hepp, Klein, & Zettler, 2015; Hilbig, Thielmann, Wührl, &
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Zettler, 2015; Hilbig, Zettler, Leist, & Heydasch, 2013; Thiel-
mann, Hilbig, & Niedtfeld, 2014; Thielmann & Hilbig, 2014;
Zettler, Hilbig, & Heydasch, 2013) as well as to prosocial SVO
(Ackermann, Fleiß, & Murphy, in press; Hilbig et al., 2014;
Hilbig, Zettler, Moshagen, & Heydasch, 2013; Hilbig & Zettler,
2009). Low levels of Honesty-Humility, in contrast, have been
associated with drive for money, material goods, and power
(Ashton & Lee, 2008b; Lee et al., 2013) as well as with crime and
delinquency (Ashton & Lee, 2008b; Cohen, Panter, Turan, Morse,
& Kim, 2014; De Vries & van Gelder, 2013; Dunlop, Morrison,
Koenig, & Silcox, 2012; Lee, Ashton, & De Vries, 2005; Van
Gelder & De Vries, 2012; for an overview see Ashton & Lee,
2008a). Besides fairness, Honesty-Humility has—as its name sug-
gests—also been linked to honesty-related behavior. Specifically,
research found that low levels of Honesty-Humility predicted
cheating (Hershfield, Cohen, & Thompson, 2012; Hilbig & Zettler,
2015), immoral behavior (Hilbig, Moshagen, & Zettler, 2015), and
unethical business practices (Ashton & Lee, 2008b; Cohen et al.,
2014; Lee, Ashton, Morrison, Cordery, & Dunlop, 2008; Marcus,
Lee, & Ashton, 2007). Accounting for both fairness and honesty,
the Honesty-Humility factor should hence cover the trustworthi-
ness aspect of trust behavior. Supporting this reasoning, Honesty-
Humility was significantly related to trustworthiness expectations,
mediated by fairness as assessed in the dictator game (Thielmann
& Hilbig, 2014).
Finally, trait forgiveness—the proposed source of individual
differences in betrayal sensitivity—is covered by HEXACO-
Agreeableness.14 More specifically, HEXACO-Agreeableness
represents “the tendency to be forgiving and tolerant of others, in
the sense of cooperating with others even when one might be
suffering exploitation by them” (Ashton & Lee, 2007, p. 156).
Correspondingly, high levels of HEXACO-Agreeableness have
been associated with trait forgiveness (Shepherd & Belicki, 2008)
as well as with the willingness to refrain from retaliatory actions
when others act in an uncooperative or unfair manner (Hilbig,
Zettler, Leist, et al., 2013; Thielmann et al., 2014). In turn, low
levels of HEXACO-Agreeableness have been linked to revenge
intentions (Lee & Ashton, 2012; K. E. Sheppard & Boon, 2012)
and readiness to retaliate (Perugini, Gallucci, Presaghi, & Ercolani,
2003). Overall, HEXACO-Agreeableness should explain individ-
ual differences in trust behavior through its influence on trait
forgiveness.
To conclude, the HEXACO model would account for individual
differences in trust behavior based on three basic traits, namely
Emotionality, Honesty-Humility, and Agreeableness. Indeed, each
of the three proposed characteristics underlying trust behavior (i.e.,
anxiety/fear, trustworthiness, and forgiveness) is—at least in the-
ory—uniquely covered by one single personality trait of the
HEXACO model. That is, unlike the FFM, the HEXACO model
provides a more clear-cut distinction between the underlying traits
of trust behavior. This will allow for stricter empirical tests at a
higher resolution. For example, rather than predicting that some
combination of Agreeableness and Neuroticism will influence trust
behavior through trait forgiveness and betrayal sensitivity, respec-
tively, the HEXACO model makes the bold assumption that
HEXACO-Agreeableness alone would be responsible for this
mechanism. However, actual evidence on the relation between
trust behavior and the HEXACO dimensions is still missing (cf.
Zhao & Smillie, 2015). We suggest that this is also a fruitful
direction for future research.
However, as briefly sketched above, Extraversion might be
another determinant of trust behavior (mediated through reward
sensitivity) in situations involving a pronounced social component.
In line with this notion, Extraversion has—in both the FFM and the
HEXACO framework—been considered a pillar of the “interper-
sonal circle.” That is, both models assume that Extraversion covers
the intensity of social interaction, whereas Agreeableness (in the
FFM) and Emotionality, Agreeableness, and Honesty-Humility (in
the HEXACO) cover the quality of social interaction (Ashton et
al., 2014; Ashton & Lee, 2007). Hence, the FFM as well as the
HEXACO might account for the (social) reward-related aspect of
trust through individual differences in Extraversion. A positive
relation between Extraversion and trust is also implied by the
positive secondary loading of the trust facet of FFM-
Agreeableness (as measured via the NEO-PI-R; Costa et al., 1991)
on Extraversion as well as by negative secondary loadings of the
anxiety and fearfulness facets of HEXACO-Emotionality (Lee &
Ashton, 2004) on Extraversion.
Summary and Conclusion
In the present work, we provide a broad and integrative review
of interpersonal trust behavior and present a person-situation
framework which organizes the extant findings on trust among
strangers into a coherent structure. We conclude that trust among
strangers can be explained through an interaction between features
of the trust situation and a trustor’s personality characteristics. In
general, this view rests on the notion that trust behavior represents
a risky choice to depend on another in a situation of uncertainty
(cf. Boon & Holmes, 1991). That is, conceptually, the decision to
trust is similar to a decision under risk with more or less obvious
outcomes (i.e., potential gain and loss), and mostly unknown
probabilities of these outcomes—because of the inherent uncer-
tainty about an interaction partner’s trustworthiness.
Based on this general approach, we distill three core compo-
nents of interpersonal trust behavior from the extant literature: (I)
attitudes toward risky prospects, (II) trustworthiness expectations,
and (III) betrayal sensitivity (cf. Figure 1). First, in line with the
decision making literature, we propose that trust behavior involves
two attitudes toward risky prospects, one referring to risk-taking as
a function of probabilities (i.e., risk aversion) and the other refer-
ring to risk-taking as a function of outcomes (i.e., loss aversion)—
both, in turn, influenced by an individual’s trait anxiety and fear.
Second, given that the probabilities of gain versus loss (i.e., trust
appreciation vs. trust betrayal) are, by definition, unknown in a
trust situation (e.g., Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994), trustors might
use three sources of information to come up with a trustworthiness
expectation which provides the probability-related input for the
decision to trust: (a) trust cues, (b) prior trust experiences, and (c)
social projection. Whereas trust cues and prior trust experiences
14 HEXACO-Agreeableness represents a slightly rotated version of
FFM-Agreeableness, including, for example, anger-related traits that are,
in the FFM, summarized in the Neuroticism factor. In the HEXACO
model, trait forgiveness is hence uniquely ascribed to Agreeableness
whereas in the FFM, it is covered by a combination of Agreeableness and
Neuroticism (Ashton et al., 2014).
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mainly refer to the specific trust situation, social projection refers
to the personality aspect underlying trustworthiness expectations.
That is, it reflects an individual’s own trustworthiness (i.e., fair-
ness and honesty) which is, in turn, projected onto another (e.g.,
Krueger et al., 2012). Third and finally, the risk associated with
trusting results from another person’s betrayal rather than from bad
luck (cf. Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004). Thus, betrayal sensitivity is
introduced as a determinant of trust-related loss evaluation that is
driven by trait forgiveness and assumed to affect the outcome-
related input of the decision to trust.
In general, the present work approaches interpersonal trust be-
havior from both a situational and an individual difference per-
spective. With regard to the latter (i.e., the personality aspect of
trust behavior), we extend earlier notions of interpersonal trust by
specifying three distinct personality traits (i.e., anxiety/fear, trust-
worthiness, and forgiveness) as primary sources of interindividual
variation. These three traits, in turn, are well captured in models of
basic personality structure, specifically in the Five-Factor Model
(Costa & McCrae, 1992; McCrae & Costa, 1985) and the
HEXACO model (Ashton & Lee, 2007; Lee & Ashton, 2004).
Thus, precise predictions can be derived and tested beyond exist-
ing accounts that merely considered a single trait of trust propen-
sity (e.g., Mayer et al., 1995). At the same time, the framework
details different aspects of the trust situation (e.g., another’s trust-
worthiness, temptation to betray, availability of potential sanc-
tions) which are likely to influence trust behavior independent of
(or in some interaction with) the proposed personality aspects.
In addition, the present work addresses several contradicting
findings and unsolved issues reported in the trust literature. First,
the review points to a reasonable explanation for people’s seem-
ingly irrational tendency to trust despite rather pessimistic expec-
tations about others’ trustworthiness (Dufwenberg & Gneezy,
2000; Evans & Krueger, 2014; Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009):
Trust behavior is not solely driven by expectations; rather—as
soon as an individual expects a minimum chance of trust appre-
ciation—other factors affect the decision to trust as well (i.e., risk
aversion, loss aversion, and betrayal sensitivity). Hence, individ-
uals might have good reasons to trust despite expecting a relatively
low probability of trust appreciation. Also, the review explicitly
traces the frequently observed (yet insufficiently explained) rela-
tion between trust and trustworthiness (e.g., Colquitt, Scott, &
LePine, 2007; see also early work by Wrightsman, 1964) to social
projection of a trustor’s own trustworthiness onto interaction part-
ners. Finally, it provides reasonable explanations for the inconsis-
tent evidence regarding the relation between trust behavior and
risk aversion. On the one hand, the appropriate assessment and
conceptualization of dispositional risk aversion is still unclear.
Thus, inconsistent findings seem to be likely attributable to the
reliance on different and partly suboptimal measures of risk aver-
sion which, at the same time, apply to different domains of risk
aversion. On the other hand, the influence of dispositional risk
aversion on trust behavior might be diminished under certain
circumstances as a result of the interplay between the different
trust determinants. As sketched above, it seems likely that—
depending on the weights individuals assign to the different as-
pects of the situation (i.e., gains and losses with corresponding
probabilities of occurrence)—the aspects may outweigh each
other, thus causing one determinant to be the primary driver of the
specific trust decision. This implies that dispositional risk aver-
sion, for example, will drive the decision to trust only weakly if
individuals place great emphasis on the potential outcomes of
trusting. Altogether, our review and corresponding framework
hence indicates that—even in light of the inconsistent extant
evidence—risk aversion should be maintained as a reasonable
predictor of trust behavior.
In going beyond a summary of and common structure for extant
literature, the present work also provides clear-cut hypotheses,
implications, and specific open questions for future research (cf.
Table 1). In particular, it is our hope that this review might trigger
more systematic attempts to study the relation between trust be-
havior and (basic) personality traits—an issue that has, in our
view, gained too little attention in previous work. Similarly, the
framework might inspire research on the interaction between (and
integration of) the different determinants underlying trust deci-
sions rather than focusing on each component in isolation. This
might help clarify inconsistent evidence reported in the extant
literature. Overall, the review and distilled framework might en-
courage bringing together different areas of research (e.g., behav-
ioral economics, judgment and decision making, social psychol-
ogy, and personality psychology), thereby fostering a symbiosis
between these (typically—and unfortunately—rather secluded) be-
havioral sciences as has been called for (cf. Rhodewalt, 2008).
Moreover, the specification of three trait components underlying
trust might help clarify sex- and age-related differences in trust
behavior. Regarding the former, the typically observed higher
levels of trait anxiety among women (Costa, Terracciano, & Mc-
Crae, 2001; Feingold, 1994)—and the correspondingly elevated
levels of risk aversion (Eckel & Grossman, 2008), loss aversion
(e.g., Brooks & Zank, 2005; Rau, 2014; Schmidt & Traub, 2002),
and Emotionality (Moshagen, Hilbig, & Zettler, 2014)—imply that
women would show a reduced tendency to trust as compared to
men. By contrast, however, women’s tendency to be more forgiv-
ing than men (A. J. Miller, Worthington, & McDaniel, 2008)
suggests the opposite, namely an increased tendency to trust.
Finally, equal levels of cooperativeness across the sexes (Balliet,
Li, Macfarlan, & Van Vugt, 2011) hint at similar trustworthiness
expectations (based on social projection) and thus a lack of sex
differences in trust. Altogether, sex differences in trait anxiety,
forgiveness, and cooperativeness hence lead to conflicting predic-
tions on sex differences in trust behavior. However, these incon-
sistencies actually correspond to the mixed extant evidence on sex
differences in trust—as reported in a recent literature review
(Croson & Gneezy, 2009)—and indeed make sense within the
current framework. Specifically, because of the proposed interplay
of trust determinants, the most decisive determinant in a given
situation might drive the presence (vs. absence) and direction
(higher levels in men vs. women) of sex differences in trust
behavior. Besides, regarding age-related differences in trust be-
havior, lower levels of risk aversion in the social domain in older
compared to younger adults (Bonem, Ellsworth, & Gonzalez,
2015) suggest a higher willingness to trust in elderly people. A
similar prediction can be derived from more optimistic trustwor-
thiness expectations (i.e., higher trust propensity) in older adults
(Li & Fung, 2013; Poulin & Haase, in press). However, contrary to
these predictions, the (albeit scarce) extant evidence on trust be-
havior across ages hints at constant trust levels in different adult
age groups (Rieger & Mata, 2015; Sutter & Kocher, 2007). In any
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case, more conclusive data on age- (and sex-) related differences in
trust behavior (and their underlying trait sources) is needed.
It should also be noted that the approach taken herein is well-suited
for future expansions to other types of trust, for example trust among
familiar agents (e.g., colleagues, friends, family and the like). In
interactions with familiar others, one could, for instance, assume that
trustworthiness expectations are primarily based on prior trust expe-
riences with the specific interaction partner in similar situations—in
line with interdependence theory (Holmes, 2002). In consequence,
these expectations should be clearer, thus reducing uncertainty and
fostering predictability (cf. Holmes & Rempel, 1989) and, in turn,
diminishing the impact of risk aversion on trust behavior. In contrast,
the effect of betrayal sensitivity could arguably be enhanced because
a loss resulting from betrayal by a (well-)known person may well be
even more severe than a loss resulting from betrayal by an unknown
person (cf. Rotenberg, 2010). Thus, comparing trust in strangers to
trust in familiar agents, one could make the strong prediction that the
relative impact of risk aversion will be greater in the former than in the
latter—and vice versa for betrayal sensitivity (and, by implication,
loss aversion). Of course, additional factors might play a role for the
decision to trust a familiar interaction partner, for example reciprocity
considerations (Ferrin, Bligh, & Kohles, 2007) or a motivation to
communicate positive relational signals (Six, Nooteboom, & Hoogen-
doorn, 2010; see also Simpson, 2007). In any case, although trust
among familiar agents is beyond the scope of this review we are
confident that it can be integrated into the framework proposed—or a
variant of the latter.
In conclusion, the present review provides an integrative summary
on trust behavior among unfamiliar agents, spanning several hundred
articles. Scholars from various fields of research agree on the vital
significance of trust for us as social beings, but also point to the
apparent irrationality of trusting unknown others. Correspondingly,
the study of trust in general—and of trust among strangers in partic-
ular—has gained broad attention in research across all social and
economic sciences and beyond. So far, however, there has been little
integration of the diverse literature on trust within a coherent structure.
To this end, we present a person–situation integration framework of
interpersonal trust behavior, embedding the (specific) literature on
trust across fields in the (more general) literature on behavioral
economics, social psychology, and personality psychology. Thereby,
the present work contributes to an overall understanding of trust
among strangers by uncovering the underlying determinants of trust
behavior from both a situational and a personality perspective.
Specifically, the review highlights that people might decide to trust
for various reasons: On the one hand, diverse features of the trust
situation (i.e., trustee characteristics, temptation to betray, availability
of potential sanctions) might signal the likelihood of encountering a
trustworthy (vs. untrustworthy) interaction partner; on the other hand,
different personality characteristics (i.e., risk and loss aversion, trust-
worthiness, and betrayal sensitivity) might influence an individual’s
willingness to trust irrespective of (or in interaction with) the situation
at hand. As such, the extracted framework specifically accounts for
individual differences in trust behavior—an issue that has been clearly
underemphasized in prior conceptualizations of trust. Most notably,
however, the work presented herein provides a broad summary of the
extensive literature on trust and may thus offer a theoretical founda-
tion for future research.
References
Ackermann, K. A., Fleiß, J., & Murphy, R. O. (in press). Reciprocity as an
individual difference. The Journal of Conflict Resolution. Advance
online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002714541854
Aimone, J. A., & Houser, D. (2011). Beneficial betrayal aversion. PLoS
ONE, 6, e17725. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0017725
Aimone, J. A., & Houser, D. (2012). What you don’t know won’t hurt you:
A laboratory analysis of betrayal aversion. Experimental Economics, 15,
571–588. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-012-9314-z
Aimone, J. A., & Houser, D. (2013). Harnessing the benefits of betrayal
aversion. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 89, 1–8.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.02.001
Albert, M., Güth, W., Kirchler, E., & Maciejovsky, B. (2007). Are we
nice(r) to nice(r) people?–An experimental analysis. Experimental Eco-
nomics, 10, 53–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9131-3
Altmann, S., Dohmen, T., & Wibral, M. (2008). Do the reciprocal trust
less? Economics Letters, 99, 454 – 457. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j
.econlet.2007.09.012
Anh, H. T., Pereira, L. M., & Santos, F. C. (2011). Intention recognition
promotes the emergence of cooperation. Adaptive Behavior, 19, 264–
279. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1059712311410896
Arneson, R. J. (1982). The principle of fairness and free-rider problems.
Ethics, 92, 616. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/292379
Asch, S. E. (1956). Studies of independence and conformity: I. A minority
of one against a unanimous majority. Psychological Monographs: Gen-
eral and Applied, 70, 1–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0093718
Ashraf, N., Bohnet, I., & Piankov, N. (2006). Decomposing trust and
trustworthiness. Experimental Economics, 9, 193–208. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1007/s10683-006-9122-4
Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2007). Empirical, theoretical, and practical
advantages of the HEXACO model of personality structure. Personality
and Social Psychology Review, 11, 150–166. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
1088868306294907
Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2008a). The HEXACO model of personality
structure and the importance of the H factor. Social and Personality
Psychology Compass, 2, 1952–1962. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-
9004.2008.00134.x
Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2008b). The prediction of Honesty-Humility–
related criteria by the HEXACO and Five-Factor Models of personality.
Journal of Research in Personality, 42, 1216–1228. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.jrp.2008.03.006
Ashton, M. C., Lee, K., & de Vries, R. E. (2014). The HEXACO Honesty-
Humility, Agreeableness, and Emotionality factors: A review of research
and theory. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 18, 139–152.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1088868314523838
Ashton, M. C., Lee, K., & Paunonen, S. V. (2002). What is the central
feature of extraversion? Social attention versus reward sensitivity. Jour-
nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 245–252. http://dx.doi
.org/10.1037/0022-3514.83.1.245
Ashton, M. C., Lee, K., & Son, C. (2000). Honesty as the sixth factor of
personality: Correlations with Machiavellianism, primary psychopathy,
and social adroitness. European Journal of Personality, 14, 359–368.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/1099-0984(200007/08)14:4359::AID-
PER3823.0.CO;2-Y
Ashton, M. C., Paunonen, S. V., Helmes, E., & Jackson, D. N. (1998). Kin
altruism, reciprocal altruism, and the Big Five personality factors. Evo-
lution and Human Behavior, 19, 243–255. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
S1090-5138(98)00009-9
Bacharach, M., & Gambetta, D. (2001). Trust in signs. In K. S. Cook (Ed.),
Trust in society (pp. 148–184). New York, NY: Russell Sage Founda-
tion.
Baier, A. (1986). Trust and antitrust. Ethics, 96, 231–260. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1086/292745
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
266 THIELMANN AND HILBIG
Balliet, D., Li, N. P., Macfarlan, S. J., & Van Vugt, M. (2011). Sex
differences in cooperation: A meta-analytic review of social dilemmas.
Psychological Bulletin, 137, 881–909. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/
a0025354
Balliet, D., Mulder, L. B., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2011). Reward,
punishment, and cooperation: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin,
137, 594–615. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0023489
Balliet, D., Parks, C. D., & Joireman, J. A. (2009). Social value orientation
and cooperation in social dilemmas: A meta-analysis. Group Processes
& Intergroup Relations, 12, 533–547. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
1368430209105040
Balliet, D., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2012). Trust, conflict, and cooperation:
A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 139, 1090–1112. http://dx.doi
.org/10.1037/a0030939
Balliet, D., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2013). Trust, punishment, and
cooperation across 18 societies: A meta-analysis. Perspectives on Psy-
chological Science, 8, 363–379. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
1745691613488533
Balliet, D., Wu, J., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2014). Ingroup favoritism in
cooperation: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 140, 1556–1581.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0037737
Barclay, P. (2004). Trustworthiness and competitive altruism can also
solve the “tragedy of the commons.” Evolution and Human Behavior,
25, 209–220. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2004.04.002
Baron, J. (1998). Trust: Beliefs and morality. In A. Ben-Ner & L. Putter-
man (Eds.), Economics, values, and organization (pp. 408–418). Cam-
bridge, England: Cambridge University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/
CBO9781139174855.017
Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer, C., & Vohs, K. D. (2001).
Bad is stronger than good. Review of General Psychology, 5, 323–370.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.5.4.323
Baumert, A., Schlösser, T. M., & Schmitt, M. (2013). Economic games: A
performance-based assessment of fairness and altruism. European Jour-
nal of Psychological Assessment. Advance online publication.
Baumgartner, T., Heinrichs, M., Vonlanthen, A., Fischbacher, U., & Fehr,
E. (2008). Oxytocin shapes the neural circuitry of trust and trust adap-
tation in humans. Neuron, 58, 639–650. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j
.neuron.2008.04.009
Becker, A., Deckers, T., Dohmen, T., Falk, A., & Kosse, F. (2012). The
relationship between economic preferences and psychological personal-
ity measures. Annual Review of Economics, 4, 453–478. http://dx.doi
.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080511-110922
Bellemare, C., & Kroger, S. (2007). On representative social capital.
European Economic Review, 51, 183–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j
.euroecorev.2006.03.006
Ben-Ner, A., & Halldorsson, F. (2010). Trusting and trustworthiness:
What are they, how to measure them, and what affects them. Journal
of Economic Psychology, 31, 64 –79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep
.2009.10.001
Ben-Ner, A., Kong, F., & Putterman, L. (2004). Share and share alike?
Gender-pairing, personality, and cognitive ability as determinants of
giving. Journal of Economic Psychology, 25, 581–589. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/S0167-4870(03)00065-5
Ben-Ner, A., & Putterman, L. (2009). Trust, communication and contracts:
An experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 70(1–
2): 10, 6–121. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.01.011
Bente, G., Baptist, O., & Leuschner, H. (2012). To buy or not to buy:
Influence of seller photos and reputation on buyer trust and purchase
behavior. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 70, 1–13.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhcs.2011.08.005
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. A. (1995). Trust, reciprocity, and
social history. Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 122–142. http://dx
.doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1027
Berry, D. S. (1990). Taking people at face value: Evidence for the kernel
of truth hypothesis. Social Cognition, 8, 343–361. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1521/soco.1990.8.4.343
Berry, J. W., Worthington, E. L. J., Jr., O’Connor, L. E., Parrott, L., III, &
Wade, N. G. (2005). Forgivingness, vengeful rumination, and affective
traits. Journal of Personality, 73, 183–226. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j
.1467-6494.2004.00308.x
Betsch, T., & Glöckner, A. (2010). Intuition in judgment and decision
making: Extensive thinking without effort. Psychological Inquiry, 21,
279–294. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2010.517737
Betts, L. R., Rotenberg, K. J., & Trueman, M. (2009). The Early Childhood
Generalized Trust Belief Scale. Early Childhood Research Quarterly,
24, 175–185. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecresq.2008.10.002
Bibby, P. A., & Ferguson, E. (2011). The ability to process emotional
information predicts loss aversion. Personality and Individual Differ-
ences, 51, 263–266. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2010.05.001
Bicchieri, C., Duffy, J., & Tolle, G. (2004). Trust among strangers. Phi-
losophy of Science, 71, 286–319. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/381411
Bigoni, M., Bortolotti, S., Casari, M., & Gambetta, D. (2013). It takes two
to cheat: An experiment on derived trust. European Economic Review,
64, 129–146. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.08.009
Birkás, B., Dzhelyova, M., Lábadi, B., Bereczkei, T., & Perrett, D. I.
(2014). Cross-cultural perception of trustworthiness: The effect of eth-
nicity features on evaluation of faces’ observed trustworthiness across
four samples. Personality and Individual Differences, 69, 56–61. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2014.05.012
Blair, M. M., & Stout, L. A. (2001). Trust, trustworthiness, and the
behavioral foundations of corporate law. University of Pennsylvania
Law Review, 149, 1735–1810. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3312898
Blais, A.-R., & Weber, E. U. (2006). A Domain-Specific Risk-Taking
(DOSPERT) scale for adult populations. Judgment and Decision Mak-
ing, 1, 33–47.
Blomqvist, K. (1997). The many faces of trust. Scandinavian Journal of
Management, 13, 271–286. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0956-
5221(97)84644-1
Boero, R., Bravo, G., Castellani, M., & Squazzoni, F. (2009). Reputational
cues in repeated trust games. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 38,
871–877. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2009.05.004
Bohnet, I., & Baytelman, Y. (2007). Institutions and trust: Implications for
preferences, beliefs and behavior. Rationality and Society, 19, 99–135.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1043463107075110
Bohnet, I., Greig, F., Herrmann, B., & Zeckhauser, R. (2008). Betrayal
aversion: Evidence from Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, and
the United States. The American Economic Review, 98, 294–310. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.1.294
Bohnet, I., Herrmann, B., & Zeckhauser, R. (2010). Trust and the reference
points for trustworthiness in Gulf and Western countries. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 125, 811–828. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/qjec
.2010.125.2.811
Bohnet, I., & Huck, S. (2004). Repetition and reputation: Implications for
trust and trustworthiness when institutions change. The American Eco-
nomic Review, 94, 362–366. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/000282
8041301506
Bohnet, I., & Meier, S. (2005). Deciding to distrust. Public policy discus-
sion papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, No, 05:4. http://dx.doi
.org/10.2139/ssrn.839225
Bohnet, I., & Zeckhauser, R. (2004). Trust, risk and betrayal. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 55, 467–484. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.jebo.2003.11.004
Bolton, G. E., Katok, E., & Ockenfels, A. (2004). How effective are electronic
reputation mechanisms? An experimental investigation. Management Sci-
ence, 50, 1587–1602. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0199
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
267TRUST
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000). ERC: A Theory of equity, reci-
procity, and competition. The American Economic Review, 90, 166–193.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.1.166
Bond, C. F., Jr., Berry, D. S., & Omar, A. (1994). The kernel of truth in
judgments of deceptiveness. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 15,
523–534. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15324834basp1504_8
Bonem, E. M., Ellsworth, P. C., & Gonzalez, R. (2015). Age differences in
risk: Perceptions, intentions and domains. [Advance online publication].
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, n/a. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/
bdm.1848
Bonnefon, J.-F., Hopfensitz, A., & De Neys, W. (2013). The modular
nature of trustworthiness detection. Journal of Experimental Psychol-
ogy: General, 142, 143–150. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0028930
Boon, S. D., & Holmes, J. G. (1991). The dynamics of interpersonal trust:
Resolving uncertainty in the face of risk. In R. A. Hinde & J. Groebel
(Eds.), Cooperation and prosocial behavior (pp. 190–211). Cambridge,
England: Cambridge University Press.
Boone, R. T., & Buck, R. (2003). Emotional expressivity and trustworthi-
ness: The role of nonverbal behavior in the evolution of cooperation.
Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 27, 163–182. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/
A:1025341931128
Bracht, J., & Feltovich, N. (2009). Whatever you say, your reputation
precedes you: Observation and cheap talk in the trust game. Journal of
Public Economics, 93, 1036–1044. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco
.2009.06.004
Brewer, M. B. (2008). Depersonalized trust and ingroup cooperation. In J. I.
Krueger (Ed.), Rationality and social responsibility: Essays in honor of
Robyn Mason Dawes (pp. 215–232). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
Brocklebank, S., Lewis, G. J., & Bates, T. C. (2011). Personality accounts
for stable preferences and expectations across a range of simple games.
Personality and Individual Differences, 51, 881–886. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.paid.2011.07.007
Brooks, P., & Zank, H. (2005). Loss averse behavior. Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty, 31, 301–325. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11166-005-5105-7
Brose, L. A., Rye, M. S., Lutz-Zois, C., & Ross, S. R. (2005). Forgiveness
and personality traits. Personality and Individual Differences, 39, 35–
46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2004.11.001
Brunswik, E. (1952). The conceptual framework of psychology. Oxford,
UK: University Chicago Press.
Burks, S. V., Carpenter, J. P., & Verhoogen, E. (2003). Playing both roles
in the trust game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 51,
195–216. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00093-8
Butler, G., & Mathews, A. (1987). Anticipatory anxiety and risk percep-
tion. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 11, 551–565. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1007/BF01183858
Cabon-Dhersin, M.-L., & Ramani, S. V. (2007). Opportunism, trust and
cooperation: A game theoretic approach with heterogeneous agents.
Rationality and Society, 19, 203–228. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
1043463107077391
Camerer, C. F. (2003). Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic
interaction. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
Camerer, C. F. (2005). Three cheers–psychological, theoretical, empirical–
for loss aversion. Journal of Marketing Research, 42, 129–133. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.42.2.129.62286
Camerer, C. F., & Weigelt, K. (1988). Experimental tests of a sequential
equilibrium reputation model. Econometrica, 56, 1–36. http://dx.doi.org/
10.2307/1911840
Campellone, T. R., & Kring, A. M. (2013). Who do you trust? The impact of
facial emotion and behaviour on decision making. Cognition and Emotion,
27, 603–620. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2012.726608
Chang, L. J., Doll, B. B., van ’t Wout, M., Frank, M. J., & Sanfey, A. G.
(2010). Seeing is believing: Trustworthiness as a dynamic belief. Cog-
nitive Psychology, 61, 87–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych
.2010.03.001
Charness, G., Cobo-Reyes, R., & Jimenez, N. (2008). An investment game
with third-party intervention. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organi-
zation, 68, 18–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.02.006
Charness, G., Du, N., & Yang, C.-L. (2011). Trust and trustworthiness
reputations in an investment game. Games and Economic Behavior, 72,
361–375. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.002
Chaudhuri, A., & Gangadharan, L. (2007). An experimental analysis of
trust and trustworthiness. Southern Economic Journal, 73, 959–985.
Chen, X.-P., Pillutla, M. M., & Yao, X. (2009). Unintended consequences
of cooperation inducing and maintaining mechanisms in public goods
dilemmas: Sanctions and moral appeals. Group Processes & Intergroup
Relations, 12, 241–255. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1368430208098783
Clark, L. A., Watson, D., & Mineka, S. (1994). Temperament, personality,
and the mood and anxiety disorders. Journal of Abnormal Psychology,
103, 103–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.103.1.103
Cohen, T. R., Panter, A. T., Turan, N., Morse, L., & Kim, Y. (2014). Moral
character in the workplace. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, 107, 943–963. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0037245
Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of social theory. Cambridge, MA:
Belknap Press.
Colquitt, J. A., Scott, B. A., & LePine, J. A. (2007). Trust, trustworthiness,
and trust propensity: A meta-analytic test of their unique relationships
with risk taking and job performance. Journal of Applied Psychology,
92, 909–927. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.92.4.909
Corcos, A., Pannequin, F., & Bourgeois-Gironde, S. (2012). Aversions to
trust. Recherches Economiques de Louvain/Louvain. Economic Review,
78, 115–134.
Coricelli, G., Gonzalez Morales, L., & Mahlstedt, A. (2006). The invest-
ment game with asymmetric information. Metroeconomica, 57, 13–30.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-999X.2006.00231.x
Corriveau, K., & Harris, P. L. (2010). Young children’s trust in what other
people say. In K. J. Rotenberg (Ed.), Interpersonal trust during childhood
and adolescence (pp. 87–109). New York, NY: New York: Cambridge
University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511750946.005
Costa, P. T., Jr., McCrae, R. R., & Dye, D. A. (1991). Facet scales for
agreeableness and conscientiousness: A revision of the NEO Personality
Inventory. Personality and Individual Differences, 12, 887–898. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869(91)90177-D
Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1992). Revised NEO Personality Inventory
(NEO-PI–R) and NEO Five–Factor Inventory (NEO–FFI) professional
manual. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources.
Costa, P. T., Terracciano, A., & McCrae, R. R. (2001). Gender differences in
personality traits across cultures: Robust and surprising findings. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology. Washington, DC: American Psycho-
logical Association. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.81.2.322
Courtois, P., & Tazdaït, T. (2012). Learning to trust strangers: An evolu-
tionary perspective. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 22, 367–383.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00191-011-0247-z
Cox, J. C. (2004). How to identify trust and reciprocity. Games and
Economic Behavior, 46, 260 –281. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0899-
8256(03)00119-2
Crosetto, P., & Filippin, A. (2013). The “bomb” risk elicitation task.
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 47, 31–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/
s11166-013-9170-z
Croson, R., & Gneezy, U. (2009). Gender differences in preferences.
Journal of Economic Literature, 47, 448 – 474. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1257/jel.47.2.448
Currall, S. C., & Judge, T. A. (1995). Measuring trust between organizational
boundary role persons. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 64, 151–170. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1995.1097
Das, T. K., & Teng, B.-S. (2004). The risk-based view of trust: A concep-
tual framework. Journal of Business and Psychology, 19, 85–116. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:JOBU.0000040274.23551.1b
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
268 THIELMANN AND HILBIG
Dasgupta, P. (1988). Trust as a commodity. In D. Gambetta (Ed.), Trust:
Making and breaking cooperative relations (Vol. 4, pp. 49–72). Oxford,
UK: Basil Blackwell.
Dawes, R. M., McTavish, J., & Shaklee, H. (1977). Behavior, communi-
cation, and assumptions about other people’s behavior in a commons
dilemma situation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35,
1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.35.1.1
Delgado, M. R., Frank, R. H., & Phelps, E. A. (2005). Perceptions of moral
character modulate the neural systems of reward during the trust game.
Nature Neuroscience, 8, 1611–1618. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nn1575
De Neys, W., Hopfensitz, A., & Bonnefon, J.-F. (2015). Adolescents
gradually improve at detecting trustworthiness from the facial features of
unknown adults. Journal of Economic Psychology, 47, 17–22. http://dx
.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2015.01.002
Denissen, J. J. A., & Penke, L. (2008). Motivational individual reaction
norms underlying the Five-Factor Model of personality: First steps
towards a theory-based conceptual framework. Journal of Research in
Personality, 42, 1285–1302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2008.04.002
Depue, R. A., & Collins, P. F. (1999). Neurobiology of the structure of
personality: Dopamine, facilitation of incentive motivation, and extra-
version. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 491–517. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1017/S0140525X99002046
Derks, J., Lee, N. C., & Krabbendam, L. (2014). Adolescent trust and
trustworthiness: Role of gender and social value orientation. Journal of
Adolescence, 37, 1379–1386. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.adolescence
.2014.09.014
Desmet, P. T. M., De Cremer, D., & van Dijk, E. (2011). Trust recovery
following voluntary or forced financial compensations in the trust game:
The role of trait forgiveness. Personality and Individual Differences, 51,
267–273. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2010.05.027
DeSteno, D., Breazeal, C., Frank, R. H., Pizarro, D., Baumann, J., Dickens,
L., & Lee, J. J. (2012). Detecting the trustworthiness of novel partners in
economic exchange. Psychological Science, 23, 1549–1556. http://dx
.doi.org/10.1177/0956797612448793
Deutsch, M. (1958). Trust and suspicion. The Journal of Conflict Resolu-
tion, 2, 265–279. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002200275800200401
Deutsch, M. (1960). Trust, trustworthiness, and the F scale. The Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 61, 138 –140. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1037/h0046501
Deutsch, M. (1962). Cooperation and trust: Some theoretical notes. In
M. R. Jones (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation, 1962 (pp.
275–320). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.
De Vries, R. E., & van Gelder, J.-L. (2013). Tales of two self-control
scales: Relations with Five-Factor and HEXACO traits. Personality and
Individual Differences, 54, 756–760. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid
.2012.12.023
Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., & Sunde, U. (2011). The intergen-
erational transmission of risk and trust attitudes. The Review of Eco-
nomic Studies. Advance online publication.
Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., Sunde, U., Schupp, J., & Wagner,
G. G. (2011). Individual risk attitudes: Measurement, determinants, and
behavioral consequences. Journal of the European Economic Associa-
tion, 9, 522–550. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01015.x
Doty, T. J., Japee, S., Ingvar, M., & Ungerleider, L. G. (2013). Fearful face
detection sensitivity in healthy adults correlates with anxiety-related
traits. Emotion, 13, 183–188. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0031373
Downey, G., & Feldman, S. I. (1996). Implications of rejection sensitivity
for intimate relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
70, 1327–1343. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.70.6.1327
Dufwenberg, M., & Gneezy, U. (2000). Measuring beliefs in an experi-
mental lost wallet game. Games and Economic Behavior, 30, 163–182.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0715
Dunlop, P. D., Morrison, D. L., Koenig, J., & Silcox, B. (2012). Comparing
the Eysenck and HEXACO models of personality in the prediction of
adult delinquency. European Journal of Personality, 26, 194–202.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/per.824
Dunn, J. (1988). Trust and political agency. In D. Gambetta (Ed.), Trust:
Making and breaking cooperative relations (pp. 73–93). Oxford, UK:
Basil Blackwell.
Dunn, J. R., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2005). Feeling and believing: The
influence of emotion on trust. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 88, 736–748. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.88.5.736
Dunning, D., Anderson, J. E., Schlösser, T., Ehlebracht, D., & Fetchen-
hauer, D. (2014). Trust at zero acquaintance: More a matter of respect
than expectation of reward. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, 107, 122–141. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0036673
Dunning, D. A., & Fetchenhauer, D. (2010). Trust as an expressive rather
than an instrumental act. In S. Thye & E. Lawler (Eds.), Advances in
group processes (Vol. 27, pp. 97–127). New York, NY: Emerald.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/S0882-6145(2010)0000027007
Dunning, D. A., & Fetchenhauer, D. (2011). Understanding the psychology
of trust. In D. A. Dunning (Ed.), Social motivation (pp. 147–169). New
York, NY: Psychology Press.
Dunning, D. A., Fetchenhauer, D., & Schlösser, T. M. (2012). Trust as a
social and emotional act: Noneconomic considerations in trust behavior.
Journal of Economic Psychology, 33, 686 – 694. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.joep.2011.09.005
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (2008). Men, women and risk aversion:
Experimental evidence. Handbook of Experimental Economics Results,
1, 1061–1073. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00057-1
Eckel, C. C., & Wilson, R. K. (2003). The human face of game theory:
Trust and reciprocity in sequential games. In E. Ostrom & J. Walker
(Eds.), Trust and reciprocity: Interdisciplinary lessons from experimen-
tal research (pp. 245–274). New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
Eckel, C. C., & Wilson, R. K. (2004). Is trust a risky decision? Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 55, 447–465. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.jebo.2003.11.003
Eek, D., & Biel, A. (2003). The interplay between greed, efficiency, and
fairness in public-goods dilemmas. Social Justice Research, 16, 195–
215. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1025984611796
Efferson, C., & Vogt, S. (2013). Viewing men’s faces does not lead to
accurate predictions of trustworthiness. Scientific Reports, 3, 1047.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep01047
Ellsberg, D. (1961). Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms. The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 75, 643–669. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/
1884324
Etang, A., Fielding, D., & Knowles, S. (2011). Does trust extend beyond
the village? Experimental trust and social distance in Cameroon. Exper-
imental Economics, 14, 15–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-010-
9255-3
Evans, A. M., Athenstaedt, U., & Krueger, J. I. (2013). The development
of trust and altruism during childhood. Journal of Economic Psychology,
36, 82–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2013.02.010
Evans, A. M., & Krueger, J. I. (2009). The psychology (and economics) of
trust. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 3, 1003–1017. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2009.00232.x
Evans, A. M., & Krueger, J. I. (2011). Elements of trust: Risk and
perspective-taking. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47,
171–177. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2010.08.007
Evans, A. M., & Krueger, J. I. (2014). Outcomes and expectations in
dilemmas of trust. Judgment and Decision Making, 9, 90–103.
Evans, A. M., & Revelle, W. (2008). Survey and behavioral measurements
of interpersonal trust. Journal of Research in Personality, 42, 1585–
1593. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2008.07.011
Fang, C., Kimbrough, S. O., Pace, S., Valluri, A., & Zheng, Z. (2002). On
adaptive emergence of trust behavior in the game of stag hunt. Group
Decision and Negotiation, 11, 449–467. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:
1020639132471
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
269TRUST
Fehr, E. (2009). On the economics and biology of trust. Journal of the
European Economic Association, 7, 235–266. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/
JEEA.2009.7.2-3.235
Fehr, E., & Camerer, C. F. (2007). Social neuroeconomics: The neural
circuitry of social preferences. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 419–
427. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2007.09.002
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and
cooperation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817–868. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1162/003355399556151
Fehrler, S., & Przepiorka, W. (2013). Charitable giving as a signal of
trustworthiness: Disentangling the signaling benefits of altruistic acts.
Evolution and Human Behavior, 34, 139–145. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.evolhumbehav.2012.11.005
Feingold, A. (1994). Gender differences in personality: A meta-analysis.
Psychological Bulletin, 116, 429–456. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-
2909.116.3.429
Ferrin, D. L., Bligh, M. C., & Kohles, J. C. (2007). Can I trust you to trust
me? A theory of trust, monitoring, and cooperation in interpersonal and
intergroup relationships. Group & Organization Management, 32, 465–
499. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1059601106293960
Fetchenhauer, D., & Dunning, D. A. (2009). Do people trust too much or
too little? Journal of Economic Psychology, 30, 263–276. http://dx.doi
.org/10.1016/j.joep.2008.04.006
Fetchenhauer, D., & Dunning, D. (2010). Why so cynical? Asymmetric
feedback underlies misguided skepticism regarding the trustworthiness
of others. Psychological Science, 21, 189 –193. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1177/0956797609358586
Fetchenhauer, D., & Dunning, D. A. (2012). Betrayal aversion versus
principled trustfulness—How to explain risk avoidance and risky
choices in trust games. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
81, 534–541. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.07.017
Finkel, E. J., Rusbult, C. E., Kumashiro, M., & Hannon, P. A. (2002).
Dealing with betrayal in close relationships: Does commitment promote
forgiveness? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 956–
974. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.82.6.956
Fishman, I., Ng, R., & Bellugi, U. (2011). Do extraverts process social
stimuli differently from introverts? Cognitive Neuroscience, 2, 67–73.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17588928.2010.527434
Fleeson, W., & Leicht, C. (2006). On delineating and integrating the study
of variability and stability in personality psychology: Interpersonal trust
as illustration. Journal of Research in Personality, 40, 5–20. http://dx
.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2005.08.004
Foddy, M., Platow, M. J., & Yamagishi, T. (2009). Group-based trust in
strangers: The role of stereotypes and expectations. Psychological Sci-
ence, 20, 419–422. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02312.x
Funder, D. C. (2008). Persons, situations, and person-situation interactions.
In O. P. John, R. W. Robins, & L. A. Pervin (Eds.), Handbook of
personality: Theory and research (3rd ed., pp. 568–580). New York,
NY: Guilford Press.
Gächter, S., Johnson, E. J., & Herrmann, A. (2010). Individual-level loss
aversion in riskless and risky choices. CeDEx Discussion Paper Series,
2010–20, Center for Decision Research & Experimental Economics.
Gambetta, D. (1988). Can we trust trust? In D. Gambetta (Ed.), Trust:
Making and breaking cooperative relations (pp. 213–237). Oxford, UK:
Basil Blackwell.
Gambetta, D., & Przepiorka, W. (2014). Natural and strategic generosity as
signals of trustworthiness. PLoS ONE, 9, e97533.
Giffin, K. (1967). The contribution of studies of source credibility to a
theory of interpersonal trust in the communication process. Psycholog-
ical Bulletin, 68, 104–120. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0024833
Gigerenzer, G. (1998). Surrogates for theories. Theory & Psychology, 8,
195–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959354398082006
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996). Reasoning the fast and frugal
way: Models of bounded rationality. Psychological Review, 103, 650–
669. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.103.4.650
Gill, H., Boies, K., Finegan, J. E., & McNally, J. (2005). Antecedents of
trust: Establishing a boundary condition for the relation between pro-
pensity to trust and intention to trust. Journal of Business and Psychol-
ogy, 19, 287–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10869-004-2229-8
Gilliam, D. A., & Voss, K. (2013). A proposed procedure for construct
definition in marketing. European Journal of Marketing, 47, 5–26.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03090561311285439
Gintis, H., Bowles, S., Boyd, R., & Fehr, E. (2003). Explaining altruistic
behavior in humans. Evolution and Human Behavior, 24, 153–172.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1090-5138(02)00157-5
Giorgetta, C., Grecucci, A., Zuanon, S., Perini, L., Balestrieri, M., Bonini,
N., . . . Brambilla, P. (2012). Reduced risk-taking behavior as a trait
feature of anxiety. Emotion, 12, 1373–1383. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/
a0029119
Glanville, J. L., & Paxton, P. (2007). How do we learn to trust? A
confirmatory tetrad analysis of the sources of generalized trust. Social
Psychology Quarterly, 70, 230 –242. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
019027250707000303
Glöckner, A., & Hilbig, B. E. (2012). Risk is relative: Risk aversion yields
cooperation rather than defection in cooperation-friendly environments.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 19, 546 –553. http://dx.doi.org/
10.3758/s13423-012-0224-z
Glöckner, A., & Witteman, C. (2010). Beyond dual-process models: A
categorisation of processes underlying intuitive judgement and decision
making. Thinking & Reasoning, 16, 1–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
13546780903395748
Golembiewski, R. T., & McConkie, M. (1975). The centrality of interper-
sonal trust in group processes. In C. L. Cooper (Ed.), Theories of group
processes (pp. 131–185). London, UK: Wiley.
Gollwitzer, M., Rothmund, T., Alt, B., & Jekel, M. (2012). Victim sensi-
tivity and the accuracy of social judgments. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 38, 975–984. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
0146167212440887
Gollwitzer, M., Rothmund, T., Pfeiffer, A., & Ensenbach, C. (2009). Why
and when justice sensitivity leads to pro- and antisocial behavior. Jour-
nal of Research in Personality, 43, 999–1005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.jrp.2009.07.003
Gollwitzer, M., Rothmund, T., & Süssenbach, P. (2013). The Sensitivity to
Mean Intentions (SeMI) model: Basic assumptions, recent findings, and
potential avenues for future research. Social and Personality Psychology
Compass, 7, 415–426. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12041
Gomez, R., & Francis, L. M. (2003). Generalised anxiety disorder: Rela-
tionships with Eysenck’s, Gray’s and Newman’s theories. Personality
and Individual Differences, 34, 3–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0191-
8869(02)00020-X
Goto, S. G. (1996). To trust or not to trust: Situational and dispositional
determinants. Social Behavior and Personality, 24, 119–131. http://dx
.doi.org/10.2224/sbp.1996.24.2.119
Gray, J. A. (1970). The psychophysiological basis of introversion-
extraversion. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 8, 249–266. http://dx
.doi.org/10.1016/0005-7967(70)90069-0
Güney, S., & Newell, B. R. (2013). Fairness overrides reputation: The
importance of fairness considerations in altruistic cooperation. Frontiers
in Human Neuroscience, 7, 252. http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013
.00252
Hardin, R. (2002). Trust and trustworthiness. New York, NY: Russell Sage
Foundation.
Harris, A. J. L., Corner, A., & Hahn, U. (2009). Estimating the probability
of negative events. Cognition, 110, 51–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j
.cognition.2008.10.006
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
270 THIELMANN AND HILBIG
Harris, P. L. (2007). Trust. Developmental Science, 10, 135–138. http://dx
.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2007.00575.x
Hershfield, H. E., Cohen, T. R., & Thompson, L. (2012). Short horizons
and tempting situations: Lack of continuity to our future selves leads to
unethical decision making and behavior. Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 117, 298–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j
.obhdp.2011.11.002
Hilbig, B. E., Glöckner, A., & Zettler, I. (2014). Personality and prosocial
behavior: Linking basic traits and social value orientations. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 107, 529–539. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1037/a0036074
Hilbig, B. E., Moshagen, M., & Zettler, I. (2015). Truth will out: Linking
personality, morality, and honesty through indirect questioning. Social
Psychological and Personality Science, 6, 140–147. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1177/1948550614553640
Hilbig, B. E., Thielmann, I., Hepp, J., Klein, S., & Zettler, I. (2015). From
personality to altruistic behavior (and back): Evidence from a double-
blind dictator game. Journal of Research in Personality, 55, 46–50.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2014.12.004
Hilbig, B. E., Thielmann, I., Wührl, J., & Zettler, I. (2015). From Honesty–
Humility to fair behavior—Benevolence or a (blind) fairness norm?
Personality and Individual Differences, 80, 91–95. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.paid.2015.02.017
Hilbig, B. E., & Zettler, I. (2009). Pillars of cooperation: Honesty-
Humility, social value orientations, and economic behavior. Journal of
Research in Personality, 43, 516–519. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp
.2009.01.003
Hilbig, B. E., & Zettler, I. (2015). When the cat’s away, some mice will
play: A basic trait account of dishonest behavior. Journal of Research in
Personality, 57, 72–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2015.04.003
Hilbig, B. E., Zettler, I., & Heydasch, T. (2012). Personality, punishment
and public goods: Strategic shifts towards cooperation as a matter of
dispositional Honesty-Humility. European Journal of Personality, 26,
245–254. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/per.830
Hilbig, B. E., Zettler, I., Leist, F., & Heydasch, T. (2013). It takes two:
Honesty–Humility and Agreeableness differentially predict active versus
reactive cooperation. Personality and Individual Differences, 54, 598–
603. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2012.11.008
Hilbig, B. E., Zettler, I., Moshagen, M., & Heydasch, T. (2013). Tracing
the path from personality—via cooperativeness—to conservation. Euro-
pean Journal of Personality, 27, 319–327. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/per
.1856
Hill, C. A., & O’Hara, E. A. (2006). A cognitive theory of trust. Wash-
ington University Law Review, 84, 1717–1796.
Hiraishi, K., Yamagata, S., Shikishima, C., & Ando, J. (2008). Mainte-
nance of genetic variation in personality through control of mental
mechanisms: A test of trust, extraversion, and agreeableness. Evolution
and Human Behavior, 29, 79 – 85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j
.evolhumbehav.2007.07.004
Hirsh, J. B., & Peterson, J. B. (2009). Extraversion, neuroticism, and the
prisoner’s dilemma. Personality and Individual Differences, 46, 254–
256. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2008.10.006
Hodges, B. H. (2014). Rethinking conformity and imitation: Divergence,
convergence, and social understanding. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 726.
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00726
Hodges, B. H., Meagher, B. R., Norton, D. J., McBain, R., & Sroubek, A.
(2014). Speaking from ignorance: Not agreeing with others we believe
are correct. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 106, 218–
234. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0034662
Hogarth, R. M., & Karelaia, N. (2007). Heuristic and linear models of
judgment: Matching rules and environments. Psychological Review,
114, 733–758. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.114.3.733
Holm, H. J., & Danielson, A. (2005). Tropic trust versus Nordic trust:
Experimental evidence from Tanzania and Sweden. The Economic Jour-
nal, 115, 505–532. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.00998.x
Holm, H. J., & Nystedt, P. (2008). Trust in surveys and games–A meth-
odological contribution on the influence of money and location. Journal
of Economic Psychology, 29, 522–542. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep
.2007.07.010
Holmes, J. G. (2002). Interpersonal expectations as the building blocks of
social cognition: An interdependence theory perspective. Personal Re-
lationships, 9, 1–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1475-6811.00001
Holmes, J. G., & Rempel, J. K. (1989). Trust in close relationships. In C.
Hendrick (Ed.), Close relationships (pp. 187–220). Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Holt, C. A., & Laury, S. K. (2002). Risk aversion and incentive effects. The
American Economic Review, 92, 1644–1655. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/
000282802762024700
Hong, K., & Bohnet, I. (2007). Status and distrust: The relevance of
inequality and betrayal aversion. Journal of Economic Psychology, 28,
197–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2006.06.003
Hosmer, L. T. (1995). Trust: The connecting link between organizational
theory and philosophical ethics. The Academy of Management Review,
20, 379–403.
Houser, D., Schunk, D., & Winter, J. (2010). Distinguishing trust from risk:
An anatomy of the investment game. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, 74, 72–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2010.01.002
James, H. S. J. (2002). On the reliability of trusting. Rationality and
Society, 14, 229–256. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1043463102014002004
Jensen-Campbell, L. A., & Graziano, W. G. (2001). Agreeableness as a
moderator of interpersonal conflict. Journal of Personality, 69, 323–362.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-6494.00148
Johansson-Stenman, O., Mahmud, M., & Martinsson, P. (2013). Trust,
trust games and stated trust: Evidence from rural Bangladesh. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 95, 286–298. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.022
Johnson, N. D., & Mislin, A. A. (2011). Trust games: A meta-analysis.
Journal of Economic Psychology, 32, 865– 889. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.joep.2011.05.007
Johnson-George, C., & Swap, W. C. (1982). Measurement of specific
interpersonal trust: Construction and validation of a scale to assess trust
in a specific other. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43,
1306–1317. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.43.6.1306
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1986). Fairness and the
assumptions of economics. The Journal of Business, 59, S285–S300.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/296367
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (Eds.). (1982). Judgment under
uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. New York, NY: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511809477
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of
decision under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263–291. http://dx.doi.org/
10.2307/1914185
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1984). Choices, values, and frames. Amer-
ican Psychologist, 39, 341–350. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X
.39.4.341
Kamas, L., & Preston, A. (2012). Distributive and reciprocal fairness:
What can we learn from the heterogeneity of social preferences? Journal
of Economic Psychology, 33, 538–553. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep
.2011.12.003
Kanagaretnam, K., Mestelman, S., Nainar, K., & Shehata, M. (2009). The
impact of social value orientation and risk attitudes on trust and reci-
procity. Journal of Economic Psychology, 30, 368–380. http://dx.doi
.org/10.1016/j.joep.2008.12.003
Karlan, D. S. (2005). Using experimental economics to measure social
capital and predict financial decisions. The American Economic Review,
95, 1688–1699. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/000282805775014407
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
271TRUST
Kee, H. W., & Knox, R. E. (1970). Conceptual and methodological
considerations in the study of trust and suspicion. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 14, 357–366. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00220027
7001400307
Kelley, H. H., Holmes, J. G., Kerr, N. L., Reis, H. T., Rusbult, C. E., & Van
Lange, P. A. M. (2003). An atlas of interpersonal situations. New York,
NY: Cambridge University Press.
Kelley, H. H., & Stahelski, A. J. (1970). Social interaction basis of
cooperators’ and competitors’ beliefs about others. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology, 16, 66 –91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/
h0029849
Keser, C. (2003). Experimental games for the design of reputation man-
agement systems. IBM Systems Journal, 42, 498–506. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1147/sj.423.0498
King-Casas, B., Tomlin, D., Anen, C., Camerer, C. F., Quartz, S. R., &
Montague, P. R. (2005). Getting to know you: Reputation and trust in a
two-person economic exchange. Science, 308, 78–83. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1126/science.1108062
Kirsch, P., Esslinger, C., Chen, Q., Mier, D., Lis, S., Siddhanti, S., . . .
Meyer-Lindenberg, A. (2005). Oxytocin modulates neural circuitry for
social cognition and fear in humans. The Journal of Neuroscience, 25,
11489–11493. http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3984-05.2005
Kiyonari, T., & Yamagishi, T. (1999). A comparative study of trust and
trustworthiness using the game of enthronement. The Japanese Journal
of Social Psychology, 15, 100–109.
Kiyonari, T., Yamagishi, T., Cook, K. S., & Cheshire, C. (2006). Does trust
beget trustworthiness? Trust and trustworthiness in two games and two
cultures: A research note. Social Psychology Quarterly, 69, 270–283.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/019027250606900304
Klapwijk, A., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2009). Promoting cooperation and
trust in “noisy” situations: The power of generosity. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology, 96, 83–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/
a0012823
Koenig, M. A., & Harris, P. L. (2005). The role of social cognition in early
trust. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9, 457– 459. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.tics.2005.08.006
Kollock, P. (1999). The production of trust in online markets. In S. R.
Thye, E. J. Lawler, M. W. Macy, & H. A. Walker (Eds.), Advances in
group processes (Vol. 16, pp. 99–123). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Koole, S. L., Jager, W., van den Berg, A. E., Vlek, C. A. J., & Hofstee,
W. K. B. (2001). On the social nature of personality: Effects of Extra-
version, Agreeableness, and feedback about collective resource use on
cooperation in a resource dilemma. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 27, 289–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167201273003
Kosfeld, M., Heinrichs, M., Zak, P. J., Fischbacher, U., & Fehr, E. (2005).
Oxytocin increases trust in humans. Nature, 435, 673–676. http://dx.doi
.org/10.1038/nature03701
Kramer, R. M. (2010). Dilemmas and doubts: How decision-makers cope
with interdependence and uncertainty. In R. M. Kramer, A. E. Ten-
brunsel, & M. H. Bazerman (Eds.), Social decision making: Social
dilemmas, social values, and ethical judgments (pp. 117–143). New
York, NY: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.
Kreps, D. M. (1990). Corporate culture and economic theory. In J. E. Alt
& K. A. Shepsle (Eds.), Perspectives on positive political economy (pp.
90 –143). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1017/CBO9780511571657.006
Krueger, J. I. (2007). From social projection to social behaviour. European
Review of Social Psychology, 18, 1–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
10463280701284645
Krueger, J. I., & Acevedo, M. (2005). Social projection and the psychology
of choice. In M. D. Alicke, D. A. Dunning, & J. I.. Krueger (Eds.), The
self in social judgment (pp. 17–41). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
Krueger, J. I., & Acevedo, M. (2007). Perceptions of self and other in the
prisoner’s dilemma: Outcome bias and evidential reasoning. The Amer-
ican Journal of Psychology, 120, 593–618.
Krueger, J. I., DiDonato, T. E., & Freestone, D. (2012). Social projection
can solve social dilemmas. Psychological Inquiry, 23, 1–27. http://dx
.doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2012.641167
Krueger, J. I., Massey, A. L., & DiDonato, T. E. (2008). A matter of trust:
From social preferences to the strategic adherence to social norms.
Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, 1, 31–52. http://dx.doi
.org/10.1111/j.1750-4716.2007.00003.x
Krumhuber, E., Manstead, A. S. R., Cosker, D., Marshall, D., Rosin, P. L.,
& Kappas, A. (2007). Facial dynamics as indicators of trustworthiness
and cooperative behavior. Emotion, 7, 730 –735. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1037/1528-3542.7.4.730
Kugler, T., Connolly, T., & Kausel, E. E. (2009). The effect of consequen-
tial thinking on trust game behavior. Journal of Behavioral Decision
Making, 22, 101–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bdm.614
Kurzban, R., & Houser, D. (2001). Individual differences in cooperation in
a circular public goods game. European Journal of Personality,
15(1,SpecIssue), S37–S52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/per.420
Landrum, A. R., Eaves, B. S. J., Jr., & Shafto, P. (2015). Learning to trust
and trusting to learn: A theoretical framework. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 19, 109–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2014.12.007
Lauriola, M., & Levin, I. P. (2001). Personality traits and risky decision-
making in a controlled experimental task: An exploratory study. Per-
sonality and Individual Differences, 31, 215–226. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/S0191-8869(00)00130-6
Lee, K., & Ashton, M. C. (2004). Psychometric properties of the HEXACO
personality inventory. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 39, 329–358.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327906mbr3902_8
Lee, K., & Ashton, M. C. (2012). Getting mad and getting even: Agree-
ableness and Honesty-Humility as predictors of revenge intentions.
Personality and Individual Differences, 52, 596–600. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.paid.2011.12.004
Lee, K., Ashton, M. C., & De Vries, R. E. (2005). Predicting workplace
delinquency and integrity with the HEXACO and Five-Factor models of
personality structure. Human Performance, 18, 179–197. http://dx.doi
.org/10.1207/s15327043hup1802_4
Lee, K., Ashton, M. C., Morrison, D. L., Cordery, J., & Dunlop, P. D.
(2008). Predicting integrity with the HEXACO personality model: Use
of self- and observer reports. Journal of Occupational and Organiza-
tional Psychology, 81, 147–167. http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/
096317907X195175
Lee, K., Ashton, M. C., Wiltshire, J., Bourdage, J. S., Visser, B. A., &
Gallucci, A. (2013). Sex, power, and money: Prediction from the Dark
Triad and Honesty–Humility. European Journal of Personality, 27,
169–184. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/per.1860
Lee, K., Ogunfowora, B., & Ashton, M. C. (2005). Personality traits
beyond the big five: Are they within the HEXACO space? Journal of
Personality, 73, 1437–1463. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.2005
.00354.x
Lehmann-Waffenschmidt, M., & Leipold, K. (2011). Determinants of trust.
Nervenheilkunde: Zeitschrift für Interdisziplinaere Fortbildung, 30,
401–409.
Lejuez, C. W., Read, J. P., Kahler, C. W., Richards, J. B., Ramsey, S. E.,
Stuart, G. L., . . . Brown, R. A. (2002). Evaluation of a behavioral
measure of risk taking: The Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART).
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 8, 75–84. http://dx.doi
.org/10.1037/1076-898X.8.2.75
Lenton, P., & Mosley, P. (2011). Incentivising trust. Journal of Economic
Psychology, 32, 890–897. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2011.07.005
Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2001). Fear, anger, and risk. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 146–159. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1037/0022-3514.81.1.146
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
272 THIELMANN AND HILBIG
Lewicki, R. J., McAllister, D. J., & Bies, R. J. (1998). Trust and distrust:
New relationships and realities. The Academy of Management Review,
23, 438–458.
Li, T., & Fung, H. H. (2013). Age differences in trust: An investigation
across 38 countries. The Journals of Gerontology: Series B: Psycholog-
ical Sciences and Social Sciences, 68, 347–355.
Little, A. C., Jones, B. C., DeBruine, L. M., & Dunbar, R. I. M. (2013).
Accuracy in discrimination of self-reported cooperators using static
facial information. Personality and Individual Differences, 54, 507–512.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2012.10.018
Lönnqvist, J.-E., Verkasalo, M., & Walkowitz, G. (2011). It pays to
pay—Big Five personality influences on co-operative behaviour in an
incentivized and hypothetical prisoner’s dilemma game. Personality and
Individual Differences, 50, 300–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid
.2010.10.009
Lönnqvist, J.-E., Verkasalo, M., Walkowitz, G., & Wichardt, P. C. (2010).
Measuring individual risk attitudes in the lab: Task or ask? An empirical
comparison. CGS Working Paper, Vol. 2, No. 3, Cologne Graduate
School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences. http://dx.doi
.org/10.2139/ssrn.1556647
López-Pérez, R. (2012). The power of words: A model of honesty and
fairness. Journal of Economic Psychology, 33, 642–658. http://dx.doi
.org/10.1016/j.joep.2011.12.004
Lorian, C. N., & Grisham, J. R. (2010). The safety bias: Risk-avoidance
and social anxiety pathology. Behaviour Change, 27, 29–41. http://dx
.doi.org/10.1375/bech.27.1.29
Lorian, C. N., & Grisham, J. R. (2011). Clinical implications of risk
aversion: An online study of risk-avoidance and treatment utilization in
pathological anxiety. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 25, 840–848. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.janxdis.2011.04.008
Lorian, C. N., Mahoney, A., & Grisham, J. R. (2012). Playing it safe: An
examination of risk-avoidance in an anxious treatment-seeking sample.
Journal of Affective Disorders, 141, 63–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j
.jad.2012.02.021
Lucas, R. E., & Diener, E. (2001). Understanding extraverts’ enjoyment of
social situations: The importance of pleasantness. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 81, 343–356. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.81.2.343
Lucas, R. E., Diener, E., Grob, A., Suh, E. M., & Shao, L. (2000).
Cross-cultural evidence for the fundamental features of extraversion.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 452–468. http://dx
.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.79.3.452
Luhmann, N. (1988). Familiarity, confidence, trust: Problems and alterna-
tives. In D. Gambetta (Ed.), Trust: Making and breaking cooperative
relations (pp. 94–107). Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.
Macko, A., Malawski, M., & Tyszka, T. (2014). Belief in others’ trust-
worthiness and trusting behaviour. Polish Psychological Bulletin, 45,
43–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/ppb-2014-0007
Macy, M. W., & Skvoretz, J. (1998). The evolution of trust and cooperation
between strangers: A computational model. American Sociological Re-
view, 63, 638–660. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2657332
Malhotra, D. (2004). Trust and reciprocity decisions: The differing per-
spectives of trustors and trusted parties. Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 94, 61–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j
.obhdp.2004.03.001
Maltby, J., Wood, A. M., Day, L., Kon, T. W. H., Colley, A., & Linley,
P. A. (2008). Personality predictors of levels of forgiveness two and a
half years after the transgression. Journal of Research in Personality, 42,
1088–1094. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2007.12.008
Manapat, M. L., Nowak, M. A., & Rand, D. G. (2013). Information,
irrationality, and the evolution of trust. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, 90(Suppl), S57–S75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo
.2012.10.018
Manapat, M. L., & Rand, D. G. (2012). Delayed and inconsistent infor-
mation and the evolution of trust. Dynamic Games and Applications, 2,
401–410. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13235-012-0055-6
Maner, J. K., & Gerend, M. A. (2007). Motivationally selective risk
judgments: Do fear and curiosity boost the boons or the banes? Orga-
nizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 103, 256–267.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2006.08.002
Maner, J. K., Richey, J. A., Cromer, K., Mallott, M., Lejuez, C. W., Joiner,
T. E., & Schmidt, N. B. (2007). Dispositional anxiety and risk-avoidant
decision-making. Personality and Individual Differences, 42, 665–675.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2006.08.016
Maner, J. K., & Schmidt, N. B. (2006). The role of risk avoidance in
anxiety. Behavior Therapy, 37, 181–189. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j
.beth.2005.11.003
Mansbridge, J. (1999). Altruistic trust. In M. Warren (Ed.), Democracy and
trust. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1017/CBO9780511659959.010
Manson, J. H., Gervais, M. M., & Kline, M. A. (2013). Defectors cannot
be detected during “small talk” with strangers. PLoS ONE, 8, e82531.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0082531
Marcus, B., Lee, K., & Ashton, M. C. (2007). Personality dimensions
explaining relationships between integrity tests and counterproductive
behavior: Big five, or one in addition? Personnel Psychology, 60, 1–34.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-6570.2007.00063.x
Masuda, N., & Nakamura, M. (2012). Coevolution of trustful buyers and
cooperative sellers in the trust game. PLoS ONE, 7, e44169. http://dx
.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0044169
Matthews, B. A., Kordonski, W. M., & Shimoff, E. (1983). Temptation and
the maintenance of trust: Effects of bilateral punishment capability.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27, 255–277. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
0022002783027002003
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995). An integrative
model of organizational trust. The Academy of Management Review, 20,
709–734.
McCarter, M. W., Rockmann, K. W., & Northcraft, G. B. (2010). Is it even
worth it? The effect of loss prospects in the outcome distribution of a
public goods dilemma. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 111, 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2009.06.003
McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T., Jr. (1985). Updating Norman’s “Adequate
Taxonomy”: Intelligence and personality dimensions in natural language
and in questionnaires. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49,
710–721. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.49.3.710
McCullough, M. E., Bellah, C. G., Kilpatrick, S. D., & Johnson, J. L.
(2001). Vengefulness: Relationships with forgiveness, rumination, well-
being, and the Big Five. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27,
601–610. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167201275008
McCullough, M. E., & Hoyt, W. T. (2002). Transgression-related motiva-
tional dispositions: Personality substrates of forgiveness and their links
to the Big Five. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 1556–
1573. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/014616702237583
McEvily, B., Radzevick, J. R., & Weber, R. A. (2012). Whom do you
distrust and how much does it cost? An experiment on the measurement
of trust. Games and Economic Behavior, 74, 285–298. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.011
McKnight, D. H., & Chervany, N. L. (2001). Trust and distrust definitions:
One bite at a time. In R. Falcone, M. Singh, & Y.-H. Tan (Eds.), Trust
in cyber societies: Integrating the human and artificial perspectives (pp.
27–54). Berlin, Germany: Springer. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-
45547-7_3
McKnight, D. H., Cummings, L. L., & Chervany, N. L. (1998). Initial trust
formation in new organizational relationships. The Academy of Manage-
ment Review, 23, 473–490.
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
273TRUST
McNaughton, N. (2011). Trait anxiety, trait fear and emotionality: The
perspective from non-human studies. Personality and Individual Differ-
ences, 50, 898–906. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2010.07.011
Meertens, R. M., & Lion, R. (2008). Measuring an individual’s tendency to
take risks: The risk propensity scale. Journal of Applied Social Psychol-
ogy, 38, 1506 –1520. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2008
.00357.x
Messick, D. M., & McClintock, C. G. (1968). Motivational bases of choice
in experimental games. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 4,
1–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(68)90046-2
Meyerson, D., Weick, K. E., & Kramer, R. M. (1996). Swift trust and
temporary groups. In R. M. Kramer & T. R. Tyler (Eds.), Trust in
organizations: Frontiers of theory and research (pp. 166–195). Thou-
sand Oaks, CA: Sage http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781452243610.n9
Mikolajczak, M., Gross, J. J., Lane, A., Corneille, O., de Timary, P., &
Luminet, O. (2010). Oxytocin makes people trusting, not gullible. Psy-
chological Science, 21, 1072–1074. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
0956797610377343
Miller, A. J., Worthington, E. L., Jr., & McDaniel, M. A. (2008). Gender
and forgiveness: A meta–analytic review and research agenda. Journal
of Social and Clinical Psychology, 27, 843–876. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1521/jscp.2008.27.8.843
Miller, D. T. (1999). The norm of self-interest. American Psychologist, 54,
1053–1060. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.54.12.1053
Mills, C. M. (2013). Knowing when to doubt: Developing a critical stance
when learning from others. Developmental Psychology, 49, 404–418.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0029500
Moorman, C., Zaltman, G., & Deshpande, R. (1992). Relationships be-
tween providers and users of market research: The dynamics of trust
within and between organizations. Journal of Marketing Research, 29,
314–328. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3172742
Moshagen, M., Hilbig, B. E., & Zettler, I. (2014). Faktorenstruktur, psy-
chometrische Eigenschaften und Messinvarianz der deutschsprachigen
Version des 60-Item HEXACO Persönlichkeitsinventars [Factor struc-
ture, psychometric properties, and measurement invariance of the
German-language version of the 60-item HEXACO personality inven-
tory]. Diagnostica, 60, 86 –97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1026/0012-1924/
a000112
Mulder, L. B., van Dijk, E., De Cremer, D., & Wilke, H. A. M. (2006).
Undermining trust and cooperation: The paradox of sanctioning systems
in social dilemmas. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42,
147–162. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2005.03.002
Müller, J., & Schwieren, C. (2012). What can the Big Five personality
factors contribute to explain small-scale economic behavior? Tinbergen
Institute Discussion Paper No. 12–028/1. Amsterdam, The Netherlands:
Tinbergen Institute. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2029016
Murray, S. L., & Holmes, J. G. (2009). The architecture of interdependent
minds: A Motivation-management theory of mutual responsiveness.
Psychological Review, 116, 908 –928. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/
a0017015
Naumann, L. P., Vazire, S., Rentfrow, P. J., & Gosling, S. D. (2009).
Personality judgments based on physical appearance. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 35, 1661–1671. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
0146167209346309
Newell, B. R., & Bröder, A. (2008). Cognitive processes, models and
metaphors in decision research. Judgment and Decision Making, 3,
195–204.
Oda, R., Naganawa, T., Yamauchi, S., Yamagata, N., & Matsumoto-Oda,
A. (2009). Altruists are trusted based on non-verbal cues. Biology
Letters, 5, 752–754. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2009.0332
Orbell, J. M. (1993). Hamlet and the psychology of rational choice under
uncertainty. Rationality and Society, 5, 127–140. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1177/1043463193005001010
Orbell, J. M., & Dawes, R. M. (1991). A “cognitive miser” theory of
cooperators’ advantage. The American Political Science Review, 85,
515–528. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1963172
Pavot, W., Diener, E., & Fujita, F. (1990). Extraversion and happiness.
Personality and Individual Differences, 11, 1299–1306. http://dx.doi
.org/10.1016/0191-8869(90)90157-M
Payne, J. W. (1973). Alternative approaches to decision making under risk:
Moments versus risk dimensions. Psychological Bulletin, 80, 439–453.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0035260
Perugini, M., Gallucci, M., Presaghi, F., & Ercolani, A. P. (2003). The
personal norm of reciprocity. European Journal of Personality, 17,
251–283. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/per.474
Platow, M. J., Foddy, M., Yamagishi, T., Lim, L., & Chow, A. (2012). Two
experimental tests of trust in in-group strangers: The moderating role of
common knowledge of group membership. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 42, 30–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.852
Posten, A.-C., Ockenfels, A., & Mussweiler, T. (2014). How activating
cognitive content shapes trust: A subliminal priming study. Journal of
Economic Psychology, 41, 12–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2013
.04.002
Pothos, E. M., Perry, G., Corr, P. J., Matthew, M. R., & Busemeyer, J. R.
(2011). Understanding cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game.
Personality and Individual Differences, 51, 210–215. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.paid.2010.05.002
Poulin, M. J., & Haase, C. M. (in press). Growing to trust: Evidence that
trust increases and becomes more important for well-being across the
life span. Social Psychological & Personality Science. Advance online
publication.
Pruitt, D. G., & Kimmel, M. J. (1977). Twenty years of experimental
gaming: Critique, synthesis, and suggestions for the future. Annual
Review of Psychology, 28, 363–392. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev
.ps.28.020177.002051
Przepiorka, W. (2013). Buyers pay for and sellers invest in a good repu-
tation: More evidence from eBay. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 42,
31–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2012.11.004
Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics.
The American Economic Review, 83, 1281–1302.
Rau, H. A. (2014). The disposition effect and loss aversion: Do gender
differences matter? Economics Letters, 123, 33–36. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.020
Rempel, J. K., Holmes, J. G., & Zanna, M. P. (1985). Trust in close
relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 95–112.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.49.1.95
Resnick, P., & Zeckhauser, R. (2002). Trust among strangers in Internet
transactions: Empirical analysis of eBay’s reputation system. Advances
in Applied Microeconomics, 11, 127–157.
Rezlescu, C., Duchaine, B., Olivola, C. Y., & Chater, N. (2012). Unfake-
able facial configurations affect strategic choices in trust games with or
without information about past behavior. PLoS ONE, 7, ArtID:
E34293scheier. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0034293
Rhodewalt, F. (2008). Personality and social behavior: An overview. In F.
Rhodewalt (Ed.), Personality and social behavior (pp. 1–8). New York,
NY: Psychology Press.
Rieger, M., & Mata, R. (2015). On the generality of age differences in
social and nonsocial decision making. The Journals of Gerontology:
Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 70, 200–214.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/geronb/gbt088
Rilling, J. K., & Sanfey, A. G. (2011). The neuroscience of social decision-
making. Annual Review of Psychology, 62, 23–48. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1146/annurev.psych.121208.131647
Robinson, S. L. (1996). Trust and breach of the psychological contract.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 41, 574 –599. http://dx.doi.org/
10.2307/2393868
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
274 THIELMANN AND HILBIG
Rosenberg, S., & Sedlak, A. (1972). Structural representations of implicit
personality theory. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 6,
235–297.
Ross, W., & LaCroix, J. (1996). Multiple meanings of trust in negotiation
theory and research: A literature review and integrative model. Interna-
tional Journal of Conflict Management, 7, 314–360. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1108/eb022786
Rotenberg, K. J. (2010). The conceptualization of interpersonal trust: A
basis, domain, and target framework. In K. J. Rotenberg (Ed.), Inter-
personal trust during childhood and adolescence (pp. 8–27). New York,
NY: Cambridge University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/
CBO9780511750946.002
Rothmund, T., Gollwitzer, M., Bender, J., & Klimmt, C. (2015). Short- and
long-term effects of video game violence on interpersonal trust. Media
Psychology, 18, 106 –133. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15213269.2013
.841526
Rotter, J. B. (1967). A new scale for the measurement of interpersonal
trust. Journal of Personality, 35, 651–665. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j
.1467-6494.1967.tb01454.x
Rotter, J. B. (1971). Generalized expectancies for interpersonal trust.
American Psychologist, 26, 443– 452. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/
h0031464
Rotter, J. B. (1980). Interpersonal trust, trustworthiness, and gullibility.
American Psychologist, 35, 1–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X
.35.1.1
Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., & Camerer, C. F. (1998). Not
so different after all: A cross-discipline view of trust. Academy of
Management Review, 23, 393– 404. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/AMR
.1998.926617
Rozin, P., & Royzman, E. B. (2001). Negativity bias, negativity domi-
nance, and contagion. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5,
296–320. http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/S15327957PSPR0504_2
Rule, N. O., Krendl, A. C., Ivcevic, Z., & Ambady, N. (2013). Accuracy
and consensus in judgments of trustworthiness from faces: Behavioral
and neural correlates. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
104, 409–426. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0031050
Sapienza, P., Toldra Simats, A., & Zingales, L. (2013). Understanding
trust. The Economic Journal, 123, 1313–1332. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1111/ecoj.12036
Scharlemann, J. P. W., Eckel, C. C., Kacelnik, A., & Wilson, R. K. (2001).
The value of a smile: Game theory with a human face. Journal of
Economic Psychology, 22, 617–640. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-
4870(01)00059-9
Schechter, L. (2007). Traditional trust measurement and the risk confound: An
experiment in rural Paraguay. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organiza-
tion, 62, 272–292. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2005.03.006
Scheier, M. F., Carver, C. S., & Bridges, M. W. (1994). Distinguishing
optimism from neuroticism (and trait anxiety, self-mastery, and self-
esteem): A reevaluation of the Life Orientation Test. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology, 67, 1063–1078. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/
0022-3514.67.6.1063
Schlenker, B. R., Helm, B., & Tedeschi, J. T. (1973). The effects of
personality and situational variables on behavioral trust. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 25, 419–427. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1037/h0034088
Schmidt, U., & Traub, S. (2002). An experimental test of loss aversion.
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 25, 233–249. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/
A:1020923921649
Shafto, P., Eaves, B., Navarro, D. J., & Perfors, A. (2012). Epistemic trust:
Modeling children’s reasoning about others’ knowledge and intent.
Developmental Science, 15, 436–447. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
7687.2012.01135.x
Shelley, M. K. (1994). Individual differences in lottery evaluation models.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 60, 206–230.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1994.1081
Shepherd, S., & Belicki, K. (2008). Trait forgiveness and traitedness within
the HEXACO model of personality. Personality and Individual Differ-
ences, 45, 389–394. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2008.05.011
Sheppard, B. H., & Sherman, D. M. (1998). The grammars of trust: A
model and general implications. The Academy of Management Review,
23, 422–437.
Sheppard, K. E., & Boon, S. D. (2012). Predicting appraisals of romantic
revenge: The roles of Honesty-Humility, Agreeableness, and vengeful-
ness. Personality and Individual Differences, 52, 128–132. http://dx.doi
.org/10.1016/j.paid.2011.09.014
Shinada, M., Yamagishi, T., Tanida, S., Takahashi, C., Inukai, K., Koi-
zumi, M., . . . Hashimoto, H. (2010). [Accuracy of judgment about
others’ cooperative behavior: Effects of attractiveness and facial expres-
siveness]. Japanese Journal of Phycology, 81, 149–157. http://dx.doi
.org/10.4992/jjpsy.81.149
Simpson, J. A. (2007). Foundations of interpersonal trust. In A. W. Krug-
lanski & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic
principles (2nd ed., pp. 587–607). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Sitkin, S. B., & Roth, N. L. (1993). Explaining the limited effectiveness of
legalistic “remedies” for trust/distrust. Organization Science, 4(3), 367–
392. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/orsc.4.3.367
Six, F., Nooteboom, B., & Hoogendoorn, A. (2010). Actions that build
interpersonal trust: A relational signalling perspective. Review of Social
Economy, 68, 285–315. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00346760902756487
Slovic, P., & Lichtenstein, S. (1968). Relative importance of probabilities
and payoffs in risk taking. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 78,
1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0026468
Snijders, C., & Keren, G. (1999). Determinants of trust. In D. V. Budescu,
I. Erev, & R. Zwick (Eds.), Games and human behavior: Essays in
honor of Amnon Rapoport (pp. 355–385). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum Pub-
lishers.
Snijders, C., & Keren, G. (2001). Do you trust? Whom do you trust? When
do you trust? In S. R. Thye (Ed.), Advances in group processes (Vol. 18,
pp. 129–160). Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0882-6145(01)18006-9
Sofer, C., Dotsch, R., Wigboldus, D. H. J., & Todorov, A. (2015). What is
typical is good: The influence of face typicality on perceived trustwor-
thiness. Psychological Science, 26, 39–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
0956797614554955
Stewart, L. H., Ajina, S., Getov, S., Bahrami, B., Todorov, A., & Rees, G.
(2012). Unconscious evaluation of faces on social dimensions. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: General, 141, 715–727. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1037/a0027950
Stiff, C. (2008). Are they bothered? How the opportunity to damage a
partner’s reputation influences giving behavior in a trust game. The
Journal of Social Psychology, 148, 609–630. http://dx.doi.org/10.3200/
SOCP.148.5.609-630
Stirrat, M., & Perrett, D. I. (2010). Valid facial cues to cooperation and
trust: Male facial width and trustworthiness. Psychological Science, 21,
349–354. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797610362647
Stouten, J., De Cremer, D., & van Dijk, E. (2006). Violating equality in
social dilemmas: Emotional and retributive reactions as a function of
trust, attribution, and honesty. Personality and Social Psychology Bul-
letin, 32, 894–906. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167206287538
Sutter, M., & Kocher, M. G. (2007). Trust and trustworthiness across
different age groups. Games and Economic Behavior, 59, 364–382.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.07.006
Swope, K. J., Cadigan, J., Schmitt, P. M., & Shupp, R. (2008). Personality
preferences in laboratory economics experiments. The Journal of Socio-
Economics, 37, 998–1009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2006.12.065
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
275TRUST
Sylwester, K., Lyons, M., Buchanan, C., Nettle, D., & Roberts, G. (2012).
The role of Theory of Mind in assessing cooperative intentions. Person-
ality and Individual Differences, 52, 113–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.paid.2011.09.005
Thielmann, I., & Hilbig, B. E. (2014). Trust in me, trust in you: A social
projection account of the link between personality, cooperativeness, and
trustworthiness expectations. Journal of Research in Personality, 50,
61–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2014.03.006
Thielmann, I., Hilbig, B. E., & Niedtfeld, I. (2014). Willing to give but not
to forgive: Borderline personality features and cooperative behavior.
Journal of Personality Disorders, 28, 778 –795. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1521/pedi_2014_28_135
Todorov, A. (2008). Evaluating faces on trustworthiness: An extension of
systems for recognition of emotions signaling approach/avoidance be-
haviors. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1124, 208–224.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1196/annals.1440.012
Todorov, A., Baron, S. G., & Oosterhof, N. N. (2008). Evaluating face
trustworthiness: A model based approach. Social Cognitive and Affective
Neuroscience, 3, 119–127. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsn009
Todorov, A., Pakrashi, M., & Oosterhof, N. N. (2009). Evaluating faces on
trustworthiness after minimal time exposure. Social Cognition, 27, 813–
833. http://dx.doi.org/10.1521/soco.2009.27.6.813
Tullberg, J. (2008). Trust—The importance of trustfulness versus trustwor-
thiness. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 37, 2059–2071. http://dx.doi
.org/10.1016/j.socec.2007.10.004
Ullmann-Margalit, E. (2004). Trust, distrust, and in between. In R. Hardin
(Ed.), Distrust (pp. 60–82). New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
Van den Bos, W., van Dijk, E., & Crone, E. A. (2012). Learning whom to
trust in repeated social interactions: A developmental perspective. Group
Processes & Intergroup Relations, 15, 243–256. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1177/1368430211418698
Van den Bos, W., Westenberg, M., van Dijk, E., & Crone, E. A. (2010).
Development of trust and reciprocity in adolescence. Cognitive Devel-
opment, 25, 90–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2009.07.004
Van Gelder, J.-L., & De Vries, R. E. (2012). Traits and states: Integrating
personality and affect into a model of criminal decision making. Crim-
inology: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 50, 637–671. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1111/j.1745-9125.2012.00276.x
Van Lange, P. A. M. (1999). The pursuit of joint outcomes and equality in
outcomes: An integrative model of social value orientation. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 337–349. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1037/0022-3514.77.2.337
Van Lange, P. A. M. (2015). Generalized trust: Four lessons from genetics
and culture. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 24, 71–76.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721414552473
Van Lange, P. A. M., & Kuhlman, D. M. (1994). Social value orientations
and impressions of partner’s honesty and intelligence: A test of the
might versus morality effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, 67, 126–141. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.1.126
Van Lange, P. A. M., & Semin-Goossens, A. (1998). The boundaries of
reciprocal cooperation. European Journal of Social Psychology, 28,
847– 854. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0992(199809/10)28:
5847::AID-EJSP8863.0.CO;2-L
Van Lange, P. A. M., Van Vugt, M., Meertens, R. M., & Ruiter, R. A. C.
(1998). A social dilemma analysis of commuting preferences: The roles
of social value orientation and trust. Journal of Applied Social Psychol-
ogy, 28, 796 – 820. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.1998
.tb01732.x
Van Lange, P. A. M., Vinkhuyzen, A. A. E., & Posthuma, D. (2014).
Genetic influences are virtually absent for trust. PLoS ONE, 9, e93880.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0093880
van ’t Wout, M., & Sanfey, A. G. (2008). Friend or foe: The effect of
implicit trustworthiness judgments in social decision-making. Cognition,
108, 796–803. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2008.07.002
Volk, S., Thöni, C., & Ruigrok, W. (2011). Personality, personal values
and cooperation preferences in public goods games: A longitudinal
study. Personality and Individual Differences, 50, 810–815. http://dx
.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2011.01.001
Vollan, B. (2011). The difference between kinship and friendship: (Field-)
experimental evidence on trust and punishment. The Journal of Socio-
Economics, 40, 14–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2010.10.003
Vyrastekova, J., & Garikipati, S. (2005). Beliefs and trust: An experiment.
Discussion Paper 88, Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.800424
Walker, D. F., & Gorsuch, R. L. (2002). Forgiveness within the Big Five
personality model. Personality and Individual Differences, 32, 1127–
1137. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869(00)00185-9
Wang, C. S., Galinsky, A. D., & Murnighan, J. K. (2009). Bad drives
psychological reactions, but good propels behavior: Responses to hon-
esty and deception. Psychological Science, 20, 634–644. http://dx.doi
.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02344.x
Wang, T.-W. (2008). Forgiveness and Big Five personality traits among
Taiwanese undergraduates. Social Behavior and Personality, 36, 849–
850. http://dx.doi.org/10.2224/sbp.2008.36.6.849
Weber, E. U., Blais, A.-R., & Betz, N. E. (2002). A domain-specific
risk-attitude scale: Measuring risk perceptions and risk behaviors. Jour-
nal of Behavioral Decision Making, 15, 263–290. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1002/bdm.414
Weber, J. M., Malhotra, D., & Murnighan, J. K. (2005). Normal acts of
irrational trust: Motivated attributions and the trust development pro-
cess. In B. M. Staw & R. M. Kramer (Eds.), Research in organizational
behavior: An annual series of analytical essays and critical reviews
(Vol. 26, pp. 75–101). Philadelphia, PA: Elsevier Science/JAI Press.
Weller, J. A., & Thulin, E. W. (2012). Do honest people take fewer risks?
Personality correlates of risk-taking to achieve gains and avoid losses in
HEXACO space. Personality and Individual Differences, 53, 923–926.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2012.06.010
Weller, J. A., & Tikir, A. (2011). Predicting domain-specific risk taking
with the HEXACO personality structure. Journal of Behavioral Decision
Making, 24, 180–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bdm.677
Wilke, H. A. M. (1991). Greed, efficiency and fairness in resource man-
agement situations. European Review of Social Psychology, 2, 165–187.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14792779143000051
Wray, L. D., & Stone, E. R. (2005). The role of self-esteem and anxiety in
decision making for self versus others in relationships. Journal of
Behavioral Decision Making, 18, 125–144. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/
bdm.490
Wrightsman, L. S. J., Jr. (1964). Measurement of philosophies of human
nature. Psychological Reports, 14, 743–751. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/
pr0.1964.14.3.743
Yamagishi, T. (1986). The provision of a sanctioning system as a public
good. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 110–116.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.51.1.110
Yamagishi, T. (1988). The provision of a sanctioning system in the United
States and Japan. Social Psychology Quarterly, 51, 265–271. http://dx
.doi.org/10.2307/2786924
Yamagishi, T. (2011). Trust: The evolutionary game of mind and society.
Tokyo: Springer. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-53936-0
Yamagishi, T., Horita, Y., Mifune, N., Hashimoto, H., Li, Y., & Shinada,
M., . . . Simunovic, D. (2012). Rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum
game is no evidence of strong reciprocity. PNAS Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 109,
20364–20368. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1212126109
Yamagishi, T., Kanazawa, S., Mashima, R., & Terai, S. (2005). Separating
trust from cooperation in a dynamic relationship: Prisoner’s dilemma
with variable dependence. Rationality and Society, 17, 275–308. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1177/1043463105055463
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
276 THIELMANN AND HILBIG
Yamagishi, T., Mifune, N., Li, Y., Shinada, M., Hashimoto, H., Horita, Y.,
. . . Simunovic, D. (2013). Is behavioral pro-sociality game-specific?
Pro-social preference and expectations of pro-sociality. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 120, 260–271. http://dx.doi
.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.06.002
Yamagishi, T., & Yamagishi, M. (1994). Trust and commitment in the
United States and Japan. Motivation and Emotion, 18, 129–166. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02249397
Yates, J. F., & Stone, E. R. (1992). The risk construct. In J. F. Yates (Ed.),
Risk-taking behavior (pp. 1–25). Oxford, UK: Wiley.
Yu, M., Saleem, M., & Gonzalez, C. (2014). Developing trust: First
impressions and experience. Journal of Economic Psychology, 43, 16–
29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2014.04.004
Zand, D. E. (1972). Trust and managerial problem solving. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 17, 229–239. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2393957
Zettler, I., Hilbig, B. E., & Heydasch, T. (2013). Two sides of one coin:
Honesty-Humility and situational factors mutually shape social dilemma
decision making. Journal of Research in Personality, 47, 286–295.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2013.01.012
Zhao, K., & Smillie, L. D. (2015). The role of interpersonal traits in social
decision making: Exploring sources of behavioral heterogeneity in eco-
nomic games. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 19, 277–302.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1088868314553709
Zuckerman, M., Eysenck, S., & Eysenck, H. J. (1978). Sensation seeking
in England and America: Cross-cultural, age, and sex comparisons.
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 46, 139–149. http://dx
.doi.org/10.1037/0022-006X.46.1.139
Received February 21, 2015
Revision received April 28, 2015
Accepted May 4, 2015 
Members of Underrepresented Groups:
Reviewers for Journal Manuscripts Wanted
If you are interested in reviewing manuscripts for APA journals, the APA Publications and
Communications Board would like to invite your participation. Manuscript reviewers are vital to the
publications process. As a reviewer, you would gain valuable experience in publishing. The P&C
Board is particularly interested in encouraging members of underrepresented groups to participate
more in this process.
If you are interested in reviewing manuscripts, please write APA Journals at Reviewers@apa.org.
Please note the following important points:
• To be selected as a reviewer, you must have published articles in peer-reviewed journals. The
experience of publishing provides a reviewer with the basis for preparing a thorough, objective
review.
• To be selected, it is critical to be a regular reader of the five to six empirical journals that are most
central to the area or journal for which you would like to review. Current knowledge of recently
published research provides a reviewer with the knowledge base to evaluate a new submission
within the context of existing research.
• To select the appropriate reviewers for each manuscript, the editor needs detailed information.
Please include with your letter your vita. In the letter, please identify which APA journal(s) you
are interested in, and describe your area of expertise. Be as specific as possible. For example,
“social psychology” is not sufficient—you would need to specify “social cognition” or “attitude
change” as well.
• Reviewing a manuscript takes time (1–4 hours per manuscript reviewed). If you are selected to
review a manuscript, be prepared to invest the necessary time to evaluate the manuscript
thoroughly.
APA now has an online video course that provides guidance in reviewing manuscripts. To learn
more about the course and to access the video, visit http://www.apa.org/pubs/authors/review-
manuscript-ce-video.aspx.
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
277TRUST
Brief Report
Trust in me, trust in you: A social projection account of the link between
personality, cooperativeness, and trustworthiness expectations
Isabel Thielmann ⇑, Benjamin E. Hilbig
University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Available online 22 March 2014
Keywords:
Trust
Trustworthiness expectations
Social projection
Personality
HEXACO Honesty–Humility
Cooperativeness
Economic games
a b s t r a c t
Although trust is a key aspect of social behavior, individual differences in trust are not yet sufficiently
understood. Addressing this issue, the present study investigated the link between trait Honesty–Humil-
ity, behavioral tendencies in economic games, and trustworthiness expectations. Based on a social pro-
jection account, it was hypothesized that individuals base their trustworthiness expectations on their
own trustworthiness, i.e., their tendency to cooperate (as opposed to exploiting others). As predicted,
Honesty–Humility was positively associated with trustworthiness expectations. In line with the social
projection hypothesis, this relation was fully mediated through cooperativeness in the Dictator Game,
but not through entitlement in the Ultimatum Game. Cooperativeness (as driven by trait Honesty–Humil-
ity) is thus an important determinant of individual differences in trust.
 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Trust is one of the most central aspects of social behavior and
has therefore been heavily studied across the social sciences and
beyond. Indeed, the idea that personality plays a central role for
trust was already expressed decades ago. For example, Rotter
(1967) defined trust in terms of a personality trait, namely as a
‘‘general expectancy [. . .] that others can be relied upon’’ (p.
651). More commonly, though, trust has been conceptualized as
a social behavior that is determined by an individual’s general will-
ingness to trust others – her so-called trust propensity (e.g., Mayer,
Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). Despite the long history of trust-re-
lated personality research, however, the (basic) trait determinants
underlying these individual differences in trust are not yet suffi-
ciently clarified. Addressing this issue, the current work examines
the underlying personality dimensions of trustworthiness expecta-
tions. These reflect individuals’ beliefs about a trustee’s trustwor-
thiness and thus form a central prerequisite of trust behavior
alongside the willingness to take the risk associated with trusting
(e.g., Boon & Holmes, 1991). Specifically, we investigated the influ-
ence of individuals’ own trait cooperativeness on trustworthiness
expectations as a path of social projection.
Social projection has been discussed as a vital determinant of
expectations in general, and trustworthiness expectations in
particular (e.g., Krueger, Massey, & DiDonato, 2008). In situations
of trust – which are defined by insufficient knowledge on others’
trustworthiness – people are assumed to form corresponding
expectations by projecting their own cooperativeness (or trustwor-
thiness, respectively1) onto others. As such, cooperative individuals
should expect others to be cooperative, and thus trustworthy, as
well; uncooperative individuals, in turn, should expect others to be
uncooperative, and thus untrustworthy. Correspondingly, an indi-
vidual’s own cooperativeness is assumed to form a basis of her
expectations about a trustee’s likely behavior.
In line with this idea, individuals’ own cooperativeness has
repeatedly been identified as a determinant of trust in strangers.
For example, trustees returning large amounts to the trustor in
the Trust Game (i.e., trustworthy individuals; Berg, Dickhaut, &
McCabe, 1995), were found to be more willing to trust an unknown
other as compared to trustees returning only small amounts or
nothing (e.g., Evans & Revelle, 2008; Yamagishi et al., 2013). Simi-
larly, a pro-social (as opposed to a pro-self) social value orientation
as well as a high willingness to cooperate (in economic games)
had a positive effect on individuals’ willingness to trust (e.g.,
Kanagaretnam, Mestelman, Nainar, & Shehata, 2009; Yamagishi
et al., 2013). This suggests that individual differences in coopera-
tiveness can account for individual differences in trust.
However, previous studies did not disentangle trustworthiness
expectations from trust and/or cooperative behavior as they did
not assess participants’ expectations about the trustee’s
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2014.03.006
0092-6566/ 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Sciences, University of Mannheim, D7, 27, 68159 Mannheim, Germany. Fax: +49
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1 In a situation of trust, a trustee’s cooperativeness ultimately corresponds to her
trustworthiness. Thus, we use both terms synonymously in what follows.
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trustworthiness prior to the decision whether to trust or not. For
example, a large investment in the Trust Game may either indicate
an optimistic expectation about the trustee’s likely return or, in-
stead, a high willingness to take the risk associated with unrecip-
rocated trust. Likewise, large investments may be driven by a
high willingness to share – simply as an expression of individuals’
cooperativeness. Therefore, it remains unclear whether the ob-
served relation between cooperativeness and trust is actually due
to social projection or whether game-based cooperation and trust
behavior merely share a common core in terms of trait
cooperativeness.
In any case, a social projection mechanism implies that basic
personality traits driving cooperation should also relate to individ-
ual differences in trust. Supporting this notion, Big Five-Agreeable-
ness – capturing individual differences in the motivation to
cooperate (Denissen & Penke, 2008) – has been identified as the
main predictor of trust in the Trust Game (e.g., Evans & Revelle,
2008). However, as Big Five-Agreeableness specifically includes a
trust facet, the mechanism underlying this relation remains incon-
clusive. On the one hand, it is possible that Agreeableness simply
includes the tendency to trust, thus leading to more trust behavior
(without any social projection involved). On the other hand, agree-
able individuals should be more likely to cooperate (Denissen &
Penke, 2008) and may project this tendency onto strangers, thus
reflecting a social projection mechanism. In essence, the link be-
tween Big Five-Agreeableness and trust behavior cannot provide
strong evidence for the hypothesis of social projection (of trait
cooperativeness) as an underlying determinant of trustworthiness
expectations.
A more conclusive test of social projection thus requires consid-
eration of a trait that specifically signals cooperativeness without
aspects of trust propensity. One corresponding basic trait is Hon-
esty–Humility, the sixth dimension of the HEXACO model of per-
sonality structure (Honesty–Humility, Emotionality, eXtraversion,
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience;
Ashton & Lee, 2007). Honesty–Humility particularly refers to an
individual’s cooperativeness in terms of sincerity, fairness, greed-
avoidance, and modesty. As such, Honesty–Humility shares some
content with Big Five-Agreeableness (i.e., sincerity and modesty),
but also comprises more unique aspects (i.e., fairness and greed-
avoidance) which are not captured by the Big Five factors (Ashton,
Lee, & de Vries, in press).2 In line with this conceptualization, Hon-
esty–Humility has repeatedly and consistently been identified as a
predictor of active cooperation in terms of fairness and non-exploita-
tion in economic games (e.g., Hilbig, Glöckner, & Zettler, in press).
Investigating the influence of Honesty–Humility on trustworthiness
expectations can hence offer insights into the role of pure trait coop-
erativeness (and thus social projection) for individual differences in
trust.
Based on this reasoning, the present study investigated the link
between Honesty–Humility, behavioral tendencies in economic
games, and trustworthiness expectations. As implied by the idea
of social projection, we hypothesized Honesty–Humility to posi-
tively relate to trustworthiness expectations (Hypothesis 1). To
test still more conclusively whether indeed cooperativeness links
Honesty–Humility and trustworthiness expectations, we addition-
ally considered the allocation in the Dictator Game as a measure of
cooperativeness. In the Dictator Game, individuals simply divide
an endowment between themselves and another person. The
mechanism of social projection clearly predicts that the positive
relation between Honesty–Humility and trustworthiness expecta-
tions must be mediated through cooperativeness in this game
(Hypothesis 2).
Furthermore, it is necessary to rule out that entitlement (rather
than cooperativeness) drives said relation between Honesty–
Humility and trustworthiness expectations. That is, individuals
high in Honesty–Humility should expect others to be trustworthy
because they themselves are and not because they feel entitled to a
good treatment by others. To rule out this mechanism, a measure
of entitlement was obtained via the Ultimatum Game in which
individuals indicate howmuch an unknown other must offer (from
an initial endowment) for them to accept the offer. Prior research
has already indicated that Honesty–Humility and Ultimatum Game
acceptance levels are indeed unrelated (e.g., Hilbig, Zettler, Leist, &
Heydasch, 2013). In any case, the hypothesis that social projection
of cooperativeness and not entitlement links Honesty–Humility to
trustworthiness expectations predicts that Ultimatum Game
acceptance levels should not mediate the relationship between
these two variables (Hypothesis 3).
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Participants were recruited online via internet communities
and mailing lists of the University of Mannheim, Germany. An
a-priori power analysis revealed that to uncover a small to
medium-sized effect (r = .20) with optimal statistical power
(1  b = .95), a sample of about N = 260 was required. Expecting a
typical drop-out-rate of about 15%, we recruited 301 participants.
Out of these, 81% (N = 244) fulfilled the criteria for inclusion (i.e.,
completion of all tasks, no repeated participation, and at least a
‘‘good’’ grasp of the German language).3 The final sample comprised
79% females, aged 18–75 years (M = 28.79, SD = 10.64). Most partic-
ipants were students (50%) or employees (41%).
2.2. Materials
Basic personality traits (including Honesty–Humility) were
measured via the German 60-item version (Moshagen, Hilbig, &
Zettler, in press) of the HEXACO Personality Inventory-Revised
(HEXACO-60; Ashton & Lee, 2009). The inventory contains 10 items
for each of the six HEXACO dimensions. To assess trustworthiness
expectations, cooperativeness, and entitlement, we used three dif-
ferent games: the Distrust Game, the Dictator Game, and the Ulti-
matum Game. All games were completely hypothetical. That is,
participants were asked to imagine playing each game with an-
other unknown person for money.
In the Distrust Game (McEvily, Radzevick, & Weber, 2012), two
players (trustor and trustee) each receive an initial endowment of,
say, 50€. However, the trustee is empowered to take any amount of
the 50€ initially assigned to the trustor, in turn increasing her own
payoff by decreasing the trustor’s payoff. For example, if the trus-
tee decides to take 30€ from the trustor, she receives 80€ in total
whereas the trustor ends up with 20€. Hence, the trustor’s payoff
depends on the trustee’s trustworthiness in terms of her willing-
ness to maintain the fair split as opposed to taking some of the
trustor’s endowment. This was thoroughly explained to partici-
pants. As a measure of trustworthiness expectations, participants
2 As the similar names suggest, there is also substantial overlap between Big Five-
and HEXACO-Agreeableness. However, the two are not equivalent: Whereas they
share content such as forgiveness and gentleness, HEXACO-Agreeableness also covers
even-temper versus irritability, anger, and harshness – which is considered to belong
to Neuroticism in the Big Five. In turn, sentimentality-related content, which is
associated with Big Five-Agreeableness, is not captured by HEXACO-Agreeableness
but instead included in the Emotionality factor of the HEXACO model (i.e., the
counterpart of Big Five-Neuroticism; Ashton et al., in press).
3 Note that although this sample size is slightly below the optimum determined
through the power analysis, it nonetheless yields a highly satisfactory power of
1b = .93.
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(trustors) were asked to estimate how much money they expected
a hypothetical random trustee to leave for them – or, in other
words, how much the trustee would not take from them for her
personal profit. Participants indicating that the trustee will take
away nothing (thus leaving the equal split untouched) are consid-
ered to have high trustworthiness expectations. In turn, if expect-
ing an untrustworthy interaction partner, participants should
indicate that the trustee will take some of their endowment, thus
leaving less than 50€. So, the higher the amount a trustor expected
the trustee to leave, the higher the trust in the trustee’s trustwor-
thiness. As a plausibility check (and in line with the original ver-
sion of the game), we further asked those participants who
expected the trustee to behave untrustworthily how much of their
own endowment they would be willing to give up for their protec-
tion (thus eliminating the trustee’s power over the final distribu-
tion). In general, the Distrust Game offers straightforward
assessment of trustworthiness expectations because the trustee’s
behavior is not contingent on the trustor’s behavior.
In addition to the Distrust Game, we used a hypothetical Dicta-
tor Game (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994) as a measure
of cooperativeness. Participants played the allocator who is asked
to divide an amount of 100€ between herself and a hypothetical re-
cipient. As an advantage over other games (e.g., Prisoner’s Dilem-
ma Game), the allocation in the Dictator Game is a pure measure
of cooperativeness that is not confounded with trust.
Finally, to rule out entitlement as an alternative explanation (cf.
Hypothesis 3), we collected participants’ responses in a hypothet-
ical Ultimatum Game (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982).
The recipient in the Ultimatum Game is empowered to either ac-
cept or reject a proposer’s offer on how to split an initial endow-
ment between the two. Whereas accepting means that the offer
is realized as proposed, rejecting means that both players receive
nothing. The recipient can hence punish the proposer for an offer
that does not satisfy her demands. Again, this was thoroughly ex-
plained to participants and they were asked to indicate the mini-
mum offer they would be willing to accept, implying that they
would reject any offer below this minimum. The higher the offer
one is minimally willing to accept, the higher one’s subjective
entitlement.
2.3. Procedure
The study was run as a web-based study in close adherence to
the proposed standards for web-based experimenting (Reips,
2002). After providing informed consent and demographical infor-
mation, participants completed the HEXACO-60 as well as other
personality measures not pertinent to this investigation. Following
the questionnaires, participants worked on the Distrust Game, the
Dictator Game, and the Ultimatum Game, respectively. After the
games, participants answered eight control questions as a measure
of their seriousness of participation. Finally, as an incentive for par-
ticipation, they received feedback on their HEXACO personality
profile. On average, completion of the entire study took 21 min.
3. Results
Taking into account potential measurement error in the ob-
served variables, we resorted to an exploratory structural equation
modeling (ESEM) approach4 with latent factors for the six HEXACO
dimensions. Considering that personality dimensions are not per-
fectly orthogonal and therefore usually correlated (e.g., Ashton,
Lee, Goldberg, & de Vries, 2009), ESEM allows cross-loadings of items
on other than their primary factor. As a consequence, ESEM solves
part of the typical problems of confirmatory factor analyses, such
as poor model fit, inflated factor correlations, and biased parameter
estimates (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2009; see also for more informa-
tion on ESEM). ESEM was run with an oblique target rotation meth-
od, setting target values for all items except the ones intended to
load on the respective HEXACO factor to zero. Overall, the model
yielded a satisfactory fit as all fit indices recommended for personal-
ity research (Beauducel & Wittmann, 2005) were in an acceptable
range, v2/df = 1.80, RMSEA = .06, and SRMR = .05. Supporting the fac-
tor structure of the HEXACO-60 and the interpretation of the latent
factors, each item had its primary loading on the corresponding la-
tent trait dimension.
Table 1 provides the means, standard deviations, and correla-
tions for all measures of interest (for correlations between all vari-
ables see Table S1 in the online supplemental material). In general,
participants were rather optimistic about the hypothetical other’s
trustworthiness in the Distrust Game. That is, about two thirds of
participants (n = 167) expected the trustee to leave the fair split
untouched whereas only one third of participants (n = 77) expected
the trustee to take away some of their endowment, namely on
average 50.6% (SD = 27.6%) of it. Confirming that participants
understood the mechanism of the game, the amount individuals
expected the trustee to take away strongly predicted the amount
they were willing to pay for their protection, r = .49, p < .001.
As can be seen in Table 1, the pattern of results was in line with
the hypotheses: With regard to Hypothesis 1, we found a small to
medium-sized positive relation (r = .20, 95% CI [.07, .34]) between
Honesty–Humility and trustworthiness expectations, showing that
individuals high in Honesty–Humility expected the trustee to leave
a higher amount for them than individuals low in Honesty–Humil-
ity. The effect of Honesty–Humility on trustworthiness expecta-
tions remained significant when controlling for the remaining
HEXACO dimensions as covariates, b = .16, p = .033. Otherwise,
only Extraversion explained unique variance in trustworthiness
expectations, b = .14, p = .039.
In line with Hypothesis 2, we found positive associations be-
tween Honesty–Humility and cooperativeness (i.e., Dictator Game
allocation) and between cooperativeness and trustworthiness
expectations (Table 1). As predicted by the proposed social projec-
tion mechanism, a mediation analysis revealed a significant indi-
rect effect from Honesty–Humility to trustworthiness
expectations via Dictator Game cooperativeness, a * b = 0.16, 95%
CI [0.08,0.23], p < .001.5 In terms of the widely-accepted causal
steps approach for testing mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986), all cri-
teria for a full mediation were fulfilled (cf. Fig. 1).
Finally, Hypothesis 3 was also corroborated as neither a relation
between Honesty–Humility and entitlement (i.e., Ultimatum Game
acceptance level) nor between entitlement and trustworthiness
expectations was found (Table 1).6 Correspondingly, a mediation
analysis yielded a non-significant indirect effect from Honesty–
Humility to trustworthiness expectations via Ultimatum Game enti-
tlement, a * b = 0.01, 95% CI [0.01,0.02], p = .395 (cf. Fig. 1).
4. Discussion
Although trust has been heavily studied across various disci-
plines, individual differences in trust are insufficiently understood.
4 Note that all results reported in the following were replicated with traditional
scale-based analyses.
5 The indirect effect refers to the product of regression coefficients when regressing
the mediator on the predictor (a) and the criterion on the mediator (b). Repeating
mediation analyses with bootstrapped confidence intervals for indirect effects in a
traditional SEM framework confirmed the obtained result.
6 A Bayesian analysis (Wagenmakers, 2007) clearly favored the null hypothesis
over the alternative hypothesis for both correlations (p(H0|D) = 72% and
p(H0|D) = 85%, respectively).
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Addressing this issue, the present study investigated the link
between the HEXACO personality traits, cooperativeness versus enti-
tlement, and trustworthiness expectations – a key aspect of trust
(e.g., Boon & Holmes, 1991). As derived from the idea of social pro-
jection, it was hypothesized that individuals’ tendency to cooperate
(as driven by trait Honesty–Humility) should explain individual
differences in expectations about strangers’ trustworthiness.
In line with hypotheses – and mirroring a path of social projec-
tion – individuals’ trustworthiness expectations were related to
their own cooperativeness which, in turn, was related to trait
Honesty–Humility. That is, individuals high in Honesty–Humility
expected an unknown trustee to be more trustworthy than individ-
uals low in Honesty-Humility. This relation was fully mediated
through cooperativeness (as measured via the Dictator Game),
but not through entitlement (as measured via the Ultimatum
Game). Hence, individuals high in Honesty–Humility tended to
express more optimistic trustworthiness expectations – not
because they thought that others should but rather because they
themselves would behave cooperatively. Stated differently, their
trustworthiness expectations were well accounted for by their
own cooperativeness and clearly not based on a feeling of entitle-
ment, i.e., on how much cooperation they thought they deserved
from another. Overall, the pattern supports the notion that social
projection is indeed a relevant mechanism underlying the relation
between cooperativeness (as predicted by trait Honesty–Humility)
and trustworthiness expectations. Besides, it nicely mirrors the
theoretical conceptualization of Honesty–Humility capturing
fairness on the one hand and modesty on the other hand.
As a limitation, it must be acknowledged that correlation-based
mediation analyses cannot confirm any form or direction of causa-
tion (cf. MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007). Nonetheless, the main
hypothesis of this work strictly predicts a certain path (and thus a
specific mediation pattern). In turn, absence of the mediation pat-
tern would have spoken directly against the hypothesis and thus it
represents an appropriate test, despite the inherent limitations in
terms of causal inference. Similarly, we cannot fully rule out that
individuals based their self-reports on their perceptions and/or
expectations of others rather than – as implied by the idea of social
projection – basing their expectations of others on what they
themselves would do. However, given that individuals could not
observe any actions of another and were entirely unaware of
who the other person might be, it seems unlikely that specific per-
ceptions or expectations of others can account for the relation be-
tween self-reported trait cooperativeness and trustworthiness
expectations.
Furthermore, it is important to take into account that individu-
als may differ in their tendency to project own characteristics onto
others (Krueger & Acevedo, 2007). Therefore, future research might
more conclusively test the role of social projection by considering
such differences in social projection tendency as a potential moder-
ator of the relation between traits driving cooperativeness and
trustworthiness expectations. The potentially moderating role of
social projection tendency might also explain why the effect of
Honesty–Humility on trustworthiness expectations was only small
to medium in size.
Beyond the current hypotheses, we also found a positive effect
of Extraversion on trustworthiness expectations. As high levels of
Extraversion are associated with feelings of confidence and opti-
mism – and therefore arguably with trust (Ashton et al., in press)
– this finding is theoretically plausible and corroborates the useful-
ness of the HEXACO model for studying individual differences in
trust at a high resolution. Nonetheless, it would seem worthwhile
for future studies to dissect such nuances more directly, e.g., by
comparing the HEXACO and Big Five models in terms of which spe-
cific aspects of personality explain individual differences in trust
(cf. Hilbig et al., in press).
In conclusion, the present study identified trait cooperativeness
(i.e., Honesty–Humility) as a basic personality dimension underly-
ing trustworthiness expectations. Thus, the HEXACO model also
seems to provide useful and novel insights concerning individual
differences in trust especially due to the inclusion of a sixth basic
factor specifically capturing pro-social tendencies (e.g., Hilbig
et al., in press). Given the vital importance of trust for all kinds
of social interactions, it is our hope that the current approach
encourages future research on individual differences in trust in
general, also beyond the current focus on trustworthiness
expectations.
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Table 1
Means, standard deviations (in parentheses), and intercorrelations between all measures.
Measure Scale M (SD) Correlations
1 2 3 4
1. Honesty–Humilitya 1–5 3.54 (0.61) –
2. Distrust Game expectation 0–50 7.98 (14.09) .20** –
3. Dictator Game cooperativeness 0–100 42.19 (15.04) .43*** .36*** –
4. Ultimatum Game entitlement 0–100 29.15 (17.60) .12 .09 .08 –
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
a Cronbach’s alpha for Honesty–Humility was .75.
Trustworthiness
Expectations
Entitlement
Honesty-Humility
Cooperativeness
.12
.36***
.09
.20**
(.06)
(.19**)
.44***
Fig. 1. Mediation model of Honesty–Humility to trustworthiness expectations with
corresponding ESEM-based correlation and partial correlation coefficients (in
parentheses), controlling for the respective mediator variable. Solid connections
indicate significant relations; dashed connections indicate null relations (as
confirmed by Bayesian analyses).
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Article
Trust is a vital pillar of various social interactions and society 
as a whole (e.g., Yamagishi, 2011). However, the benefits 
associated with trust are necessarily contingent upon others’ 
trustworthiness—given that trust basically mirrors a risky 
choice to depend on another without being able to control the 
other’s actions (Thielmann & Hilbig, in press). That is, 
trust—especially among strangers—is only defensible if one 
can expect the trusted person (the so-called trustee) to honor 
rather than betray the trust (Evans & Krueger, 2009). Despite 
this vital significance of trustworthiness, there is only a rudi-
mentary understanding of trustworthy behavior, especially in 
terms of underlying personality traits.
Inspired by behavioral economics, recent research on 
trustworthiness has mostly relied on the trust game (Berg, 
Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). In this game, a trustor is asked 
to divide a certain endowment between herself and a trustee. 
The amount the trustor entrusts is multiplied (usually tripled) 
and transferred to the trustee who is then asked to decide how 
much to return to the trustor. By implication, the amount 
returned is considered a measure of behavioral trustworthi-
ness, with high returns indicating high trustworthiness (cf. 
Johnson & Mislin, 2011). Note that, according to this con-
ceptualization, we herein adopt a behavioral view of trust 
and trustworthiness.
As directly follows from the rules of the trust game, trust-
worthiness involves a reaction, that is, behavior contingent on 
another’s (prior) trust. Correspondingly, trustworthiness in the 
trust game has typically been considered an expression of reci-
procity (Berg et al., 1995), which can be defined as “a condi-
tional behaviour aimed at reacting to a behaviour with another 
behaviour of the same valence” (Perugini & Gallucci, 2001, p. 
S20). Stated differently, reciprocity captures an individual’s 
tendency to adjust her own behavior to an interaction partner’s 
(previous) behavior. Depending on whether an individual 
rewards another’s cooperative behavior or punishes another’s 
uncooperative behavior, one can further distinguish between 
positive and negative reciprocity (e.g., Perugini, Gallucci, 
Presaghi, & Ercolani, 2003). Although recent research on the 
trust game almost exclusively interpreted trustworthiness in 
terms of positive reciprocity (e.g., Chaudhuri & Gangadharan, 
2007; McCabe, Rigdon, & Smith, 2003), we consider both 
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positive and negative reciprocity as potential factors account-
ing for trustworthy behavior.1
The idea that trustworthiness essentially mirrors reciproc-
ity is largely based on evidence indicating that higher trust 
levels enhance trustees’ willingness to behave trustworthily 
(see Johnson & Mislin, 2011, for a meta-analytic review). 
Likewise, if trustees highly (rather than only marginally) 
benefitted from the trustor’s trust, trustworthiness increased 
(Malhotra, 2004). Vice versa, if trustees cannot rule out that 
trustors merely “trusted” out of strategic considerations 
rather than out of “true” trust or kindness, respectively, 
returns have been shown to decrease (Bauernschuster, Falck, 
& Große, 2013). Finally, trustee returns have been negatively 
related to trait negative reciprocity; however, for positive 
reciprocity a comparable (positive) link could not be cor-
roborated (Yamagishi et al., 2012). Nevertheless, altogether, 
these findings suggest a mechanism of reciprocity underly-
ing trustworthiness—implying that dispositions toward (pos-
itive or negative) reciprocity should determine individual 
differences in trustworthy behavior.
Besides reciprocity, it has also been argued—and empiri-
cally supported—that trustee returns are driven by individu-
als’ unconditional kindness (e.g., Cox, 2004; Gambetta & 
Przepiorka, 2014), which has mostly been operationalized 
through giving in the dictator game2 (Forsythe, Horowitz, 
Savin, & Sefton, 1994). Unconditional kindness implies that 
trustworthy behaviors are not perfectly contingent on the 
level of prior trust, but rather involve a relatively stable 
return. Correspondingly, meta-analytic evidence indicates 
that trustee returns decline less than proportionately with the 
multiplier of the entrusted amount (Johnson & Mislin, 2011). 
This implies relatively high returns if the amount is, for 
example, only doubled rather than tripled—a finding that is 
difficult to explain by reciprocity alone. Similarly, directly 
comparing (game-based) reciprocity and unconditional kind-
ness revealed that the latter accounts for the majority of vari-
ance in trustworthiness (Ashraf, Bohnet, & Piankov, 2006). 
However, in another study, neither unconditional kindness 
nor reciprocity showed significant relations with trustworthi-
ness (Ben-Ner & Halldorsson, 2010). In any case, an uncon-
ditional kindness mechanism would imply that dispositions 
toward altruistic and fair behavior can explain individual 
variation in trustworthiness.
Taken together, the extant evidence is inconclusive regard-
ing the nature and underlying (trait) determinants of trustwor-
thiness. Strikingly, though, almost all previous studies have 
exclusively relied on a game-theoretical approach, for exam-
ple, by investigating behavioral tendencies across different 
games (or structural changes within one game). This common 
practice in behavioral economics is undoubtedly fruitful, but 
essentially misses out on more stable behavioral tendencies 
(i.e., traits) and may additionally yield caveats due to 
common-method variance and individuals’ desire to respond 
consistently across games. Besides, given that a zero return in 
the trust game might reflect either negative reciprocity or a 
lack of positive reciprocity, distinguishing between positive 
and negative reciprocity is impossible using a purely game-
based approach unless the game structure is changed consider-
ably—which would, in turn, undermine comparability across 
studies.
As an alternative to the sole reliance on games, models of 
basic personality traits offer a promising avenue to identify 
the determinants underlying cooperation in general and trust-
worthiness in particular. Specifically, “broad and stable inter-
personal traits can help explain behavioral heterogeneity 
across a range of games modeling social interactions” (Zhao 
& Smillie, 2015, p. 293). Regarding trustworthiness, most 
corresponding research focused on the widely accepted Five-
Factor Model (FFM; Costa & McCrae, 1992; McCrae & 
Costa, 1985) and linked trustee behavior to Agreeableness 
(FFM-AG; see Zhao & Smillie, 2015, for a recent review). By 
definition, FFM-AG captures the tendency to cooperate in 
situations involving resource conflicts (Denissen & Penke, 
2008). Correspondingly, some studies report a positive rela-
tion between FFM-AG and trustee returns (Becker, Deckers, 
Dohmen, Falk, & Kosse, 2012; Ben-Ner & Halldorsson, 
2010). However, a similar number of studies could not cor-
roborate said link (Evans & Revelle, 2008; Müller & 
Schwieren, 2012) or found that FFM-AG is only predictive in 
combination with other factors (low Neuroticism; Lönnqvist, 
Verkasalo, Wichardt, & Walkowitz, 2012). Summarized care-
fully, the evidence is currently inconclusive.
Plausibly, the inconsistent findings may not be due to a 
conceptual limitation of FFM-AG per se, but may be due to 
the broad nature of this factor capturing all kinds of coopera-
tive tendencies (including unconditional kindness and posi-
tive/negative reciprocity; cf. Costa, McCrae, & Dye, 1991). 
Thus, the inconsistent evidence might actually suggest that 
only one of the proposed determinants explains trustworthy 
behavior. If, for example, only unconditional kindness 
accounts for trustworthiness whereas positive and negative 
reciprocity do not, the former mechanism would strengthen 
the association between FFM-AG and trustworthiness, 
whereas the latter would reduce it—leading to an inconsis-
tent overall picture such as the one observed. In consequence, 
because FFM-AG covers all trait aspects potentially—but 
not necessarily—relevant for trustworthiness, a positive rela-
tion between FFM-AG and trustworthiness cannot help 
unravel which specific dispositional tendency is actually 
decisive.
Fortunately, the more recently proposed HEXACO 
(Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, eXtraversion, Agreeableness, 
Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience) model of per-
sonality (Ashton & Lee, 2007; Lee & Ashton, 2004) distin-
guishes between three trait dimensions accounting for 
individual variation in prosocial behavior: Honesty-Humility, 
Emotionality, and Agreeableness (Ashton, Lee, & De Vries, 
2014). Whereas Emotionality involves a tendency toward kin 
altruism, Honesty-Humility (HEX-HH) and Agreeableness 
(HEX-AG) encompass complementary aspects of reciprocal 
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altruism. That is, HEX-HH is defined as “the tendency to be 
fair and genuine in dealing with others, in the sense of coop-
erating with others even when one might exploit them with-
out suffering retaliation” (Ashton & Lee, 2007, p. 156). As 
such, high levels of HEX-HH imply sincerity, fairness, 
greed-avoidance, and modesty. HEX-AG, in turn, describes 
“the tendency to be forgiving and tolerant of others, in the 
sense of cooperating with others even when one might be 
suffering exploitation by them” (Ashton & Lee, 2007, 
p. 156). Thus, high levels of HEX-AG stand for forgiveness, 
gentleness, flexibility, and patience.
Corroborating the theoretical conceptualizations of both 
HEXACO factors with regard to prosocial behavior, 
HEX-HH has consistently (positively) been linked to active 
cooperation (i.e., non-exploitation) in social dilemmas 
(Hilbig, Zettler, & Heydasch, 2012; Zettler, Hilbig, & 
Heydasch, 2013) and—of particular interest for the issue at 
hand—to unconditional kindness in the dictator game (e.g., 
Baumert, Schlösser, & Schmitt, 2013; Hilbig, Thielmann, 
Hepp, Klein, & Zettler, 2015; Thielmann & Hilbig, 2014) as 
well as to positive reciprocity (Ackermann, Fleiß, & Murphy, 
in press; Perugini et al., 2003). For HEX-AG, in turn, studies 
point to negative associations with reactive cooperativeness 
(i.e., non-retaliation) in the ultimatum game (Hilbig, Zettler, 
Leist, & Heydasch, 2013; Thielmann, Hilbig, & Niedtfeld, 
2014) and, specifically, negative reciprocity (Ackermann 
et al., in press; Perugini et al., 2003).
Due to this specific distinction between different coopera-
tive tendencies captured by HEX-HH and HEX-AG, respec-
tively, the HEXACO model allows for a particularly 
fine-grained analysis of dispositional tendencies underlying 
cooperative behavior. The model is thus especially useful 
whenever evidence based on the broader FFM is inconclu-
sive (e.g., Hilbig, Glöckner, & Zettler, 2014). Correspondingly, 
for trustworthiness, specific predictions on the relation 
between trustworthy behavior and HEX-HH or HEX-AG, 
respectively, can be derived for each of the proposed poten-
tial mechanisms (as detailed below). Exactly this type of 
evidence—on the link between the HEXACO dimensions 
and trustworthiness (in the trust game)—is currently missing 
(Zhao & Smillie, 2015).
Consequently, the purpose of the present studies was to 
dissect the potential dispositional tendencies underlying 
trustworthiness based on the HEXACO model of personality. 
Given the theoretical conceptualizations of HEX-HH and 
HEX-AG—and corresponding evidence as sketched above—
the following predictions can be derived: If trustworthiness 
is determined by unconditional kindness (alone), it should be 
positively linked to HEX-HH, but not linked to HEX-AG (as 
the latter refers to reactive cooperativeness which is, by defi-
nition, conditional). A similar main effect of HEX-HH would 
be compatible—but not necessary—if positive reciprocity is 
the responsible factor. Nonetheless, the unconditional kind-
ness and positive reciprocity mechanisms make incompati-
ble predictions on the presence of an interaction with the 
level of prior trust: By definition, unconditional kindness is 
unconditional and it should therefore drive trustworthiness 
independently of the trustor’s level of trust (precluding an 
interaction). By contrast, positive reciprocity is inherently 
conditional and should thus drive trustworthiness contingent 
on the trustor’s prior behavior (implying an interaction): The 
more is entrusted, the more strongly HEX-HH would have to 
predict trustworthiness. In summary, unconditional kindness 
would thus require a main effect of HEX-HH on trustworthi-
ness, but none of HEX-AG, and no interaction of HEX-HH 
with prior trust. Positive reciprocity, in turn, would require 
said interaction; otherwise, a main effect of HEX-HH would 
be compatible, but not necessary.
Finally, if trustworthiness is determined by negative reci-
procity, it should be (negatively) linked to HEX-AG. 
However, this relationship must also be a conditional one 
(given the conditional nature of reciprocity), implying an 
interaction between HEX-AG and prior trust (i.e., a stronger 
relation between HEX-AG and trustworthiness with decreas-
ing levels of trust).3 In turn, a main effect of HEX-AG on 
trustworthiness would not be required, but nonetheless be 
compatible with the negative reciprocity account.
To test the alternative mechanisms, we conducted three 
online studies on the link between basic personality traits and 
trustworthiness—all in close adherence to standards for 
Internet-based experimenting (e.g., Reips, 2002). As our pri-
mary goal was to disentangle the different potential determi-
nants of trustworthy behavior, we exclusively focused on the 
relations between the HEXACO dimensions (particularly, 
HEX-HH and HEX-AG) and trustworthiness in Study 1. In 
Studies 2 and 3, we additionally aimed at clarifying whether 
the relatively weak link between FFM-AG and trustworthi-
ness (Zhao & Smillie, 2015) can be attributed to the broader 
nature of FFM-AG (subsuming different cooperative 
tendencies).
Study 1
Method
Materials. To assess basic personality traits, we used the 
German 60-item version of the HEXACO Personality 
Inventory–Revised (HEXACO-60; Ashton & Lee, 2009; for 
psychometric properties of the German version, see Mosha-
gen, Hilbig, & Zettler, 2014). The HEXACO-60 includes 10 
items for each of the six HEXACO dimensions. Responses 
are given on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree.
To measure trustworthiness, we relied on the classical 
version of the trust game (Berg et al., 1995), placing partici-
pants in the role of the trustee.4 During the game, participants 
could earn points, based on which they were later incentiv-
ized. Specifically, each participant was randomly matched to 
an unknown trustor. The combination of the participant’s and 
the trustor’s choices determined participants’ point scores. 
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The 25% of participants with the highest final score received 
a 10€ (approximately US$12.60) gift voucher.
Initially, both trustors and trustees received an endow-
ment of 30 points. Trustees (participants) were informed that 
the trustor (a randomly assigned unknown other, denoted as 
Player 1) could decide how much of this endowment (in 
5-point increments) she wants to transfer to the trustee 
(denoted as Player 2). The transfer was tripled accordingly. 
Trustees’ task was to indicate how much of the (tripled) 
transfer they wanted to return to the trustor. Corresponding 
to the widely accepted strategy method (Selten, 1967), par-
ticipants were unaware of the trustor’s actual transfer, but 
specified their return for each of the six potential (tripled) 
amounts (above 0) the trustor could transfer (i.e., between 15 
and 90 points, in 15-point increments).
Procedure. After providing informed consent and demo-
graphic information, participants completed the 
HEXACO-60. Next, they were thoroughly introduced to the 
rules of the trust game and asked to indicate their return to 
the trustor for each potential transfer. Finally, participants 
answered a few control questions assessing their seriousness 
of participation and received individual feedback on their 
HEXACO scores. After completing data collection, each 
participant was randomly assigned to a trustor to determine 
their point scores (using pseudonymous codes preserving 
anonymity).
Participants. Participants were recruited via online social net-
works (e.g., Facebook) and university mailing lists. An a 
priori power analysis using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buch-
ner, & Lang, 2009) revealed a required sample size of N = 
108 to detect a medium-sized effect (f 2 = .10) in a two-tailed 
t test for single regression coefficients in a linear regression 
with a high power (1 − β = .90). Note that sample size calcu-
lations were based on the main effects of HEX-HH and 
HEX-AG, respectively, on trustworthiness, given that these 
mirror the most basic tests in our analyses. Corresponding to 
these calculations, we recruited N = 108 trustees (and the 
same number of trustors, see above), including 81 females 
and aged between 19 and 49 years (M = 25.5, SD = 5.6). The 
majority (72.2%) of participants were students, 17.6% were 
employees.
Results and Discussion
Table 1 summarizes the means, standard deviations, and 
zero-order correlations between all focal variables (for infor-
mation on all variables, see Table S1 in the Supplemental 
Material). First off, trustee returns showed strong positive 
correlations with HEX-HH for all potential trust levels indi-
vidually as well as for the average return across trust levels 
(all rs > .30, p < .001). For HEX-AG, in turn, no (or only 
very weak) correlations with trustworthiness could be 
observed (all rs < .08, p > .43).
To statistically test this pattern (i.e., an influence of 
HEX-HH, but not of HEX-AG, on trustworthiness), we ana-
lyzed the average return across trust levels using a three-step 
analytical approach (cf. Hilbig et al., 2014). First, we used an 
approximation of the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 
from R2 (Raftery, 1995, Equation 26; Wagenmakers, 2007). 
From the BIC, we calculated Bayes Factors (BF). Following 
Wagenmakers (2007), we refer to BF
01
, relating the probabil-
ity of the null hypothesis to the probability of the alternative 
hypothesis. Thus, BF
01
 < 1 indicates evidence in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis, whereas BF
01
 > 1 indicates evidence 
in favor of the null hypothesis. For HEX-HH, a BF
01
 = 
0.0003 indicated that the alternative hypothesis (a meaning-
ful correlation between HEX-HH and trustworthiness) was 
more than 3,000 times as likely as the null hypothesis given 
the data. By contrast, for HEX-AG, a BF
01
 = 8.75 indicated 
the opposite, with the null being almost 9 times as likely 
as the alternative hypothesis. Second, we compared the size 
of the two correlation coefficients (i.e., r = .42 for HEX-HH 
Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations (in Parentheses), and Bivariate Correlations (95% Confidence Intervals in Brackets) of All Focal 
Variables Assessed in Study 1, With Internal Consistency Reliabilities (Cronbach’s α) in the Diagonal.
Measure Scale M (SD)
Correlations
HEX-HH HEX-AG
HEX-HH 1-5 3.43 (0.64) .80  
HEX-AG 1-5 3.08 (0.59) .24** [.06, .41] .78
Return 15 points (in %) 0-100 38.9 (23.6) .35*** [.18, .51] .00 [−.19, .19]
Return 30 points (in %) 0-100 40.3 (23.3) .42*** [.26, .57] .06 [−.13, .25]
Return 45 points (in %) 0-100 41.2 (21.1) .39*** [.22, .54] .08 [−.11, .26]
Return 60 points (in %) 0-100 42.8 (21.1) .40*** [.22, .54] .07 [−.12, .26]
Return 75 points (in %) 0-100 42.8 (22.0) .34*** [.16, .50] .05 [−.14, .24]
Return 90 points (in %) 0-100 43.8 (23.5) .39*** [.22, .54] .06 [−.13, .24]
M return (in %) 0-100 41.6 (20.5) .42*** [.25, .56] .06 [−.13, .24]
Note. HEX-HH = Honesty-Humility; HEX-AG = HEXACO-Agreeableness.
**p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.
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vs. r = .06 for HEX-AG) using a z test for dependent correla-
tions (Meng, Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1992). As implied by a sig-
nificant difference, z = 3.16, p = .002, the correlation between 
trustworthiness and HEX-HH was indeed larger than its 
counterpart for HEX-AG. Finally, concurrently regressing the 
average return on both HEX-HH and HEX-AG revealed a 
unique impact of HEX-HH, β = .43, p < .001, 95% CI = [.25, 
.61], but not of HEX-AG, β = −.05, p = .592, 95% CI = [−.23, 
.13]. In sum, all three analyses consistently supported an 
influence of HEX-HH, but not of HEX-AG, which, in turn, 
corresponds to the unconditional kindness mechanism and is 
also compatible with the positive reciprocity mechanism.
However, as detailed above, an unconditional kindness 
mechanism also requires that the relation between HEX-HH 
and trustworthiness is independent of the level of trust, thus 
prohibiting an interaction with prior trust. By contrast, the 
positive reciprocity mechanism specifically necessitates said 
interaction. To hence test the interaction between HEX-HH 
and prior trust, we used a linear mixed model, regressing 
trustworthiness on HEX-HH (between-level predictor), trust 
(within-level predictor), and their interaction.5 In line with 
the unconditional kindness mechanism, the model revealed a 
significant main effect of HEX-HH, B = 13.47, p < .001, 
95% CI = [7.92, 19.01], but no interaction between HEX-HH 
and trust, B = −0.02, p = .759, 95% CI = [−0.16, 0.12]. To test 
this null interaction more conclusively, we approximated the 
BIC values for the two regression models (i.e., the main-
effects model without the interaction term and the interaction 
model including the interaction term) based on their respec-
tive log-likelihood (Wagenmakers, 2007; Equation 9) and 
calculated the BF
01
 for the difference between the two BIC 
values (Wagenmakers, 2007; Equation 10). As indicated by 
BF
01
 = 9.91 (based on ∆BIC
10
 = 4.59), the probability of the 
main-effects model given the data was almost 10 times 
greater than the probability of the interaction model. Overall, 
this pattern implies that positive reciprocity cannot account 
for trustworthy behavior. As displayed in Figure 1, the (posi-
tive) relation between HEX-HH and trustworthiness was 
indeed equivalent across trust levels.
To finally test the negative reciprocity mechanism, the 
same linear mixed model was used, including HEX-AG, 
trust, and their interaction as predictors. Contradicting the 
negative reciprocity mechanism, the model did not reveal an 
interaction between HEX-AG and trust, B = 0.06, p = .481, 
95% CI = [−0.10, 0.21] (and—mirroring the results for the 
average return—no main effect of HEX-AG, B = 1.96, p = 
.558, 95% CI = [−4.64, 8.56]). Correspondingly, comparing 
the HEX-AG main-effects model with the interaction model 
revealed BF
01
 = 8.10 (∆BIC
10
 = 4.18), thus indicating that 
the probability for the main-effects model was about 8 times 
greater than the corresponding probability for the interaction 
model. Hence, the data contradicted negative reciprocity as 
underlying determinant of trustworthiness.
In summary, our analyses yielded a positive and consis-
tent influence of HEX-HH on trustee returns across different 
trust levels. This suggests that trustworthiness is driven by 
dispositional tendencies of unconditional kindness. By con-
trast, there was no evidence favoring the positive or negative 
reciprocity mechanisms as we found no interactions of 
HEX-HH or HEX-AG, respectively, with prior trust.
However, a potential limitation of our study was that par-
ticipants distributed points (rather than money) in the trust 
game and that only 25% of participants were incentivized. 
Although meta-analytic evidence on the trust game suggests 
that trustee behavior should be unaffected by the actual rate 
of incentivization (Johnson & Mislin, 2011), it nonetheless 
seemed prudent to replicate the above results providing mon-
etary behavior-contingent incentives for all participants. In 
addition, given that the majority of participants in Study 1 
were students and that 75% were female, we aimed at criti-
cally testing the results in a more heterogeneous (non-stu-
dent) sample. Therefore, participants in Study 2 were 
recruited by an independent professional panel provider. 
Furthermore, we considered it important to rule out demand 
effects of participants’ personality self-reports on subsequent 
behavior in the trust game. Therefore, in Study 2 we imple-
mented a longitudinal design, separating the personality 
assessment from the assessment of trustworthiness in time. 
Finally, as outlined above, Study 2 aimed at clarifying the 
mixed extant evidence on the relation between FFM-AG and 
trustworthiness. To this end, we additionally tested which 
aspects of FFM-AG actually link to (or show no relation 
with) trustworthiness.
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Figure 1. Predicted trustee returns for all levels of prior trust 
(between 15 and 90 points) depending on individual Honesty-
Humility scores (centered on mean) in Study 1.
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Study 2
Method
Materials. As in Study 1, we used the German version of the 
HEXACO-60 to assess the six HEXACO dimensions. In 
addition, the FFM factors were measured via the German 
60-item NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; Borkenau & 
Ostendorf, 2008), including 12 items for each personality 
factor. In both questionnaires, participants’ responses were 
collected on 5-point Likert-type scales, ranging from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree.
To measure trustworthiness, we again relied on the classi-
cal trust game, with participants acting in the role of the 
trustee.6 However, in contrast to Study 1, participants now 
played for real money (rather than points). That is, partici-
pants (as well as trustors) received an initial endowment of 
3.00€ (approximately US$3.80) and were—again corre-
sponding to the strategy method—asked to decide how much 
they wanted to return to the trustor for each potential (tripled) 
transfer (between 1.50€ and 9.00€, in 1.50€ increments). In 
addition, we slightly changed the response format to allow 
maximum transparency, such that participants received 
explicit information on the outcomes for themselves and the 
unknown trustor for all potential returns.
Procedure. Study 2 was again conducted via the Internet. Yet, 
to further strengthen our data compared to Study 1, we 
implemented a longitudinal design, separating the personal-
ity assessment from the trust game. At both measurement 
occasions, participants first provided informed consent and 
demographic information. At Time 1, they completed the 
HEXACO-60 and the NEO-FFI, followed by other measures 
not pertinent to the current investigation. At Time 2 (about 5 
months later), a random subsample of participants were re-
invited to a follow-up study. In this study, participants 
received detailed information on the rules of the trust game 
and indicated their returns for each potential (tripled) trust 
transfer as a trustee. After completing data collection, par-
ticipants were randomly matched to a trustor (assessed in a 
separate study) to determine individual payoffs. Incentive 
payment (consisting of a flat fee for participation and payoffs 
earned in the trust game) was handled entirely (and anony-
mously) by the panel provider.
Participants. Following the power analysis reported in Study 
1, the subsample recruited for Time 2 comprised N = 118 
participants (51 female). Supporting the heterogeneous com-
position of the sample, participants’ ages covered a broad 
range (20-66 years), with a relatively high average age (M = 
42.0, SD = 12.4). Only 5.1% of participants were students, 
whereas about two thirds (68.6%) were in employment. 
Also, there was a substantial diversity in educational levels.
Results and Discussion
Unconditional kindness versus (positive/negative) reciprocity. Table 
2 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlations 
between all variables of interest (for information on all vari-
ables, see Table S2 in the Supplemental Material). Similar to 
Study 1, HEX-HH showed significant (positive) correlations 
with trustworthiness for all trust levels individually as well 
as for the average return (all rs > .20, p < .025). For HEX-
AG, in turn, no noteworthy associations with trustworthiness 
were apparent (all rs ≤ .15, p > .10). Altogether, these zero-
order correlations corroborate those observed in Study 1, 
although effect sizes were slightly different.
To test this pattern of results statistically, we relied on the 
same three-step approach as in Study 1 (based on the average 
return across trust levels). First, we approximated the BIC 
and corresponding BF
01
 based on R2 (predicting trustworthi-
ness with HEX-HH and HEX-AG, respectively; Raftery, 
1995; Wagenmakers, 2007). For HEX-HH, BF
01
 = 0.07 
Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations (in Parentheses), and Bivariate Correlations (95% Confidence Intervals in Brackets) of All Focal 
Variables Assessed in Study 2, With Internal Consistency Reliabilities (Cronbach’s α) in the Diagonal.
Measure Scale M (SD)
Correlations
HEX-HH HEX-AG FFM-AG
HEX-HH 1-5 3.51 (0.59) .73  
HEX-AG 1-5 3.13 (0.52) .45*** [.29, .58] .77  
FFM-AG 1-5 3.62 (0.45) .49*** [.34, .62] .60*** [.47, .71] .75
Return 1.50€ (in %) 0-100 49.2 (26.4) .28** [.11, .44] .12 [−.07, .29] .21* [.03, .38]
Return 3.00€ (in %) 0-100 47.9 (23.6) .21* [.03, .38] .07 [−.11, .25] .15 [−.04, .32]
Return 4.50€ (in %) 0-100 45.9 (22.7) .24** [.06, .40] .15 [−.03, .32] .10 [−.08, .28]
Return 6.00€ (in %) 0-100 46.3 (23.5) .26** [.09, .42] .15 [−.04, .32] .16 [−.02, .33]
Return 7.50€ (in %) 0-100 48.5 (22.7) .23* [.05, .40] .13 [−.05, .31] .16 [−.02, .33]
Return 9.00€ (in %) 0-100 49.8 (24.0) .27** [.09, .43] .14 [−.04, .31] .18* [.00, .35]
M return (in %) 0-100 47.9 (20.8) .29** [.11, .44] .14 [−.04, .32] .18* [.00, .35]
Note. HEX-HH = Honesty-Humility; HEX-AG = HEXACO-Agreeableness; FFM-AG = FFM-Agreeableness.
*p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.
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yielded substantial evidence in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis, being more than 14 times as likely as the null 
hypothesis given the data. For HEX-AG, by contrast, BF
01
 = 
3.11 suggested the null hypothesis to be about 3 times as 
likely as the alternative hypothesis. Second, we compared 
the zero-order correlations between trustworthiness and 
HEX-HH (r = .29) and HEX-AG (r = .14), respectively 
(Meng et al., 1992). Unlike in Study 1, this test did not reach 
a conventional level of statistical significance (z = 1.49, p = 
.137). Nevertheless, when finally regressing the average 
return on both HEX-HH and HEX-AG concurrently, only 
HEX-HH predicted unique variance in trustworthiness, β = 
.28, p = .006, 95% CI = [.08, .47], whereas HEX-AG did not, 
β = .02, p = .830, 95% CI = [−.18, .22]. Taken together, these 
results largely replicate the findings of Study 1, providing 
evidence for the unconditional kindness and compatible with 
the positive reciprocity mechanism.
To further test whether the link between HEX-HH and 
trustworthiness is unconditional or conditional on the level 
of prior trust, we once more used a linear mixed model, first 
regressing trustworthiness on HEX-HH, trust, and their 
interaction (cf. Study 1). Consistent with Study 1, and in line 
with unconditional kindness, we found a significant main 
effect of HEX-HH, B = 10.03, p = .002, 95% CI = [3.92, 
16.13], but no interaction between HEX-HH and trust, B = 
−0.28, p = .774, 95% CI = [−2.17, 1.61]. Correspondingly, 
comparing the main-effects model with the interaction model 
(cf. Study 1) yielded BF
01
 = 10.43 (based on ∆BIC
10
 = 4.69), 
thus indicating the main-effects model to be about 10 times 
as likely as the interaction model given the data. Indeed, the 
relation between HEX-HH and trustworthiness was again 
comparable for all potential trust levels (Figure 2), thus con-
tradicting the positive reciprocity mechanism.
Finally, aiming to test the negative reciprocity mecha-
nism, we reran the linear mixed model including HEX-AG 
as between-level predictor. However, the model showed no 
interaction between HEX-AG and prior trust in predicting 
trustworthiness, B = 0.60, p = .584, 95% CI = [−1.55, 2.75] 
(and, corroborating the results for the average return, no 
main effect of HEX-AG, B = 5.77, p = .114, 95% CI = [−1.40, 
12.93]). Correspondingly, the BF
01
 = 9.35 (∆BIC
10
 = 4.47) 
for the model comparison revealed that the main-effects 
model was more than 9 times as likely as the interaction 
model. Overall, Study 2 hence replicated the findings 
observed in Study 1, corroborating that trustworthy behavior 
can be considered an expression of unconditional kindness 
rather than of positive/negative reciprocity.
FFM-AG and trustworthiness. Regarding the relation between 
FFM-AG and trustee behavior, our results mirror previous 
findings in that FFM-AG showed small to medium-sized 
(Cohen, 1988) correlations with trustworthiness, with sig-
nificant effects for some trust levels, but not for others (and 
r = .18, p = .045, for the average return; cf. Table 2). As rea-
soned above, a potential explanation for this relatively weak 
effect might be that only very specific aspects of FFM-AG—
namely those driving unconditional kindness, as implied by 
the above results—actually account for trustworthiness. To 
test this assumption, we first regressed trustworthiness (aver-
age return) on both FFM-AG and HEX-HH, given that HEX-
HH captures unconditional kindness. Indeed, only HEX-HH 
predicted unique variance in trustworthiness, β = .26, p = 
.013, 95% CI = [.05, .46], whereas FFM-AG did not, β = .06, 
p = .579, 95% CI = [−.15, .26]. This suggests that those 
aspects linking FFM-AG to trustworthiness are the ones cov-
ered by HEX-HH.7 To test this interpretation more thor-
oughly, we used a mediation approach (Preacher & Kelley, 
2011) in Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). Indirect effects 
(a × b) refer to the standardized solution with the correspond-
ing bootstrap confidence interval based on B = 1,000 boot-
strap samples. As the analyses revealed, HEX-HH indeed 
mediated the link between FFM-AG and trustworthiness, a × 
b = 0.128, p = .043, 95% CI = [0.004, 0.252], but not vice 
versa (for FFM-AG as mediator), a × b = 0.028, p = .592, 
95% CI = [−0.075, 0.132]. Overall, the results hence suggest 
that the relation between FFM-AG and trustworthiness can 
be attributed to aspects of active cooperativeness (including 
unconditional kindness) as covered by HEX-HH. However, 
as these aspects only constitute one component of FFM-AG 
(among several others), FFM-AG seems somewhat too broad 
to predict a specific behavior like trustworthiness in a satis-
factory manner.
Taken together, Study 2 successfully replicated the results 
of Study 1 in a heterogeneous (non-student) sample with 
monetary behavior-contingent incentives for all participants, 
Honesty−Humility (centered on mean)
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Figure 2. Predicted trustee returns for all levels of prior trust 
(between 1.50€ and 9.00€) depending on individual Honesty-
Humility scores (centered on mean) in Study 2.
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using a longitudinal design. Thus, the findings support the 
conclusion that trustworthiness is mainly driven by uncondi-
tional kindness. Moreover, Study 2 provides clarification 
concerning the mixed evidence linking FFM-AG to trust-
worthiness: Aspects mirroring unconditional kindness are 
only a relatively minor component of the broad FFM-AG 
factor, but are well captured by HEX-HH.
Still, a limitation of Studies 1 and 2 refers to our exclusive 
reliance on the strategy method to assess trustworthiness. 
Although the strategy method has the inherent advantage of 
providing as much data as possible for each individual (cf. 
Brandts & Charness, 2011), responses are partially hypothet-
ical in nature and do not necessarily mirror actual reactions 
toward another’s trust. Consequently, the influence of reci-
procity might be suppressed to some extent. To hence rule 
out that the strategy method undermined the positive/nega-
tive reciprocity mechanisms, participants in Study 3 indi-
cated their return for one specific trust level only. Moreover, 
so as to provide more direct evidence on the proposed mech-
anisms underlying trustworthiness, we tested whether par-
ticipants’ expectations and evaluations regarding another’s 
trust account for trustworthiness and further explicitly 
assessed participants justifications for their return decision.
Study 3
Method
Materials. Similar to Study 2, we assessed individuals’ trait 
levels on the six HEXACO dimensions (using the German 
version of the HEXACO-60) and the FFM traits (using the 
60-item NEO-FFI). Responses were given on 5-point Likert-
type scales, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly 
agree.
Trustworthiness was again assessed via the classical trust 
game with participants acting as the trustees. However, 
unlike Studies 1 and 2, we now relied on the direct-response 
method. That is, participants only indicated their return for 
one specific trust level a trustor could transfer from her 6.00€ 
(approximately US$6.80) endowment. To ensure that all 
potential trust levels were almost equally covered in our 
data, we implemented a hypothetical design without “real” 
trustors and money involved. However, note that evidence 
supports the equivalence of trustee behavior across hypo-
thetical and real scenarios (Holm & Nystedt, 2008). As an 
advantage, this procedure allowed us to systematically 
manipulate the trust level between participants (from 1.00€ 
to 6.00€, in 1.00€ increments). Correspondingly, participants 
were asked to imagine having received a specific transfer 
(tripled trust level) by an unknown other and to indicate how 
much they want to return.
Besides trustworthiness, we created two ad hoc scales to 
measure participants’ evaluation of the specific trust level as 
well as their justification for their return decision (see 
Supplemental Material for individual items). The “Evaluation 
scale” consisted of 10 items (adjectives) in total, comprising 
4 positive attributes (e.g., kind), 4 negative attributes (e.g., 
uncooperative), and 2 rationality-related attributes (e.g., 
understandable). The “Justification scale” comprised 6 items 
in total, with 2 items referring to each proposed mechanism 
(i.e., unconditional kindness, positive reciprocity, negative 
reciprocity). In both questionnaires, responses were given on 
5-point Likert-type scales, ranging from strongly disagree to 
strongly agree. Analyses were based on the means of the 
three subscales for each questionnaire.
Procedure. Similar to Study 2, we again implemented a lon-
gitudinal design in Study 3, separating the personality assess-
ment from the trust game. Specifically, another random 
subsample of participants taking part in the “pre-study” 
(Time 1) for Study 2 (in which participants completed the 
HEXACO-60 and the NEO-FFI) was re-invited to an online 
follow-up study (about 11 months later) by the same panel 
provider (excluding participants from Study 2). After provid-
ing informed consent for this follow-up study and demo-
graphic information, participants received detailed 
information on the rules of the trust game (as trustee). Next, 
they indicated the level of trust they would expect from an 
unknown other (between 1.00€ and 6.00€). Thereafter, par-
ticipants received information on the actual (hypothetical) 
trust level, evaluated this trust level (using the 10-adjective 
Evaluation scale), and indicated how much of the tripled 
amount they wanted to return. Finally, participants provided 
reasons for their return decision (using the 6-item Justifica-
tion scale). A flat fee for participation was paid out anony-
mously by the panel provider.
Participants. To further strengthen our conclusions, we 
recruited a slightly larger sample compared with Studies 1 
and 2. Thus, the subsample recruited for the second measure-
ment occasion of Study 3 comprised N = 177 participants (81 
female). Overall, the composition of the sample was compa-
rable to Study 2, covering a broad diversity in age (19 to 66 
years, M = 41.5, SD = 12.7) and educational level. Only 
7.9% of participants were students; 65.0% were in employ-
ment. Participants were almost equally distributed across 
trust levels (ranging between n = 27 and n = 31)
Results and Discussion
Unconditional kindness versus (positive/negative) reciproc-
ity. Table 3 reports the means, standard deviations, and corre-
lations between all focal variables (for information on all 
variables, see Table S3 in the Supplemental Material). As 
before, HEX-HH showed a positive (albeit weaker) relation to 
trustworthiness (r = .17, p = .025), which now referred to trust-
ees’ return (percentage of tripled transfer) in response to one 
specific trust level. For HEX-AG, a corresponding link was 
again absent (r = .04, p = .611). The zero-order correlations 
hence largely corroborated the results of Studies 1 and 2.
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To test this pattern of results statistically, we used the 
same three-step analytical approach as described above (now 
based on the return for a specific trust level). First, the 
approximation of the BIC and corresponding BF
01
 based on 
R2 (Raftery, 1995; Wagenmakers, 2007) revealed BF
01
 = 1.03 
for the link between HEX-HH and trustworthiness, and 
thus—unlike Studies 1 and 2—only inconclusive evidence 
(neither for nor against the alternative hypothesis). For 
HEX-AG, by contrast, BF
01
 = 11.67 indicated strong evi-
dence in favor of the null, being almost 12 times as likely as 
the alternative hypothesis given the data. Second, comparing 
the zero-order correlations (Meng et al., 1992) between trust-
worthiness and HEX-HH (r = .17) and HEX-AG (r = .04), 
respectively, failed to reveal a significant difference, z = 
1.48, p = .139. Nevertheless, in a multiple regression includ-
ing both HEX-HH and HEX-AG as predictors of trustwor-
thiness, HEX-HH predicted unique variance, β = .17, p = 
.029, 95% CI = [.02, .33], whereas HEX-AG did not, β = 
−.02, p = .832, 95% CI = [−.17, .14]. In sum, these results 
replicated the findings of Studies 1 and 2 only partially. 
Nonetheless, they still align with the unconditional kindness 
mechanism and are also compatible with the positive reci-
procity mechanism.
To further test whether unconditional kindness or positive 
reciprocity accounts for the (albeit weak) link between 
HEX-HH and trustworthiness, we regressed trustworthiness 
(one return per participant) on HEX-HH, trust (between- 
participants), and their interaction in a multiple regression 
analysis. In line with unconditional kindness, we found a 
(one-tailed significant) main effect of HEX-HH, β = .15, p = 
.053, 95% CI = [.00, .30], but no interaction between 
HEX-HH and prior trust, β = .00, p = .916, 95% CI = [−.16, 
.14]. Correspondingly, comparing the main-effects-regression 
model with the interaction model revealed BF
01
 = 13.23 
(based on ∆BIC
10
 = 5.16), thus rendering the former 13 times 
as likely as the latter. Altogether, evidence once more corre-
sponded better to the unconditional kindness mechanism 
than to the positive reciprocity mechanism.
Regarding the negative reciprocity mechanism, we reran 
the multiple regression analysis from above, now including 
HEX-AG as trait-based predictor. However, corroborating 
the results obtained with the strategy method (Studies 1 and 
2), the interaction between HEX-AG and trust once more 
failed to explain significant variance in trustworthiness, β = 
.02, p = .689, 95% CI = [−.12, .18] (as did the main effect 
of HEX-AG, β = .03, p = .672, 95% CI = [−.12, .18]). In 
turn, comparing the main-effects model with the interaction 
model yielded BF
01
 = 12.25 (∆BIC
10
 = 5.01), thus implying 
a 12 times higher probability for the main-effects model 
given the data. Summing up, the trait-based evidence hence 
rendered the unconditional kindness mechanism most 
likely, thus essentially corroborating the conclusions from 
Studies 1 and 2.
Finally, analyses of the additional variables (i.e., expected 
trust, evaluations of trust, and justifications of return) pro-
vided further evidence for the unconditional kindness mech-
anism. First, expectations toward another’s trust should 
reasonably influence one’s interpretation of another’s coop-
erativeness (cf. Gallucci & Perugini, 2000; see also Note 
1)—as also observable in our data (Table S3 in the 
Supplemental Material)—and, according to a reciprocity 
account, affect the willingness to behave trustworthily. 
However, the relation between trustworthiness and expected 
trust level was only small (Cohen, 1988) and failed to reach 
statistical significance (r = .14, p = .058; Table 3). The cor-
responding BF
01
 = 2.13 implied the null hypothesis to be 
twice as likely as the alternative hypothesis given the data. 
Even smaller effect sizes emerged for individuals’ evalua-
tions of the specific trust level. That is, trustee returns were 
not contingent on whether participants evaluated the trust 
Table 3. Means, Standard Deviations (in Parentheses), and Bivariate Correlations (95% Confidence Intervals in Brackets) of All Focal 
Variables Assessed in Study 3, With Internal Consistency Reliabilities (Cronbach’s α) in the Diagonal.
Measure Scale M (SD)
Correlations
HEX-HH HEX-AG FFM-AG Return (in %)
HEX-HH 1-5 3.54 (0.74) .84  
HEX-AG 1-5 3.13 (0.46) .32*** [.18, .44] .66  
FFM-AG 1-5 3.64 (0.45) .56*** [.45, .66] .53*** [.41, .63] .73  
Return (in %) 0-100 50.5 (24.7) .17* [.02, .31] .04 [−.11, .18] .05 [−.10, .20] —
Expected trust 0-6 2.83 (1.60) .10 [−.05, .24] .03 [−.12, .18] −.04 [−.18, .11] .14 [.00, .28]
Trust evaluation: Positive 1-5 3.55 (0.91) .08 [−.07, .22] .19* [.04, .33] .15* [.00, .29] .04 [−.10, .19]
Trust evaluation: Negative 1-5 2.04 (0.96) −.14 [−.29, .00] −.18* [−.31, −.03] −.22** [−.36, −.08] −.09 [−.24, .05]
Trust evaluation: Rational 1-5 3.27 (0.88) −.07 [−.22, .08] .09 [−.05, .24] .08 [−.06, .23] −.12 [−.26, .03]
Justification: Unconditional kindness 1-5 3.53 (0.84) .28*** [.13, .41] .21** [.07, .35] .17* [.03, .31] .33*** [.19, .45]
Justification: Positive reciprocity 1-5 3.71 (0.89) .08 [−.07, .22] .14 [−.01, .28] .18* [.03, .32] .19* [.04, .33]
Justification: Negative reciprocity 1-5 1.75 (0.97) −.18* [−.31, −.03] −.13 [−.27, .02] −.21** [−.35, −.06] −.19* [−.33, −.04]
Note. HEX-HH = Honesty-Humility; HEX-AG = HEXACO-Agreeableness; FFM-AG = FFM-Agreeableness.
*p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.
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level positively (r = .04, p = .561, BF
01
 = 11.21), negatively 
(r = −.09, p = .215, BF
01
 = 11.21), or as being rational (r = 
−.12, p = .116, BF
01
 = 3.81). Moreover, participants’ justifi-
cation of their return decision showed the strongest correla-
tion between trustworthiness and an unconditional kindness 
justification (r = .32, p < .001, BF
01
 = 0.0006), compared 
with the positive and negative reciprocity justification (r = 
±.19, p = .012, BF
01
 = 0.54). Correspondingly, the uncondi-
tional kindness justification was the sole significant predic-
tor in a multiple regression including all three justification 
scales, β = .30, p < .001, 95% CI = [.15, .45]. Also, as depicted 
in Figure 3, the unconditional kindness justification medi-
ated the link between HEX-HH and trustworthiness, a × b = 
0.084, p = .008, 95% CI = [0.022, 0.147], whereas both the 
positive (a × b = 0.014, p = .548, 95% CI = [−0.031, 0.058]) 
and negative (a × b = 0.029, p = .156, 95% CI = [−0.011, 
0.070]) reciprocity justifications did not.8 Overall, analyses 
of our complementary variables fit in well with the trait-
based evidence from above, further supporting that trustwor-
thiness is an expression of unconditional kindness.
FFM-AG and trustworthiness. Unlike Study 2—but converging 
with the mixed extant evidence—the relation between FFM-
AG and trustee returns did not reach statistical significance in 
Study 3 (r = .05, p = .505). Correspondingly, in a multiple 
regression analysis concurrently considering HEX-HH and 
FFM-AG as predictors of trustworthiness, only HEX-HH 
predicted unique variance, β = .21, p = .024, 95% CI = [.03, 
.38], whereas FFM-AG did not, β = −.07, p = .467, 95% CI = 
[−.24, .11]. As such, results once more suggest that FFM-AG 
is somewhat too broad to account for sufficient variance in 
trustworthiness as a specific type of prosocial behavior.
General Discussion
The vital importance of trustworthiness for well-functioning 
social interactions is necessarily implied by the corresponding 
significance of trust. Surprisingly, however, the determinants 
of trustworthiness—especially in terms of (basic) personality 
traits—are insufficiently understood. Most prominently, two 
mechanisms to explain trustworthy behavior have been pro-
posed: reciprocity (including positive and negative reciproc-
ity) and unconditional kindness. However, purely 
game-theoretical evidence is mixed, and the empirical picture 
has remained inconclusive. The same holds for the few studies 
referring to basic personality traits (as conceptualized within 
the FFM). Most consistently, they suggest a positive, but weak 
and unreliable relation between trustworthiness and 
Agreeableness (FFM-AG). In any case, this link is insufficient 
to clarify the determinants underlying trustworthiness, given 
the broad nature of FFM-AG covering different aspects of 
cooperative tendencies (including positive/negative reciproc-
ity and unconditional kindness).
To provide an enhanced understanding of the disposi-
tional determinants of trustworthiness, we investigated the 
relation between trustworthiness and the HEXACO person-
ality factors. In particular, HEX-HH and HEX-AG have con-
sistently been linked to distinct aspects of cooperative 
tendencies, namely active cooperativeness (including uncon-
ditional kindness and positive reciprocity) versus reactive 
cooperativeness (including negative reciprocity). In turn, 
specific predictions on the to-be-expected relations between 
these two trait dimensions and trustworthy behavior can be 
derived for the proposed mechanisms to trustworthiness—
thus disentangling unconditional kindness, positive reciproc-
ity, and negative reciprocity through distinct hypotheses.
In three online studies, we assessed participants’ trustwor-
thiness (trustee behavior) in incentivized and hypothetical 
versions of the classical trust game, using either the strategy 
method (i.e., asking participants to indicate their trustworthi-
ness for all potential trust levels; Studies 1 and 2) or the 
direct-response method (i.e., asking participants to respond to 
one specific trust level; Study 3). As implied by a mechanism 
of unconditional kindness, all studies revealed a positive link 
Positive
Reciprocity
Unconditional
Kindness
-.18*
.33***
.19*
.17* 
(.09)
(.16*)
.28***
Negative
Reciprocity
Honesty-Humility Trustworthiness
(.14  )†
.08
-.19*
Figure 3. Mediation model of Honesty-Humility to trustworthiness with corresponding correlation and partial correlation coefficients 
(the latter controlling for the respective justification as mediator).
Note. Solid connections depict significant indirect effects; dashed relations depict a lack of significant indirect effects.
†p ≤ .10. *p ≤ .05. ***p ≤ .001.
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between trustworthiness and HEX-HH, irrespective of the 
level of trust. Across studies, this resulted in a medium-sized 
average effect of r = .28 (sample-size weighted average cor-
relation; Field, 2001). That is, HEX-HH showed a main effect 
on trustworthiness, but no interaction with prior trust—thus 
contradicting the positive reciprocity mechanism which 
inherently predicts such an interaction. HEX-AG, in turn, 
showed no relation to trustworthiness whatsoever (meta-ana-
lytic r = .07) and no interaction with prior trust, thus further 
contradicting that trustworthiness is determined by negative 
reciprocity. This interpretation was further supported by the 
finding that participants’ expectations regarding another’s 
trust as well as their evaluations of trust did not account for 
trustworthiness. In turn, participants’ justification for their 
return decision corroborated the idea that trustworthiness is 
an expression of unconditional kindness. Altogether, our 
results are hence in line with the unconditional kindness 
mechanism, but cannot be reconciled with the positive or 
negative reciprocity mechanisms. Nevertheless, it might be 
worthwhile for future research to uncover potential situation-
specific moderators that might render trustworthiness a con-
ditional (reciprocal) behavior.
Overall, our findings support previous research implying 
that unconditional kindness is a prime determinant of trust-
worthiness—primarily based on a positive relation between 
trustworthiness and dictator game altruism (Ashraf et al., 
2006; Cox, 2004; Gambetta & Przepiorka, 2014) and charita-
ble giving (Fehrler & Przepiorka, 2013). Specifically, our 
studies extend the extant literature by using a trait-based 
approach, thus overcoming some of the inherent limitations 
associated with purely game-based approaches (e.g., com-
mon-method variance, desire for consistent responding). 
Moreover, the results—especially those clashing with the neg-
ative reciprocity mechanism—further support that trust does 
not correspond to a social norm which other people expect to 
be upheld (Bicchieri, Xiao, & Muldoon, 2011; Dunning, 
Anderson, Schlösser, Ehlebracht, & Fetchenhauer, 2014).
In addition, the results of Studies 2 and 3 replicated previ-
ous research in that they only revealed a weak link between 
FFM-AG and trustworthiness (meta-analytic r = .10). 
However, our results offer a reasonable explanation for this 
pattern: Unlike in HEX-HH, trait aspects predicting uncondi-
tional kindness are only marginally represented in FFM-AG. 
Correspondingly, HEX-HH mediated the link between 
FFM-AG and trustworthiness, but not vice versa. Similarly, 
HEX-HH predicted unique variance in trustworthiness 
beyond FFM-AG. Overall, the weak link between FFM-AG 
and trustworthiness thus seems to result from the misfit 
between the rather specific nature of trustworthiness (mainly 
incorporating unconditional kindness) and the broad nature 
of FFM-AG.
Regarding the HEXACO model in particular, the findings 
provide first evidence on the relation between the HEXACO 
dimensions and (incentivized) trust game behavior—thereby 
filling a gap identified in a recent meta-analytic review (Zhao 
& Smillie, 2015). In other words, they extend previous 
research linking HEX-HH and non-exploitation in the dicta-
tor game (e.g., Baumert et al., 2013; Hilbig et al., 2015) to 
situations in which the to-be-divided endowment is provided 
by another person rather than the investigator. Thereby, the 
results essentially corroborate the notion that HEX-HH 
should, by definition, drive trustworthiness (Thielmann & 
Hilbig, 2014).
Nonetheless, some limitations of the present studies should 
be acknowledged. First, the degree of interpersonal contact is 
obviously minimized in web-based studies. Thus, our web-
based procedure might have diminished the feeling that one’s 
own behavior is consequential for another’s outcome. 
Although evidence suggests a high comparability of trust 
game behavior across web-based and lab-based studies (Holm 
& Nystedt, 2008), future studies might consider replicating 
our findings in lab-based settings. Second, due to our focus on 
basic and broad personality traits, we did not incorporate 
more specific trait scales of unconditional kindness and posi-
tive/negative reciprocity. This might be a worthwhile exten-
sion for future research. Finally, the trust game obviously 
represents only one specific situation eliciting trust and trust-
worthiness. Future studies might hence critically test the gen-
eralizability of our findings to other trust contexts.
In conclusion, the present studies provide trait-based evi-
dence that trustworthiness is mainly an expression of uncon-
ditional kindness rather than positive or negative reciprocity. 
Thus, the findings contribute to the understanding of trust-
worthy behavior in terms of underlying personality traits and 
provide a valuable starting point for future research. Also, 
they point to the specific usefulness of HEX-HH and the 
higher resolution afforded by the HEXACO model to explain 
individual variation in trustworthiness and prosocial behav-
ior more generally.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect 
to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support 
for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The 
work reported herein was supported by grants to the second author 
from the Baden-Württemberg Foundation (Germany) and the 
German Research Foundation (HI 1600/1-1).
Notes
1. Indeed, from a game-theoretical perspective—assuming that 
individuals are rational utility-maximizers and thus untrust-
worthy—any trust transfer above zero should basically be 
perceived as cooperative. In turn, a trustworthy reaction nec-
essarily implies positive reciprocity, whereas an untrustworthy 
reaction would simply mirror rationality (rather than implying 
negative reciprocity). However, whether a transfer is actually 
perceived as cooperative or uncooperative will lie in the eye of 
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the beholder and, for example, depend on the level of trust a 
trustee expects an interaction partner to place in her (Gallucci & 
Perugini, 2000). Correspondingly, Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 
(1995) themselves noted that trustees returning nothing “may 
not have interpreted the [trustor’s] decisions as placing a trust” 
(p. 137, emphasis added).
2. Note that giving in the dictator game—as well as other forms of 
charitable giving—can also be considered in terms of fairness 
(cf. Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994) and might thus 
not provide an optimal measure of pure unconditional kindness.
3. On closer inspection, two HEXACO-Agreeableness items (items 3 
and 27 of the herein used HEXACO-60; Ashton & Lee, 2009) are 
already conditional in nature. According to the negative reciprocity 
mechanism, these items should thus show an unconditional relation 
to trustworthiness (i.e., a simple main effect). Correspondingly, we 
have repeated all analyses for the two-item parcel—which basi-
cally yielded similar conclusions as will be reported below.
4. More precisely, participants were randomly assigned to the 
role of the trustor or the trustee. However, in what follows, 
we will exclusively refer to participants acting as the trustee. 
Specifically, trustors’ responses mainly served the purpose of 
making the game “real” (without requiring deception).
5. The model specified the repeated trustworthiness measurements 
(Level 1) nested within participants (Level 2) and was estimated 
using the lm function of the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, 
Bolker, & Walker, 2014) in R. All variables were centered on the 
global mean. Model statistics are based on maximum-likelihood 
estimates. However, all models reported here and in the follow-
ing were also fitted based on restricted maximum-likelihood 
(REML), which did not result in any noteworthy differences.
6. The trustors, to whom participants were randomly matched, 
were assessed in a separate study. In what follows, we will only 
refer to the trustees.
7. To check whether our data (based on a moderate sample size) 
might have over- or underestimated the differential predictive 
power of Five-Factor Model-Agreeableness (FFM-AG) and 
Honesty-Humility (HEX-HH) on trustworthiness, we com-
pared the correlation between FFM-AG and HEX-HH (r = .49) 
with a larger (and representative) German sample (N = 2,027). 
However, supporting the validity of the current findings, the cor-
responding effect size in the large sample (r = .39) still fell in the 
95% CI = [.34, .62] for the observed correlation.
8. Results remain similar when including the trust level as between-
participants covariate in the mediation models (for details on the 
mediation approach, see Study 2). We refrained from calculating 
the same analyses for HEX-AG due to the observed null relation 
between HEX-AG and trustworthiness.
Supplemental Material 
The online supplemental material is available at http://pspb. 
sagepub.com/supplemental.
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